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CONTENTS

Early, Orthodox—Old Catholic Relations. By J. H. Morgan 1

Vedanta for the West. By Melville Chaning-Pearce . . 11

The Unity of the Church. By E. L. Mascall 25

Christian Initiation. By F. C. Tindall 53

Historical Background of a Christian Education. By W. N. Chaplin 77

Reviews 112

Periodicals 134

Books Received 139

Two Reactions to Gnosticism. By H. A. Blair . 141

The Christian and the Interpretation of History. By B. M. G. Reardon 159

The Catholicity of the Psalter. By G. Lacey May . . 180

Archetypes, Idols and the Living God. By A. Graham Ikin 191

The Supremacy of a Christian Philosophy. By Norman Adcock 201

The Evangelical Tradition. By L. E. Elliott-Binns . . 235

Reviews 241

Periodicals 257

Books Received 263

Index 267

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EARLY, ORTHODOX—OLD CATHOLIC RELATIONS

General Kireeff and Professor Michaud

By J. H. MORGAN

WITHIN the last few years, there has been an increasing interest, on the part of Anglicans especially, in the history and relations of the Old Catholic Churches of the Continent. This interest reached a climax in the publication in 1948 of C. B. Moss's informed and scholarly book, *The Old Catholic Movement, Its Origin and History*. The growing realization of the smallness of the world together with the pressures being brought to bear on every hand for Christian reunion are the probable reasons for this happy phenomenon. In any event, the interest is valuable and must be fostered if there is to be an enlightened and informed approach to reunion of one communion with another. We must be constantly learning from them, from their history and conflicts so as to be able to judge fairly their contributions, actual and potential, to the over-all picture of reunion.

Quelques lettres du général Kiréeff au professeur Michaud sur l'ancien-catholicisme is a book which traces in a series of letters, extending over nearly twenty years (1873-1891), the attempts of two communions to come to a satisfactory plan for union. That the effort failed is not at all a token of defeat. It is rather a realistic acceptance of the important fact that unless the basic issues of theology and rites are firmly settled, unity of ecclesiastical government alone will not be sufficient to support the new weight put upon it. And thus, in that sense, the letters do not give a picture of failure, but of success in that they point out the pitfalls of which more modern searchers after reunion must constantly be aware.

General Kireeff's letters, as far as is known, exist only in a French edition of about 1893. The present article is based on an English translation which the writer has prepared and hopes to publish in the near future. The French edition is not well known and has been out of print for some years. The copy used for translation is owned by the Cathedral of Saint John the Divine, New York City. The Canon Sacrist, the Rev. Edward N. West, D.D., was the first to recognize the importance of the book and urge that it be translated. General Kireeff's French leaves no doubt that he is writing in (to him) a foreign language. However, Michaud knew no Russian (a fact which Kireeff frequently deplores). The search for any letters which Michaud may have written to Kireeff so far has proved unsuccessful. It may be hoped that they still exist, and may some day be translated and published.

Who were these men and how did their lives become so closely linked? Eugène-Philibert Michaud (1839-1918), the son of middle-class parents, was born at Pouilly-sur-Sâone. His family since childhood had determined that he should enter the Church. He studied for this both in France and Germany, and in 1867 his career was crowned by the doctorate in theology from Munich. Even before his ordination, Michaud had been thinking along the liberal lines of Lacordaire, Bishop Felix Dupanloup of Orleans and the brilliant but erratic Hyacinthe Loyson. His hero was Darboy, the Archbishop of Paris, through whose influence Michaud was appointed assistant of the Church of the Madeleine. Living in Paris during the fall of the Empire and the rise of the Commune, the Abbé Michaud witnessed the murder of the archbishop, one of the last of the great Gallican Churchmen. Guibert, the new archbishop, was a strong pro-papal man. It was not long before all those who did not adhere to the new dogmas of the Vatican Council were deprived. Unable to exercise his ministry, Michaud turned to writing to support himself. In the meantime he was looking about for some vehicle whereby those who had broken with Rome over Papal Infallibility might unite in a catholic body.

At about the same time in Germany, a group of theological

professors, lesser clergy and laymen were standing up to the threat to their catholic faith while the bishops who refused to vote for the decrees of the Vatican Council were making their peace with Pius IX. Joseph Reinkens, Professor of Church History in the University of Breslau, and later first Old Catholic Bishop for Germany, Johann von Schulte, Professor of Canon Law at Prague, and, above all, the famous historian, Ignaz von Döllinger of Munich, were ready to suffer at the hands of fanatical Roman Catholics for their loyalty to the ancient creeds. They, too, knew full well that they could not live the Catholic life in a vacuum and, in order to regularize their position, they came together with others from Austria, France, Switzerland, Spain and elsewhere in the first Old Catholic Congress in Munich in September, 1871. This was no radical congress and its 300 Old Catholic sympathizers had no thought of schism. They came together to try to provide for the spiritual needs of those who had been excommunicated for refusing to submit to the council. It was a traditional congress, drawing up a tentative doctrinal basis and programme for reorganization. Yet this congress proved to be the parting of the ways with Rome. From this time forward, the Old Catholic Movement was not a party within the Roman Communion. It had set up its own organization. It was thus on the way to becoming a separate communion.

At the first congress, members of the American Episcopal Church and of the Greek Orthodox Church had been present. The Bishop of Ely (Harold Browne) and the Bishop of Lincoln (Christopher Wordsworth) sent messages of brotherly interest. At the second congress, meeting in Cologne in September, 1872, many more visitors from other communions were present. Bishop Wordsworth attended accompanied by the Bishops of Ely and Maryland and twenty-two Anglican priests, among them Dean Stanley and the Rev. F. S. May. The Archbishop of Utrecht with four of his priests were there. There were also present the Archpriest Janyschev, Rector of the Theological Academy at St. Petersburg, and General Kireeff. It was there that the friendship of Kireeff and Michaud began.

Michaud's polemical and historical works, in due course,

brought him fame. He was appointed to the Old Catholic Theological Faculty of the University of Bern, and in 1878 he received the additional appointment to the chair of French Literature. Here he remained until his death, working and advising in Old Catholic circles and often publishing a book a year. In 1892 he played a leading part in the founding of the *Revue internationale de Théologie* which, since 1911, has been published in German as the *Internationale kirchliche Zeitschrift* and, as the standard organ of Old Catholicism on the scholarly level, has attained a world-wide reputation.

Alexander Kireeff (1833-1910) was of the petty Russian nobility. The family was originally settled in Poland, but, about the time of Alexander's birth, a move was made to estates nearer Moscow. The boy grew up in a deeply religious home, went through the military school of the capitol, and was appointed to the staff of the Grand Duke Constantine Nicholaeovitch, the brother of Alexander II. Kireeff used his high place to advantage for the Orthodox Church. The Grand Duke shared his interest, and together they represented the unofficial concern over the trend of events following the Vatican Council. Several of Kireeff's letters betray a close similarity to the views of Constantine Pobyedonostsef, the Procurator of the Holy Synod, for many years an unofficial power in Russian politics.

Two other children of the Kireeff family made an impression on the world of their day. The daughter of the family, Olga, became one of the earliest female propagandists. As Mme. Novikoff, she was credited with considerable influence on Disraeli during the Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin. She was the editor of the French edition of her brother's letters and was a considerable author in her own right. Nicholas Kireeff gave his life in the Pan-Slav cause.

Any series of letters is, of course, an intensely personal document. General Kireeff is no exception. He does not hide his personal feelings on any of the subjects which he has under consideration. Writing with considerable feeling for the grasp of the facts, he is usually a realist, searching for the best possible solution. While most of the letters are concerned with the situa-

tion existing in the Old Catholic Movement, Kireeff has a great deal to say on other matters. His views, which to-day would be called reactionary, find their expression in comment on Russian and international politics, education, economics and social problems. The letters are, by no means, on serious subjects only. Kireeff knows how to enjoy the lighter moments of life and there are accounts of happy hours with friends, of trips and outings and of anniversaries. There are bits of Court scandal and an almost forgotten way of life receives delicate treatment.

The pressures which Russia was undergoing during the latter half of the nineteenth century naturally bulk large in the letters. The Tsar, Alexander II, was trying hard to bring his country closer to the accepted European standards of his day. He freed the serfs in 1861 and set about to reform the judicial system and the universities. He had met with some success, when the Polish Revolt started a series of events which made a liberal Tsar more and more of a reactionary, until, when in March, 1881, an anarchist's bomb found its mark, he had almost run the entire gamut of political theory. While the liberal days lasted, many Russians — and foreigners too — persuaded themselves that a better day was dawning for Russia. Yet the aristocracy thought that the Tsar was moving too fast, and the intellectual revolutionaries knew that he was moving too slowly. The constant pressure of the Pan-Slav Movement was gaining force until, after the Russo-Turkish War and the Congress of Berlin, Alexander felt that his first steps toward entrance into the family of European nations having been rebuffed, he must turn to domestic problems as having a priority for solution.

In the early letters of the series (*c.* 1873-1876), the General shows a romantic strain. These letters are filled with expectations of the early establishment of the French monarchy under "Henry V". He is sadly disillusioned when the Third Republic is proclaimed. Kireeff distrusts Gambetta and the leaders of that day, not only for their anti-clericalism, but perhaps more so for their democracy. The "Mother of Parliaments" is not treated kindly either. There are many letters where the romantic blends with the cynical, and elaborate proofs are given that any elector-

ate backs the candidate who fulfils its desires, and usually the electorate itself is manipulated by the international financiers. For Kireeff, with Alexander Hamilton, regards the mob as "a great beast".

This conception of politics carries over into the current Russian judicial reforms. "How can there be justice", Kireeff asks Michaud, "when most of the judges are ignorant men?" In this, the General is treading on firm ground. He hastens, however, to cut it out from under himself because he does not believe in universal education. Several letters ask for copies of the curricula of French and Swiss schools for comparison with their Russian counterparts. He wants much study in the classics, and little science. He wants the schools returned to clerical control. Laymen do not know what to teach, and besides, they are mostly revolutionaries. Kireeff feels that the way to meet the rising Nihilist Movement is to offer less science in the schools.

All these aspects of Russian life take second place in the General's mind to the Pan-Slav Movement. This movement which was destined to have a profound effect on Russian history was a super-patriotic form of pressure which used nationalism along with a sort of romantic mysticism for Mother Russia and for the Russian Church and culture to influence successive tsars and governments to play a more active part in world affairs, especially in the Balkans. Fellow Slavs there had been under the Turkish yoke for years. The movement hoped to free them from this foreign tyranny and give them the benefits of the rule, or the influence, of Russia.

Kireeff's letters on Pan-Slavism breathe the very spirit of the movement since, indeed, he and his family were among the leaders in it. His brother, Nicholas Kireeff, was killed leading a group of volunteers against the Turks in Serbia before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War. Clad in white from head to foot, Nicholas doubtless made an excellent target! A few years after peace had been restored, Kireeff visits the scene and views the heaps of bones which the peasants had piled neatly together. He listens to the tales of Turkish atrocities and goes to the Monastery of the Trinity where some of the dead are buried,

among whom it is hoped lies Nicholas Kireeff. It is a cause of great embarrassment to the General that he does not see action. However, he does act as president of a draft board in St Petersburg. He also directs the recruiting of nurses among whom is his brother's beautiful widow! Kireeff is impatient for war. He fairly champs at the bit until the order is given to march. Russia, as the inheritor of the Byzantine civilization and the seat of the Third Rome, has a duty to attack Turkey! This is no question of politics; but of religion! Russia must have a warm water port on the Black Sea—and the Cross must be restored to Santa Sophia!

The General does not think much of the Austrian forces which may try to stop Russian progress. The British have only a navy. That will do them little good when the contest is to be fought on land. Kireeff is very angry when French and British pressure prevent the Russians from entering Constantinople. Significantly enough, the Tsar is not blamed for the misfortunes of the campaign. It is his advisors who are to blame, and the Jews. He sees the Jews as the cause for the decadence of Austria where mixed marriages are allowed even in a Roman Catholic country. With the Jews, the international financiers share his hatred. The letters which contain this material are filled with an almost feudal conception of money and politics. Interesting it is to note that there is no censure for Lord Beaconsfield either as a Jew or as an Englishman, for he is favourable to the Russians. It is Lord Salisbury of whom Kireeff disapproves.

The General does have his lighter moments, to be sure. He tells, rather too casually, about an early affair which never came off, leaving him sour on women. There are letters which give glimpses of financial troubles caused in part by the French defaulting on bonds issued to help finance the Franco-Prussian War. Kireeff is enough of a gentleman not to hold this against the exiled Empress Eugènie when he has tea with her at Chislehurst and discovers that he is drinking out of a cracked cup! He tries to recoup these losses by buying and developing large tracts of timber near Moscow. We are left in doubt how successful he was in this venture. These letters betray his shocked realization

that a business man is able to cheat a nobleman—and with impunity!

The greater part of the letters is taken up with religious discussion begun at one of the early Old Catholic congresses. Kireeff is trying to make the Orthodox Church attractive to the Old Catholic Movement. When he writes that the movement is suspected of being an arm of German imperialism and is too closely identified with German interests, he is pushing off on to Michaud the very charges which may be levelled at him. For it is ultimately on this rock that the idea of an autocephalous orthodox western church is wrecked. There is not enough cohesion even with similarity of creeds (for the German Old Catholic Creed dispensed with the *filioque* clause) to bind together permanently the two communions. Indeed, Kireeff senses this, and many letters have references to the Church of England in which the Old Catholics of Switzerland especially were becoming interested after the visit of Bishop Herzog to America in 1880 and to England the next year. The Swiss and German Old Catholic Churches, as early as 1879 and 1883 respectively, had already formally granted permission to members of the Anglican Communion to communicate at their altars. The principal objection of Kireeff is that there is no united Anglican opinion on the important issues of Orders and the Eucharist. What escaped his notice was the comprehensive character of the Church of England. The "High Church" group met his specifications, but the "Low Church" and the "Broad Church" parties gave him the impression that the Old Catholic Movement would soon be one more Protestant group. Kireeff did not have the satisfaction of knowing very well the old-fashioned "High" Churchmen, such as Christopher Wordsworth, among the Anglicans. He knew better such men as Dean Stanley of Westminster and the Rev. Frederick Meyrick.

Kireeff, politely, takes exception to Michaud's marriage and to the other canonical changes which the movement is adopting in Switzerland. There is a touch, too, of impatience with the leaders that they do not more quickly agree with the Russian proposals. Many letters are taken up with comments upon

Michaud's various and important books against the Roman Catholics. Kireeff gives what help and encouragement he can to his friend in his determined fight against the Ultramontane forces. In many of these matters, Kireeff is speaking with personal knowledge. There was a considerable movement afoot in the Court to go to Rome and several noblewomen took that road. Kireeff tries to dissuade them and becomes embroiled with one of the Roman priests in St. Petersburg. There is a flurry of letters to Cardinal Manning for explanations, and to Michaud for answers to hard questions. At the end Kireeff remarks that one of the ladies who did become a convert was not even denied access to court! She was told, however, not to try to convert anyone else!

General Kireeff remained a firm friend of the Old Catholics even after he saw his immediate plans fail. It was he who brought the Mariavite Church of Poland to the attention of the Old Catholics. He attended the later congresses and conferences and read a paper at the congress at Lucerne in 1892.

Kireeff's influence on the Old Catholic Movement was probably small. His greatest contribution was to keep the attention of a small movement fixed on the larger issues of reunion in general. And this is in itself no mean monument to his memory.

It might be fairly asked why the plans which General Kireeff and Professor Michaud wrote of never came to any definite conclusion. Looking back over the years, the answer is easier to come upon than it was for the two correspondents. It can be seen now that the first period of the letters (*c.* 1873-1878) was a time when the Old Catholic Movement had above all things to secure its own household and to establish its own ethos before it could set out on larger issues.

The Balkan crisis of the latter year turned Orthodox attention to other directions The second period which extends beyond the scope of the letters (*c.* 1889-1914) was occupied in discussions seeking to bring about union. No conclusion was ever reached, and World War I ended Russian participation in them. Kireeff and Michaud do not differ so much in dogma as they do in discipline and general outlook on life. These matters

are harder to regulate than questions of theology. Michaud accepts the teaching of the undivided Church; Kireeff declares that the Church has never been divided. Important, too, is the fact that the Old Catholics revolted from tradition whereas the Orthodox are constantly appealing to tradition for their basis of faith. There are differences in rites and customs and especially in piety which would not necessarily divide the two communions, but in actual practice tend to set them apart. Small, intangible issues defeated the plans for union rather than the larger issues. Yet, accepting all these facts, the letters are valuable for their eye-witness reporting of the stirring days when reunion—or union—seemed so much closer and easier. The Old Catholic Churches, with their many strands of ecclesiastical background, stand to-day in a strategic position for the future of Christian reunion in the large, a fact which their intercommunion with the Church of England proves on a small scale. And the letters recount vividly the first, feeble, sometimes ill-advised steps whereby that position was achieved.

VEDANTA FOR THE WEST

By MELVILLE CHANING-PEARCE

With the decline, as a majority faith, of traditional Christian orthodoxy in the Western world the vogue, in diverse forms, of "Vedanta for the West" tends increasingly to enter, if not to fill, that vacuum which, in religion as in life, nature, including human nature, abhors. This oriental trend of thought is an aspect of a general turn of the tide of world-history which, for half a millenium, has flowed so irresistibly from West to East, in the reverse direction. It has therefore a significance not limited to the levels of religion and culture. For it is upon a real meeting and *modus vivendi* between East and West that the precarious future of modern mankind manifestly depends. And it is upon this basic level that such a meeting-place can alone be built upon a rock. Here we reach bed-rock and herein lies the more than apparent importance of this movement of mind and faith.

The cult, self-styled, of "Vedanta for the West" is typical of a general Gnosticism or Wisdom-religion which, in all its forms, derives ultimately from an oriental "gnosis". This Eastern invasion of Western faith manifested itself, during the inter-war period, in eclectic minority cults such as those of Ouspensky and his "Forest Philosophers" or of Keyserling or Rudolf Steiner and their disciples. To-day, with the mounting influence of the great Indian seer and metaphysician, Sri Aurobindo, of the mystiques of the Heard-Huxley "Vedantists" and of a multiplicity of Gnostic sects, this spiritual invasion from the East tends to become, from a minority, a mass movement of mind and feeling.

All these cults are, indeed, more or less oriental in bias and origin, but it is to-day characteristic of them all that, with one

accord, they seek a meeting or synthesis of Eastern and Western thought and faith or, more narrowly, of Vendantism and Christianity in a common basic life of the Spirit. Thus Sri Aurobindo, Eastern by nature but Western by nurture, and, conversely, Mr. Aldous Huxley both seek such a synthesis, and a similar trend is observable among more liberally-minded Western Christians or near-Christians, as in the all-inclusive mysticism of books such as Mr. Warner Allen's *The Timeless Moment* and *The Happy Issue* or the anthologies of Mr. Joseph James or Mr. Victor Gollancz. In all these cases the underlying suggestion seems to be that, between Eastern and Western metaphysic, though not religion, there is, *in essence,* no real difference at all.

The need and desire for such a synthesis, such a meeting of East and West, such a common front and fellowship among all those for whom the life of the Spirit, in a world threatening it with extinction, is of crucial and paramount importance is as intense as the appeal of all such panaceas is profound. And it is with a politic recognition of the depth and extent of that desire and appeal that the Roman Catholic Church, in the narrower field of inter-Christian communication, has condemned this tendency as a new heresy under the name of " Irenism ". Thus, in this issue, the whole contemporary conflict between Authority and Freedom is also focused. With that realization, the task of criticizing such would-be syntheses becomes the more responsible.

This search for some Mizpah where the Eastern and Western mind may meet has been the specific theme of Mr. F. S. C. Northrop in his book *The Meeting of East and West* and of a series of books by Mr. Alan Watts culminating in his recent "Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion" called *The Supreme Identity.* The latter book provides a typical specimen of this trend and, as such, an excellent subject for its study.

Here is an avowed, sincere and unusually erudite attempt to demonstrate that " Oriental Metaphysic " and " Christian Religion " are not incompatible, but complementary. Mr. Watts seeks, not a merging, but a meeting of these contraries and to show that, in spite of the Western notion that " never the twain

(East and West) shall meet", at this deep level at least the adage is false. He thus narrows the field for Christian consideration and pin-points the real, fundamental and crucial issue upon which both peace between East and West and the survival of the life of the spirit seem to depend. For where philosophies meet politics are wont to follow.

Mr. Watts' main thesis is to the effect that "Oriental Metaphysic" and "Christian Religion" "should be set side by side and related by analogy instead of mixture". The former, he affirms, is "a wisdom which neither conflicts with nor supersedes religion". It is an original and attractive thesis. At first sight here seems to be the *modus vivendi* between East and West, of which so many minds are in search. But, in order properly to appreciate this thesis, this author's connotation of his three terms —"metaphysic" or "wisdom", "religion" and "analogy" must be examined.

As envisaged in this book, the "wisdom of Asia" has several aspects. It is "metaphysical knowledge" or "actual experience or immediate realization of that ultimate Reality which is the ground and cause of the universe, and thus the principle and meaning of human life" (p. 18). It is "immediate non-analogical knowledge . . . knowledge of that which is beyond the natural order" (p. 45). Mr. Watts, moreover, writes of "a passion for God, or for metaphysical knowledge" (p. 172), thus equating this "gnosis" with "God".

What is the source of and authority for this "immediate realization" or "knowledge" of Reality—this "gnosis" which, we are told, is a "gnosis beyond religion" (p. 131)? For a description of it we are referred to the paradoxical saying from the Upanishads that this "gnosis" (itself "Brahma" or "God") "is unknown to those who know It and is known to those who do not know it at all" (p. 161). It is thus said to be distinct from the Gnosticism which early Christianity condemned. In other words, it is not rational but instinctive or intuitive knowledge or "realization". It is, in fact, the self-realization of the nature of the particular and also the universal Self or *Atman* and of its

identity with *Brahma* or Reality or, in Mr. Watts' words, "the absolute self-evidence of the ultimate Reality" (p. 193).

It is emphasized that this "realization" of the real Self is self-authenticating. "External authority", we are told, "is no more than a symbol of the internal Spirit" (p. 189). That is, the authority for this dual dogma (for dogma it is) of, first, the existence of this "internal Spirit" in man and, second, of its identity with *Brahma,* God or Reality, is the "immediate realization" of this "internal Spirit" itself.

It is a basis of belief which seems, at first sight, to tally with general intuitive experience and with a similar Christian conception expressed by Pascal in his phrase, *connaissance du coeur.* It is, moreover, manifestly a basis for much mystical Christian faith such as that of Jakob Boehme. Nevertheless, as a sole basis for belief, and particularly under the lens of modern psychology, it remains profoundly suspect. For, by whatever purgation, discipline or "yoga" such as "immediate realization" is ultimately reached, it can only be by, through or beyond a superficial self or ego which, not only psychology but also both Eastern and Western wisdom deeply distrust. Moreover such an "immediate realization" of the individual "Self" cannot, *ipso facto,* in itself provide a basis for a universal faith. The authority of such realizations of the "internal Spirit", while valid for the individual, provides a very sandy foundation for a world-faith.

It is a weakness in his case of which, in fact, Mr. Watts seems well aware. For he buttresses that self-authenticating faith with frequent appeals to Scriptural authority—the "sacred writings" of the Vedas or their later exponents and commentators enunciating these and other dogmas: that "God is an essence without duality" (p. 69), of the Avatars ("the coming into the world of certain men who . . . do not confuse Self and soul") (p. 136), of the "primal 'creative division' of *Brahma* and *atma*, Father and Son" (p. 144), of "the Supreme Identity of the *atma* and *Brahma,* of the Self and the Infinite" (p. 72), that the Self is Lord of the self" (p. 125). Specific authorities are quoted.

"As Shankara says", we are told, "this *gnosis* is shown to be of the nature of the eternally free Self" (p. 169).

Thus, whether as revelation or corroboration, a scriptural authority for these dogmas is, in fact, constantly cited and acknowledged. And, as for Christian dogma, catholicity (*quod semper, quod ubique, quod omnibus*) is claimed. Thus it is stressed that such Vedantic authority is far more ancient than that of Christianity: "... the traditional and spiritually unanimous culture of Christendom endured for a remarkably short time compared with the traditional cultures of India and China" (p. 100).

In reality, therefore, this Vedantic "gnosis" or dogma depends primarily upon the authority of Vedantic Scriptures and tradition and secondarily upon the personal "immediate realization" which endorses it. In fact, here as in Christianity, we find a dual basis for belief—that of a sacred "Word" corresponding to personal spiritual experience. The real question therefore becomes, first, whether these "Words" or dogmas fundamentally conflict, and, second, if they do not, that of the real and right relation between them.

According to Mr. Watts that right relation is, in reality, that of "analogy". "... spiritual traditions such as the Vedanta, Buddhism and Taoism", we are told, "are not religions in the strict sense" (p. 12); they embody a metaphysical wisdom or "gnosis" which religion formulates in myth, dogma and ritual; "religion interprets it (this 'gnosis') as a dancer interprets music" (p. 13).

The relation or analogy between such "wisdom" and religion is thus conceived here as that of original to derivative, prior to secondary, superior to inferior. The dance of religion is dependent upon the "music" of this "metaphysic" and not *vice versa* and the latter is conceived as transcending the former: "in this realm (that of this 'gnosis')", we are told, "religious and theological distinctions are transcended" (p. 14); "... religion is our nearest approach to metaphysic" (p. 36). But "metaphysic" is the end and the goal. Religion is finite, "metaphysic" infinite: "the religious idea of God is an analogy of the

infinite in finite terms" (p. 45). "... the religious mode of knowledge is mediate, objective and analogical ... metaphysical knowledge is immediate ..." (p. 50). And revelation is contrasted with "realization"; "... religion begins with revelation, metaphysic begins with realization" (p. 53). Again, "... the language of religion is kataphatic ... it confines itself to the temporal, spatial and historical order" (p. 60), while that of metaphysic is aphophatic, the "negative description" of Reality. So, too, "the religious idea of everlastingness" is contrasted with the "metaphysical concept of eternity" (p. 71).

It is, moreover, very remarkable that this most erudite student of mysticism includes the majority of Christian mysticism in the same category. "Mystical ecstasy", he writes, "is simply an analogy of intellectual knowledge in terms of feeling, and is in no way essential to metaphysical realization" (p. 37). Yet, elsewhere, he singles out certain Christian mystics (including pseudo-Dionysius, generally held to be the fountain-head of Christian mysticism) as being metaphysicians of the Christian tradition" who "teach essentially the same doctrine as Shankara and the Upanishads, as Chinese Taoism and the Sufis of Islam" (p. 41).

Thus, for this thesis, it is only those mystics (such as Eckhart) who profess this "metaphysical" doctrine of the divine *atma*-Self or Spirit who rank as metaphysicians. The rest, mystics of the stature of Boehme, St. John of the Cross or Ruysbroek, remain in the subordinate and relative ranks of analogical religion. This, it is to be noted in passing, is where the cult of a universal mysticism ends—for the "straiter" orientalist. Here, again, we meet the real dividing-line differentiating, for this thesis, "metaphysic" and "religion"—the Vedantic dogma of the *atma*-Self. It is this fundamental "gnosis" or dogma which is evidently the lynch-pin of this "oriental metaphysic".

"Religion" (inclusive of most Christian mysticism) is thus conceived by Mr. Watts as, at all points, relative to "metaphysic": "... without metaphysical knowledge, religion is a wheel spinning by momentum alone" (p. 162), he declares. It belongs to the "comfortable realm of relativity" (p. 166) and is

inhibited by its "necessary confusion of Self and ego" (p. 181). Therefore the deduction is drawn that, in order that religion and "metaphysic" may "lie down together", "... the theological and religious viewpoint (inclusive of the majority of Christian religion) should begin to accept its own relativity" (p. 121) to the absolute "gnosis" of "metaphysic".

Such is the conception of the "analogy" between religion and "metaphysic" assumed in this book. It is characteristic of the majority of those who embrace Vedantism in its various forms in our day. But it is observable and significant that, in this struggle for synthesis, the conception of "analogy" becomes very confused. At one point religion is conceived as analogous (that is, similar yet distinct) to "metaphysic"; at another metaphysical "wisdom" is said to be the "true centre" of both "man's spiritual life" and "the Church" (p. 14). Elsewhere we are told that "religion constitutes a marvellous incarnation or projection of the ultimate Reality" (p. 50). And presently we find "analogy" equated with "image" ("Christ the 'express image' of the Father ... is the analogy *par excellence*", p. 51) and still again with "symbol" ("... Catholic and traditional Christianity is *principally* significant ... as a symbol ... of metaphysical Reality") (p. 140).

The confusion of thought in this profusion of imagery has only to be exposed to become manifest. For, as the Oxford dictionary defines it, "analogy" signifies "similarity in parallel cases" or "resemblance between things essentially different ..." But the terms—centre, incarnation, image, projection, symbol—with which Mr. Watts equates it, imply a quite different relationship. The centre and the circumference, incarnation and the incarnate "Word", image and seal, projection and the consciousness which projects, symbol and that which is symbolized are neither parallel to nor essentially different from each other but in a relationship far more close. In this confusion between radically different types of relationship Mr. Watts' argument from analogy seems to founder together with its main premise and conclusion that "metaphysic" and "religion" neither con-

flict with nor supersede each other. The indiscriminate use of these categories suggests, indeed, an inordinate and perhaps impossible desire to "eat the cake" of Vedantism and keep that of Christianity.

An examination of Mr. Watts' use of the third term in his proposition—that of "religion"—suggests the real reason for this collapse of the argument from analogy. For, as has been seen, he depicts religion throughout as relative, mediate, finite, egocentric, historical, objective and devoid of metaphysical content. In relation to "oriental metaphysic" it is therefore, for him, inferior, subordinate, derivatory. It is, in fact, appearance as compared with Reality. He finds in religion no more than that "objectification" of official and institutional religion which critics such as Kierkegaard and Berdyaev, while remaining Christian, have also condemned.

But this is, in reality, no more than an aspect of religion and one to which the epithet of "Christian" cannot properly be applied at all. The Christian religion is here considered only in that objective aspect, as a ritual "dance" for which the essential music of "metaphysic" is to be sought elsewhere—in fact, as a religion "after the flesh" but not, save by virtue of a "metaphysic" borrowed from the East, "after the Spirit". Christianity is presented as a physical, "oriental metaphysic" as a metaphysical faith. Such is the antithesis, or rather antimony, elaborated in this book.

It is, in truth, not a true antithesis but a false simplification. For Christianity is rooted and grounded in metaphysical principles and values—in its testimony to pure Being ("I am"), to the "primacy of Spirit", to an "aeonian life" other than that of "the world", to an Agape-Love transcending the Eros-Love of the flesh. But it is a metaphysic "made flesh". As Theodor Haecker said, "the Christian's metaphysic is—that he eats God" (*Journal in the Night*, p. xliii). A full incarnational Christianity contains that metaphysical core as body contains soul and soul spirit. That, as is the way of the world, the physical is all too apt to submerge the metaphysical, the flesh to quench the Spirit does not alter that fundamental fact.

Nor is it true that Christianity is merely objective. From Deuteronomy and the Prophetic writings onwards subjectivity and inwardness are the dominating themes of the Bible. And its theology is as often apophatic as kataphatic. It points, moreover, to an approach to God (or spiritual metaphysical Reality) which is both immediate and mediate. And, in particular, the affirmation of a "spirit" in man responsive to the Spirit of God, distinct from though instinct in soul and body, pervades the entire Bible. It is a conception of indwelling or "internal spirit" which culminates in the Pauline and Johannine doctrine of the "indwelling Christ". It is not as to the fact but as to the nature of that "internal spirit" that Christianity and Vedantism differ. Where Vedantism speaks of the "lordly Self", Christianity calls for a "lowly" spirit.

In fact, so far as metaphysical doctrine or "gnosis" is concerned, Christianity has no need to borrow from Vedantism. It has its own metaphysical core which the Christian Church, being incarnate in the world, incessantly tends to forget and betray, to petrify in objectivity. But, again and again, it is found to flame forth from the institutionalism which tends to entomb it. Again and again those stones of objectivity are rolled away and the Christ who is both metaphysical and physical, Spirit and flesh, "very God and very Man", the "Word made flesh" rises again in the fire-purged consciousness of Christendom and the Church.

Here, in truth, is the heart of the matter and the cause of this failure to correlate "Christian Religion" and "Oriental Metaphysic". The Christian religion is represented here as a thing of flesh, time, objectivity, history only in fallacious analogy to a pure "metaphysic" of Spirit, eternity, subjectivity, meta-history. Of such antitheses it indeed remains eternally true that "never the twain shall meet". But Mr Watts misrepresents the faith of a full incarnational Christianity which *ipso facto*, incarnates and coordinates these antitheses, the metaphysical in the physical, Spirit in flesh, that world in this.

This misconception or underestimate of the Incarnation recurs throughout this book and the type of Vedantist thought

which it represents. Thus we are told that "the very Incarnation upon which the Church is founded is not the ascent of a man to God, but the descent of God to man" (p. 53). But, for a full concept of the Incarnation, the ascending and descending movements are made one in Christ. Again we hear that "the divine act of redemption, the Incarnation of God the Son, must be conceived as an event occurring in *time* not only from the terrestrial but also from the celestial viewpoint" (p. 61). It is the double truth which the full Christian faith has always affirmed. And, from that fallacious premise, Mr. Watts proceeds to the no less fallacious conclusion that "eternity and infinity . . . are outside the sphere of religious knowledge" (p. 61). So, too, "dogma" is said to be a "perfect analogy of realization", but the idea of dogma as itself an *incarnation* of such "realization", a form in which the "Word" is "made flesh", is not seriously considered.

This analogical method thus persistently holds apart as, though similar, yet essentially distinct and parallel, the very dualities of Spirit and flesh, idea and form, eternity and time, metahistory and history, metaphysical and physical, God and man which, for a full Incarnational faith, are made one in Christ and coordinated in Christianity. For the Christian it is only in the light and power of, not analogy, but Incarnation that these "twain" can really meet. The Christian religion for which "religion" and "metaphysic" are not thus coordinated is not the true Christian religion at all. This is thus a profoundly false analogy.

The Christian truth of matter is, as Karl Barth has so often and so emphatically affirmed in our day, that in the connotation of the term in this book and common usage, Christianity is not "religion" at all. It has always condemned "religion" as such. It is essentially and in itself that which, by transcending them, alone "makes peace" between, which marries these contraries of "religion" and "metaphysics" and makes both one. It is the incarnation of metaphysical Spirit in the flesh of religion. That is its true title to the quality of "uniqueness" with which this book and all "Vedantist" thought of this type ultimately quarrel. And here is the real crux of the question between Vedantism and

Christianity. For, with this issue, we immediately stumble upon the "scandal of particularity".

But that stone of stumbling is also the corner-stone of a full Christian faith in the Incarnation. It is the stone upon which this analogical thesis itself stumbles. It seems at first sight, and to the speculative view, one which can readily be rolled away. For "oriental metaphysic" also affirms the *principle* of incarnation. Thus, as Mr. Watts tells us, "the Incarnate Son of God at the feast of Cana and on the Cross at Golgotha, participating in every form of human experience" has a "metaphysical counterpart in the unique Knower of all knowledge" (p. 94), in the doctrine that "the Self is the incarnation, the deliberate self-limitation of the infinite" (p. 118), of the "great act of incarnation, and self-abandonment whereby the infinite manifests the finite" (p. 191) and, in particular, in "the oriental doctrine of the Avatars, or incarnations of the personal God" (p. 136).

Thus Vedantism meets Christianity with regard to the *principle* of incarnation for it maintains that, in every self (or soul) the supreme Self (or Spirit) is, in fact, incarnate and that, in the case of the "Avatars" (amongst whom Christ ranks with other Avatars such as the Buddha), this is preeminently so. In fact it affirms a general, but denies a special, incarnation. When it comes to the question of a special Incarnation in a particular Person at a particular time and place, even Mr Watts, for all his goodwill and devotion to Christianity, is driven to water down the awkward and essential Christian doctrine of real Incarnation.

According to him "Catholic dogma" affirms only that "Christ is unique in so far as he is divine". The term "*only*-begotten Son of God" refers only to the uniqueness of the one who is incarnate, not the uniqueness of the incarnation" (p. 136). And he adds that "Hindu doctrine will likewise insist that he who is incarnate as this or that Avatar is the 'One and Only', the sole real Knower or Self" (id). But this doctrine is, in reality, tantamount to the assertion that, in Dr. Bethune-Baker's words, "the humanity (of Jesus) was only the organ of revelation, the momentary vehicle for the introduction into the world of the eternal truth" (*Introduction to the*

Early History of Christian Doctrine, p. 81), that the Incarnation was real only in so far as "the One", the Spirit was concerned. It is certainly not the faith of a full Christianity of the "Word made flesh" or of the "Catholic dogma" of "very God and very Man"; it is, as Dr. Bethune-Baker adds, a heresy, a fundamental denial of the Incarnation which, in one form or another, the Church has combated throughout her history and for which the saying of Tertullian that "they who would make of Christ's humanity nothing but a spectre are themselves but spectral men" still, for Christians, holds good.

It is thus only by lapse into heresy that the *principle* of a general incarnation in Vedantism can be equated with the historic *fact* of the unique Incarnation of the God-Man in Christ which is the real, crucial and central Christian faith. The stone of stumbling, the "scandal of particularity" remains, and no special pleading can really remove it. Nor is this issue of particularity one which merely distinguishes the typical Western from the typically Eastern life-attitude. It may be said with much truth that while, for the Eastern mind, the immemorial word "Thou art That" is the key to its wisdom, the contrary dictum "Thou art This" seems no less characteristic of the West. But the antithesis applies only to a truncated, not to a real Christianity. For a full Incarnational Christianity, Jesus Christ is both "That", the cosmic Christ, and "This", the historic Jesus; in him there is neither East nor West; "the twain" are made one. Moreover, if this central and crucial "scandal of particularity" is surrendered, not only does Christianity cease to be unique but, for the Christian, the only possible and real synthesis of "religion" and "metaphysic" is also thereby abandoned. For while a full Incarnational Christianity can include the insights and intimations of oriental "wisdoms" in its charity, a Christianity accommodated to Vedantism by the rejection of this stumbling-stone of particularity ceases to be really Christian at all.

The temptation to surrender this corner-stone of particularity and uniqueness is more than ever seductive to-day when it seems that the very destiny of mankind may turn upon that apparently insignificant issue. Once that awkward corner is

turned an entrancing vista of a world-faith embracing and uniting East and West, congenial to "common sense" and even to the "scientific attitude", offering, for a dire eschatology, a psychic evolution, abstracting from Christianity its thorns of acute intellectual, moral and personal challenge, but leaving scope for the following and adoration of Christ, substituting a distant pacifying "principle" for a very present Person bringing "fire on the earth" and, for a "self" found sinful and worthless, a "Self" "lordly" and divine in its own right, opens on the enchanted view.

Yet, the fact remains that a Christianity which surrenders that particularity, historicity and personalism ceases in reality to be Christianity at all. The choice remains, not between some Christianized Vedantism or Vedantic Christianity, but between a real Incarnational and therefore particularized and unique Christianity and a Gnosticism, a universal wisdom-faith, which is both pre- and post-Christian.

That choice remains in spite of this very sincere and competent search for compromise. Mr. Watts seems, indeed, having written this book, to have realized that he has set himself an impossible task and that, between these two ways and wisdoms there is, in reality, neither analogy nor *via media.* For, since its publication, he has announced, in an Open Letter, that he has felt obliged to abandon his office in the Episcopal Church of Canada. His decision seems a further token of the failure of his gallant attempt and is certainly a token of his integrity. And where Mr. Watts has failed those less learned in both these wisdoms are not likely to succeed.

The choice remains. It is a real and can be excruciating choice between two alternative ways of faith and life each of which is very real, sincerely spiritual and exacting. This is not, as complacent Christians are apt sometimes to imagine, a choice between reality and illusion, wisdom and ignorance. It is, like all life's real choices, a choice between two goods. For the Wisdom-religion which confronts Christianity in Vedantism and similar cults is not, necessarily, as is sometimes suggested, either ineffective or an unreal escapism. It can be a great and exacting

force in life, a genuine way of life " after the Spirit ".

It was in the power of such a syncretism of Christian ethic and oriental " gnosis ", of the Gospels and the Gîta, that Mahatma Gandhi moved his mountains in India, and there is no good reason to suppose that this very potent and vital faith has died with him. It is, indeed, far more probable that, for the growing multitudes who can accept neither orthodox Christianity nor materialism but still seek the life of the Spirit, and with the turn of the tide from East to West, such a Wisdom-religion rooted in an immemorial Eastern " gnosis " as old and as new as the world of men, is much more likely to increase than to decrease. In its genuine form therefore this is no faith to be lightly discounted.

The choice remains, and it is one with which all real Christianity must very seriously reckon. And though there may be no meeting-place along the lines of analogy as proposed by Mr. Watts, it remains imperative for the peace of the world and the survival of the life of the Spirit that a real *modus vivendi* between these two allied yet distinct life-attitudes should be found. What, then, is the real and right relation between Christianity and Vedantism? In that his book challenges Christianity to review and revive its own metaphysic and discloses that real question we remain deeply in Mr. Watts' debt.

THE UNITY OF THE CHURCH[1]

By E. L. MASCALL

I. The Nature of the Church's Unity.

"I BELIEVE . . . in one . . . Church". This is a provocative statement and, on the lips of an Anglican, it would not appear at first sight to be a particularly sensible one. When uttered by a Roman Catholic this clause of the Creed is easily intelligible to anyone who hears it; the Church to which it refers clearly means the totality of Christians who are in peace and communion with the see of Rome, and, in view of the tightly knit organization which it manifests, this totality can obviously be described as "one" in a quite straightforward sense. Nor does the clause raise any special difficulty for those Protestants who hold that the Church is entirely invisible; the Church consists of those whose identity is known to God alone, who are united to Christ by justifying faith, and their unity is in no way impaired by the fact that there are a number of separated and sometimes mutually hostile groups of people who call themselves Christians, for those groups, as visible organizations, have simply nothing to do with the Church of which the Creed speaks. For Anglicans, however, and indeed for Eastern Orthodox and many Protestants, the assertion that the Church is one has, at any rate *prima facie*, a highly paradoxical ring. (In passing, it should be noted that although, from the strictly canonical point of view, the Eastern Orthodox Church holds that it and it alone is the Catholic Church of Christ, very few of its theologians are to-day prepared to defend this position

[1] This article is based upon a paper read at the Theological Conference of the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius at St. Helen's School, Abingdon, Berks, in August, 1950.

without qualification.) No one would, I imagine, be prepared to maintain that the Catholic Church was simply identical with the Anglican Communion. Nevertheless, Anglicans continue to affirm their belief in one Church, while the great majority of them would certainly deny that the Church is purely invisible. It might be thought that the explanation of this was simply that Anglicans are thoroughly unreflective and illogical. No doubt many of them are, but many of them are not. And I think that if we inquire how it is possible to maintain that the Church is one when we believe that it is neither purely invisible nor, on the other hand, a mere unity of organization, we may be led to a more profound understanding of the unity of the Church than we should otherwise have had.

It will help to clear the ground if we begin by recognizing that the word "one" is highly ambiguous. As St. Thomas Aquinas reminds us,[2] we must distinguish between "one, which is the principle of number" and "one, which is convertible with being", that is, between numerical and ontological unity. As a matter of grammar and syntax, "I believe in one Church" might mean no more than "I believe that there is one Church, and not two churches, or six, or three hundred and sixty-five". And of course it does mean that; we do believe that the Church, holy, catholic, and apostolic, the Church of which the creeds speak, is numerically one. But if that was all that was meant by unity, we should, I think, as Anglicans hardly profess our belief in the unity of the Church at all. Unless we believed that the Church was one in some deeper sense we should in all probability say, when we looked at Christendom as it is, with all its divisions, that there was not one Church, but a very large number of churches; we should use the word "church" as it is used, for example, in the title "World Council of Churches", and that would be all. We might perhaps profess our belief in one Ecumenical Movement, but hardly in one Catholic Church; and that is, in effect, what a good many liberal Protestants seem to do.

When, however, Catholic Christians profess their belief in one Church, they mean much more than that the Church is

[2] S. Theol. I, xi, 1.

one numerically. They mean by the unity of the Church that the Church is one organically, an organism, a coherent whole and not a mere aggregate of items. They believe, furthermore, that what holds it together and makes it one is not merely the psychological forces of moral and emotional attraction between its members, their sense of loyalty to one another and the inspiration which they derive from their mutual fellowship; this kind of organic unity can be found in many societies that are not specifically Christian, or even religious at all, such as the Antediluvian Order of Buffaloes or the Surrey County Cricket Club. Nor, for Catholics, is the Church's unity constituted by the psychological forces of moral and emotional attraction between its individual members and Christ, their sense of loyalty to him and their feelings of gratitude for all that he has done for them. Such a unity would be a purely human one, in the sense that it would be constituted simply by the acts of men, even though those acts were made by them in response to the redemptive work of Christ. For Catholics the Church is made one by a unifying principle which, while it works in men and binds them both to one another and to Christ their Lord, has supervened and still supervenes upon them from outside themselves and unites them in a way beyond anything that their own activity could achieve. What, then, is this supernatural principle which makes the unity of the Church? That is the first question to which I shall address myself. There are several lines by which we might approach it, but I shall take as my starting point the seventeenth chapter of the Gospel of St. John.

On the night before his Passion, in his high-priestly prayer, the Incarnate Lord prayed to the Father for his disciples that they might be one. And this *Ut omnes unum sint* has become the watchword of all movements for Christian unity. It is, however, remarkable how often these words are interpreted without reference to their context. They occur twice in the prayer. In the first place they refer to those who are already one with Christ in the Father and for whom Christ prays that their unity may continue: "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me, for they are thine. And all mine are thine, and

thine are mine, and I am glorified in them . . . Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one . . ."[3] In the second place he prays for those who are not yet his disciples but will be brought to him through the ministrations of his Church: "Neither pray I for these alone but for them also which shall believe on me through their word; that they all may be one . . ."[4] But what is this unity into which they are to be brought? It is nothing less than the unity with which the Father and the Son are already united. In the first case, the prayer is "that they may be one, *as we are*";[5] in the second, "that they all may be one, *as thou, Father, art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us*".[6] The unity which binds together Christians in Christ is nothing other than the unity which binds Christ to the Father. And this unity is not simply the moral unity which Christ enjoys with the Father through his perfect obedience and self-dedication. He goes on to say: "The glory which thou gavest me I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one, that they may be made perfect in one".[7] They are to be one, then, with the glory which the Father gave to the Son and which the Son has given to them. And what is this glory? The beginning of the prayer tells us: it is "the glory which I had with thee before the world was",[8] the glory which the Son enjoys with the Father from all eternity in the unity of the Blessed Trinity. Let us note, then, the movement of thought. (1) The divine Word is one with the Father in unity of substance of the Trinity: "the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God; and yet there are not three Gods but one God". He is "God from God, Light from Light, very God from very God, begotten of his Father before all worlds, consubstantial with the Father". (2) By the Incarnation this unity is communicated to the human nature which the Son

[3] John xvii, 10, 11.
[4] John xvii, 20, 21.
[5] John xvii, 11.
[6] John xvii, 21.
[7] John xvii, 22, 23.
[8] John xvii, 5.

has united to his divine Person in the womb of Mary, so that with his human lips he can say, "Thou hast sent me into the world . . . Thou, Father, art in me and I in thee".[9] (3) And, finally, this unity is communicated to all those who are adopted and incorporated into Christ: "that they may be one, *even as we are one.*"[10] In other words, the unity with which the Church is one is nothing other than the unity with which the Persons of the Holy Trinity are one, and this unity is communicated to men, as it were, by a bridge with two arches. The first is the arch of the Incarnation, by which the divine Person of the eternal Son unites human nature to himself in Jesus Christ—the hypostatic union; the second is the arch of our adoption into Christ, by which we are incorporated into his human nature.

The principle of the Church's unity, the dynamic act which makes the Church an organism, is, then, the selfsame act which makes the Holy Trinity a consubstantial unity of love; "that the love *wherewith thou lovedst me* may be in them, and I in them"[11] are the concluding words of the high-priestly prayer. This realistic view seems to me to be inevitable, but I am fully conscious of the problems to which it gives rise. It may well be that it is here that we touch on the real issue that divides Catholics from Protestants. It would, I think, be unfair to say that Protestants believe in a purely fictitious or imputed union of man with God, but it is, I think, true to say that they tend in general to look upon this union as consisting in an influence exerted upon man by God and in a consequent stimulation of man's moral powers towards God, rather than in a real communication of God to man; they are, I think, reluctant to take *au pied de la lettre* the words of II Peter: "that ye may become partakers of the divine nature".[12] The reason for this hesitation is obvious and it is one with which one cannot but sympathize. It is the fear of obliterating the distinction between God and the creature, of

[9] John xvii, 18, 21.
[10] John xvii, 11.
[11] John xvii, 26.
[12] II Peter i, 4.

holding that a man can be entitatively transformed into God. The very word "deification", which has traditionally been used by Catholics both in East and in West to describe the effect of grace upon the soul, fills Protestants with dismay. It is, however, not true that Catholic theology teaches any such entitative transformation, any conversion of the creature into the Creator. I will give two examples of this, one from the West and the other from the East. St. John of the Cross has been quite unfairly condemned by some, and applauded by others, as being really only a Hindu mystic who had the misfortune to live in sixteenth-century Spain. They point to such statements as that in which, describing the highest form of mystical experience, he writes that the soul is "united in [God] and absorbed by him, and is thus God by participation in God".[13] Nevertheless, in the very sentence in which these words occur he writes: "The substance of this soul . . . is not the substance of God, for into this it cannot be substantially changed". And Eastern Orthodox theologians, following St. Gregory Palamas, commonly draw a distinction between the divine essence and the divine energies deliberately in order to maintain a deification of man which does not destroy his creaturely status; God, they say, really communicates himself in his energies, though his essence is incommunicable and unknowable.[14] We are admittedly confronted here with one of the most difficult notions with which Christian theology has to contend. Just as in the cognate question of Grace, and indeed in that of the Incarnation itself, what is involved in the existence of the Church is nothing less than the fact of the Infinite Being really imparting himself to the finite being without destroying the finite being's finitude. *Infinitus fit finitus*—this is the Incarnation. But in that very fact, *finitum fit infinitum*—this is that assumption of manhood into God which is the foundation of both grace and the Church. Yet neither can God be converted

[13] *Living Flame*, 2nd redaction, II, 34 (ed. Peers, III, p. 159).

[14] See, for example, the account in V. Lossky, *Théologie Mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient*, and my discussion in *Existence and Analogy*, pp. 148 f.

into a creature, nor a creature converted into God. There is ample room here for argument between the Thomist and the Palamite, and also between the Thomist and the Augustinian, as to the way in which this amazing example of divine mercy is best expressed in human words, but on the fundamental fact Catholic West and Orthodox East will, I think, agree: that the life of the Church, the organic act which constitutes its unity, is the life of the Holy Trinity imparted to men in Christ. This is indeed a great mystery, but I speak of Christ and the Church.

I will put forward at this point one consideration which may, perhaps, make this realistic doctrine of the Church's unity less difficult to accept. It will, I suppose, be universally agreed that the Church is the Spirit-bearing body of Christ, that the Holy Ghost really dwells in the Church and maintains its life. This is a view upon which Protestants, no less than Catholics, have been ready to lay great stress; indeed they have sometimes gone so far as to accuse Catholics of substituting the Pope or the Blessed Virgin Mary for the Holy Ghost as the indwelling principle of the Church's unity. Now to say that the Holy Ghost is the life or the soul of the Church is, if one is doing anything more than employing a picturesque metaphor, to say that God is really communicating himself to men, that the Church consists of deified humanity. For the Holy Ghost is God himself. Furthermore, there is a persistent tradition in Christian theology that, in the interior life of the Holy Trinity, the Spirit, as consubstantial love, is the bond of unity between the Father and the Son, the hypostatic principle of the unity of the tripersonal Godhead. If this view is correct (and it seems to go back at least as far as Athenagoras[15]), to say that the Church is the Spirit-bearing body is only another way of saying that the principle of the unity of the Holy Trinity and the principle of the Church's unity are identical, for the principle of unity of both is the Holy Ghost.

How, then, do men enter into this unity, which is the unity of God? Not merely by a moral act, however necessary faith and

[15] Cf. F. J. Hall, *Dogmatic Theology*, IV, p. 273n.

repentance may be in the man who comes to enter into it. The unity between God and his creation is never set up by a merely moral approach from the side of the creature; so far as the Incarnation is concerned, the Church made this quite clear in the condemnation of Nestorianism. Like everything else in the Church's life, our incorporation into the divine unity is a sacramental act; that is to say it is (1) an act not of men but of God, but nevertheless (2) an act performed by God through human agents and by means of material instruments. This raises important questions of detail to which it is not easy to give a confident answer. Is the sacramental rite of initiation baptism alone, or baptism and confirmation combined, as they were in the early Church and still are in Eastern Orthodoxy to-day? Can we hold that in the West, where baptism and confirmation have become two distinct rites, usually separated by an interval of anything from seven to fifteen years, some of the effects of confirmation have been transferred to baptism? What is the relation to the Church of those who have been baptized but not confirmed? Or of those who, while sincerely devoted to Christ, have been kept from baptism by invincible ignorance or prejudice? Or of those who, seeking for God according to their light, have never received baptism because they have never come into contact with the Church and never heard of Christ? There are a host of problems of this kind, which have been much discussed by theologians in recent years, but the central fact is plain. A man is brought into the life of the Holy Trinity by baptism into Christ as a member of his body the Church, and so becomes a member of the new, the re-created and renovated, human race. And if we accept the view that the bond of unity in the Holy Trinity is God the Holy Ghost we can understand why it is that in the Church's initiatory rites so much stress has always been placed on the action of the Spirit.

There is one important question to which reference must be made at this point. It is difficult to deny that there is a very real sense in which the human race was re-created and brought into the life of the Trinity simply by the Incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ, for what Christ united to himself was

neither, on the one hand, the human nature of one individual man, as Nestorianism held, nor, on the other hand, a merely abstract universal manhood, a purely logical category; it was manhood in the concrete, the manhood of which we are part. A strong patristic tradition can be quoted along these lines. *Universitatis nostrae caro est factus,* writes St. Hilary. "He incorporated himself in our humanity", writes Fr. de Lubac, summarizing this doctrine, "and incorporated it in himself".[16] Now there is an ultra-realist metaphysical doctrine about universals which, if it were true, would involve that the assumption of human nature by Christ *ipso facto* regenerated every member of the human race and so transformed the whole human race into the Church of God by one instantaneous act. But neither Christian tradition nor the facts of experience support so extreme a view. Whatever may be the correct metaphysical doctrine about universals and particulars as regards the lower creation, where man is concerned neither such an extreme realism nor the opposite extreme of nominalism, according to which the Incarnation would have had no effect upon anyone except Jesus himself, meets the case. Something real and decisive happened to the human race when the divine Word became flesh, but it was not something that removed it from the historical process or brought history to an end. Presumably one of the reasons for this is that many of the human beings whom Christ came to redeem had not even come into existence at the moment of the Incarnation; the concrete universal of humanity was not then, and is not yet, complete. If a metaphysical doctrine of universals and particulars can be constructed which will do justice to the Christian facts, so much the better, but we must not construct a metaphysical doctrine *a priori* and then demand that the Christian facts should conform to it.[17] So we must, I think, say that, although the Word became flesh for the salvation of all men and in a sense renewed the human race by that very act, yet in another sense it was only his own individual human nature, the human

[16] *Catholicism,* p. 9.

[17] I may perhaps refer to the discussion in my book *Existence and Analogy,* pp. 58f.

nature of Jesus of Nazareth made personal by its union with the Word, that was constituted in its primal perfection at that moment. Like the old Adam, the new Adam is in one sense the whole human race, but in another sense he is simply himself, not identical with, but the Father of, the human community. Christ's human nature is both universal and particular. The fact remains that the human race is not the Christian Church, even although the Church is meant for all men and claims them all, and although there is no man who is altogether excluded from the Church's redemptive life, which, like a river in flood, overflows its formal boundaries and irrigates the surrounding land. There is a sense in which Christ's redemptive work has communicated the divine life to all mankind. There is even a sense in which the act of creation itself has communicated the divine life to the whole created order: "that which was made was *life in him*", according to a very probable reading of the prologue to St. John. But, as a fully operative reality in the historical order, it is the Catholic Church that is the supernatural organism in which men, by sacramental incorporation into Christ, are elevated into the life of the Holy Trinity and, by the sacrament of the Eucharist, are maintained therein.

II. Unity and the Apostolate.

So much, then, for the Church's unity in its inner constitutive reality. We must now come down to another plane. For the Church is not only a mystical organism, the Body and Bride of Christ, *ecclesia de Trinitate et de Christo*. It is also a community of men and women living within the historical order, the City and the Army of the living God, *sponsa Christi quae per orbem militat ecclesia,* marked out indeed from other human societies by its supernatural endowments and its concern for man's eternal end, but none the less visible, tangible and entangled with all the relativities of history. It would therefore be surprising if there were no visible organ by which the Church's unity is expressed and maintained, although that unity is not a merely moral, political or organizational unity but an inner and sacramental one. Such an organ is, I would suggest, to be found in the

Apostolate, instituted by Christ in the Twelve and expanded through the centuries into the universal Episcopate. It is, I think, noteworthy that the patristic tradition lays primary stress upon the Episcopate as the link between the local and the universal Church and upon the function of the bishop as the supreme minister of the Church's sacraments and the supreme guardian of the Church's faith and tradition.

I would remark at this point that this last-mentioned function of the bishop, namely to guard the Church's faith and tradition, seems to correspond precisely to the New Testament insistence upon the Apostle as the eye-witness of the Lord's ministry and resurrection;[18] it is precisely what the function of witnessing becomes when the events to which witness is borne have moved into the chronological past. And this seems to me to be the answer to those who allege that the Apostolate could only be a temporary institution, on the ground that the first generation, which included the eye-witnesses, was bound to die out in the course of time.

Some such view of the Apostolate as this would seem to be necessary if we are to account for its existence at all. It is perhaps significant that those Christian bodies which look upon the Church either as entirely invisible or else as a merely human contrivance can find no place for the Apostolate as an enduring element in the Church. Nor do they find it easy to make sense of the Apostolate even as a New Testament institution, though, in view of the plain evidence of the Gospel, they cannot deny its existence. But what is surprising is the fact that those very bodies which are most concerned to set forward the Church of the New Testament as the primitive pattern to which the Church in all ages is bound to conform should be anxious to maintain that the institution of the Apostolate, which is one of the New Testament Church's most prominent features, was meant to be purely temporary and transient. It is no doubt difficult, in view of the sheer lack of evidence, to trace the exact steps which connect the New Testament Apostolate with the

[18] Cf. Acts i, 21, 22.

episcopate of the second century, but when we consider the place which the Apostolate holds in the Church of the New Testament we ought not, I think, to be surprised to find later on that there are persons in the Church who claim, and are recognized as having, the apostolic character; and the simplest explanation is that they are in fact what they profess to be. For the obvious significance of the institution of the twelve apostles is that they are the patriarchs of the new Israel as the sons of Jacob were the patriarchs of the old. However, the new Israel being open to the whole human race and being the substance of which the old Israel was but the shadow, the new Patriarchate—the Apostolate —is not limited in its number nor restricted to one generation; it expands and grows as the Church expands and grows. It is an *apostolic* patriarchate, charged with the mission to preach the Gospel to all nations. It is the function of the Episcopate, as the perpetual Apostolate, to manifest and preserve the unity of the Church throughout space and time, a unity which is not merely schematic, static or (in the modern sense of the word) formal, but organic, dynamic and expansive, because it is the unity of a living body and because its vital principle is nothing less than the life of the Holy Trinity communicated to men.

I have, of course, been stating a theory — or, I would prefer to say, a doctrine—about episcopacy, but this seems to me to be a very important thing to do. Some words of the Archbishop of Armagh are, I think, highly relevant in this connexion. Commenting on what he describes as "an over-accommodating readiness to treat historic disputes on the subject of Church Order with some indifference", Dr. Gregg writes as follows:

> "I am not sure if a good deal of this laxity of conviction is not to be traced to the very dangerous suggestion which has been current for some twenty years past, to the effect that, while the acceptance of episcopacy as a practice is indispensable for those who would enter into communion with the Anglican Church, no particular theory of episcopacy need be insisted on. I regard this view as both unsound and unprincipled. It seems to me nothing less than the rankest ritualism. To urge the acceptance of an institution without insisting on any reasoned meaning of it reduces it, in my opinion, to something like mumbo-jumbo. To have no philosophy of the institution which epis-

copacy is, is to undermine the Ordinal, which insists on episcopal ordination, and to leave it to be supposed that this insistence rests only on antiquarian pedantry or sectarian prejudice. Whereas if episcopacy is invested with no apostolic association, and is treated merely as a desirable, because an early, practice, we rob it of any final and ultimate authority. If it represents merely the result of an evolution upwards out of the presbyterate, and if it represents anything less than a devolution downwards from the apostolate, it is hard to see any vital reason why it should not rank with any other experiment in administration which happened to justify itself on utilitarian grounds ".[19]

I would add to this admirably lucid statement that to accept the historic episcopate without insisting on any theory about it can, in practice, only mean accepting the episcopate in the form which, in the course of history, it has come to take. And that is to destroy all hope of correcting the abuses with which it has become infected. For you can only reform any institution by applying to it in its actual condition some theory about its essential nature and so bringing it into closer conformity to that pattern. It is, in this connexion, perhaps relevant to point out that in the mission field it is the low-church Anglican societies which have tended to reproduce overseas the customary features of twentieth-century English ecclesiastical organization—to treat Anglicanism as a matter of all-or-nothing—while the Catholic-minded societies have shown themselves ready to abandon any customary Anglican features other than those which, on the basis of theological doctrine, they have believed to be essential to the Church's life. This is a question of real importance, for there can be few more unattractive ideals of Christian reunion than that which would bind upon the Church of the future the distinctive features of modern Anglican episcopacy, accepted moreover not on grounds of theological principle but merely as a concession to the obstinacy of Anglicans.

To return to our previous point, the Church, as a visible and tangible society, living in the historic process, needs a visible and tangible organ of its unity, though that union is, as I have emphasized, an interior and mystical unity and not a moral or political

[19] *Reunion*, p. 8.

one. The Church is a visible and tangible society, but it is a sacramental one, and the organ of its unity will be a sacramental organ. This is why, as I see it, the apostolic Episcopate precisely fulfils the requirements for such an organ, for the episcopal character is conferred by a sacramental act. And this is why it seems to me impossible to locate the organ of the Church's unity in the Papacy, for the papal character is not conferred by a sacramental act at all, but by the purely administrative and organizational process of election. Whether the Papacy has, by divine providence, a unique status in the Church and, if so, what are the functions which rightly attach to it are, of course, important questions, but by its very constitution the Papacy does not, so far as I can see, possess the nature which is required in the organ of the Church's unity. It might be an adequate organ if the Church's unity was the unity of an organization; it does not seem to be adequate to the unity of a sacramental organism. (Neither would the episcopate be an adequate organ if it were in its essence what many people believe it to be, a merely governmental and organizational contrivance; but it is adequate if it is, as Catholic theology maintains, a reality of the sacramental order.) It is perhaps an unconscious realization of this fact that has led the Pope to appropriate more and more exclusively to himself the episcopal character, to the detriment of his episcopal brethren. There are, I believe, some theologians who maintain that all the episcopal character primarily inheres in the Pope as universal bishop and that other bishops possess it only by delegation from him; it is certainly commonly maintained by Roman Catholic theologians that the Pope has a direct and immediate episcopal relation to every one of the faithful. I do not deny that the Pope is the successor of Peter, but the common post-Tridentine Roman attitude seems to me to make Peter not merely the Prince of the Apostles but, in effect, the only apostle. I think the Roman Church is right in insisting that the Church is a visible and not an invisible body, but I think it has gone wrong in treating the Church's visibility as an organizational rather than as a sacramental one, and so in locat-

ing that unity in the organizational organ of the Papacy rather than in the sacramental organ of the Episcopate; and the consequence has been, as I have suggested, that the Papacy has infringed upon the Episcopate and, in the Papal communion, has all but absorbed it. However I do not think that the remedy is for the Episcopate to claim that it is collectively what the Pope claims to be individually; that would only perpetuate the error in another form.

I would maintain, then, that as a visible reality in the historic order, the Church's unity is established in our Lord's institution of the Apostolate, which is continued in the universal Episcopate; the bishop is the link between the local and the universal Church. This fact is reflected in the ancient requirement that for the consecration of a new bishop at least three bishops are normally required as consecrators; that is to say, although the diocese gathered round its bishop is the self-coherent local manifestation of the Body of Christ, its perpetuation requires, at least in principle and ideally, a repeated recourse to the universal Apostolate. This requirement, which had largely become obsolete in the West, was restored by the Church of England in the sixteenth century; it has, I gather, never been abandoned in the Eastern Church. With the devolution of so many of the bishop's sacramental functions upon the second order of the ministry—the presbyterate—the status of the diocese, gathered round its bishop, as the organic local manifestation of the Catholic Church has, of course, become very much obscured. It is the parish priest, rather than the bishop, round whom the faithful are normally assembled for the great liturgical action by which the Church's life is maintained, though I am told that in the small dioceses of such countries as Greece the bishop has retained more of his primitive liturgical position. Nevertheless, the sacramental functions of the presbyterate are limited and partial, and nowhere in Catholic Christendom has the bishop abandoned his status as the sole minister who can sacramentally delegate, even partially, the apostolic character to others. Every presbyter has received his partial apostolate from the hands of the bishop in the sacramental rite of ordination; while the bishop himself has received

his full apostolate from those other bishops who together represent the Apostolate of the universal Church. The diocese, gathered round its bishop, is thus not merely a *part* of the Church of God, but is its full manifestation in a particular place. Like the cell in a living organism, it is a coherent organic entity, yet it lives only because it coheres in the whole body. Like the sacramental Body of Christ in the Eucharist, the mystical Body of Christ which is the Church is not divided into portions by its extension in space and time; it is *tota in toto, et tota in aliqua parte.*

III. The Church Catholic and the Church Militant

It is necessary at this point to introduce a new consideration, which is of the utmost importance and the neglect of which has done more than anything else to confuse the discussion of the theology of the Church in recent years. The part of the Church which is militant here on earth is only the fringe or the outpost of the whole Catholic Church of Christ. To put this same point in another way, the Catholic Church, of which the local church is the manifestation, is not just the Church militant but the whole Church on earth and beyond the grave, militant, expectant and triumphant. I must emphasize this point, for it is, as I see it, quite central to the question of the Church's unity. Only too often the Church has been thought of as a purely earthly society, which we enter by baptism and leave by death, a continuing terrestrial organism with a constantly changing membership, comparable in this respect to the Royal College of Surgeons, or the Worshipful Company of Fishmongers. On such a view the episcopate also is a group with a constantly changing membership, like the governing bodies of the two societies just mentioned, and if the bishops are conceived as having any relation to the apostles at all it is merely the relation of being the apostles' successors. Now I do not deny that the phrase "apostolic succession" can be given a legitimate meaning; one bishop succeeds another bishop in his see, and each bishop is consecrated at the hands of other bishops. But the natural suggestions of the phrase seem

to me to be highly misleading; it suggests that the episcopal office is like a relay-race in which each runner drops out when he has handed on his baton, and it gives some colour to the Protestant accusation that the Catholic view of the ministry is magical and materialistic. The truth, however, is that, although the Church has an earthly part which we call the Church militant, it is not just an earthly reality, and the Church militant at any particular epoch is only a minute fraction of the Church catholic. The Church's membership does indeed change as time goes on, but it changes simply by increasing. Men enter the Church by baptism; they do not leave it by death. And what is true of the Church is true of the apostolic episcopate; a man enters the episcopate by consecration, but he does not leave it by death. The Church grows with the passage of time, and the episcopate grows within it. Thus a newly consecrated bishop is not in the strict sense a *successor* of the apostles; he is simply a new apostle.[20] The Church militant is, of course, the only part of the Church through which a man can enter into either the Church itself or its apostolate; there are not, I imagine, baptisms and ordinations in either purgatory or heaven. This does not, however, affect the fact that the Church into which a man is baptized is not the Church militant, but the whole Church of God, and that the ministry into which a man is ordained is not just the ministry of the Church militant, but the universal apostolate. There are many problems, historical and theological, bearing upon the Church's unity and its ministry which I cannot discuss here, but they cannot even be seen in their proper setting if we identify the Church for all practical purposes with the Church on earth. And it hardly needs pointing out how much this identification has been made in recent years. It is a commonplace in the Ecumenical Movement and in contemporary reunion schemes. It has been almost invariable in Papal and other Roman Catholic pronouncements; even the famous encyclical of 1943, *Mystici Corporis Christi,* is strongly coloured with it. And

[20] I have expounded this conception more fully in my book *Christ, the Christian and the Church,* pp. 122f.

it is painfully evident in the encyclical letter and the resolutions of the Lambeth Conference of 1948, which in consequence show a remarkable hesitancy and incoherence.[21]

This unhappy identification of the Church catholic with the Church militant seems to underlie a suggestion made by the late Dr. O. C. Quick which has introduced great confusion into inter-confessional discussions about the ministry. I mean the suggestion, which was made in his book *The Christian Sacraments,* that "in a divided Church the validity of orders becomes inevitably a matter of degree".[22] If the Church in which a man was consecrated or ordained were merely the Church militant, this might perhaps be so, at least if the further assumption were made that consecration and ordination simply consisted in the conferment by the totality of the Church upon one of its members of a commission to perform certain functions in its name. (Even so, the concept of partial validity gives rise to some very perplexing questions. Can a priest whose ordination is only partially valid only celebrate partially valid sacraments?) If, however, the Church in which the consecration or ordination takes place is the whole Church of God and if the ordinand is being incorporated into the apostolate, the conclusion simply does not follow. It must, I think, be admitted that we are in fact confronted with two radically different doctrines of the ministry between which it is extremely difficult to see any possibility of reconciliation. There is, on the one hand, the doctrine that ordination is an act (whether divinely instituted or humanly invented) by which one of the constituent parts of the Church militant, to the extent to which it is competent to do so, authorizes one of its members to perform on its behalf certain functions which any Christian is in principle already capable of performing. And there is, on the other hand, the doctrine that ordination is an act by which the universal apostolate, most of whose members are not on earth at all, acting through its earthly part

[21] Cf. *Lambeth* 1948 *Reviewed*: A Report of the Theological Committee of the Church Union, pp. 3-7.

[22] P. 145.

incorporates a new member into itself.[23] This view, it must be stressed, does not mean that the apostolate is a kind of inner ring which operates in isolation from the Church as a whole. It is an organ within the Church; ordination therefore takes place in the setting of the Church's liturgy, in the presence of all the faithful. Whatever episcopal activities may take place in secret session, ordination is not one of them. Nevertheless the minister of ordination is the bishop, the local apostle, not the congregation as a whole. For what is happening, in essence, is the creation of a new apostle.[24]

It will, I think, be clear that the conception of the Church and its ministry which I have been expounding is fundamentally eschatological. Dom Gregory Dix has very clearly shown[25] that for the first three centuries the Church was looked upon by its members as a divine and supra-temporal reality into which a man or woman was admitted by baptism and confirmation, and that it was only after the official recognition of Christianity by the Roman Empire that this view was gradually overshadowed by the conception of the Church as a society operating within the temporal process and primarily concerned with the refashioning of the secular order. These two views are, of course, not formally contradictory; moreover it would, I think, be quite untheological to suggest that the Church ought to have refused to be recognized and quite unrealistic to suggest that it could in fact have done so. It is, however, important to remember—and it was in forgetting this that the great defect of medieval Christendom lay—that the Church's temporal mission is only the external manifestation of her supra-temporal and interior reality and can only be understood in terms of it. In calling this concept "eschatological", it is perhaps necessary to explain

[23] There is also the doctrine held, I am told, by some Protestant bodies, that ordination does not *make* a man a minister at all but is nothing more than the recognition by the earthly Church that a man has already been made a minister by the call of God.

[24] See, for example, the prayer for consecrating a bishop in the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus (Trans. G. Dix, pp. 4, 5).

[25] *The Shape of the Liturgy*, ch. xi, "The Sanctification of Time".

precisely how one understands the term. I do not mean, as many of its exponents apparently do, simply that the New Testament, following a contemporary Jewish idiom, frequently describes things that have already happened or are now going on as if they had not yet occurred, in a way which has consistently misled the Church throughout the centuries. I mean rather that, in his membership of Christ and of the Church, the Christian experiences here and now realities whose manifestation in the natural chronological process of history will not take place until the end of time, and that he is able so to experience them because in the unseen realm they already exist and inhere in the ascended Christ. They are future in history, but they are present in the Church, because they are present in Christ. Thus the Church militant, while it is neither an illusion nor a perversion, can only be properly understood if it is seen as the manifestation on earth, and the communication to men, of the human nature which the eternal Word united to himself in the womb of Mary. Our membership of the Church therefore endures as we pass from the Church militant into the Church expectant and triumphant. If we identify the Church of God simply with the Church militant, we shall look upon it as a society with a membership that is constantly *changing* as new members enter it by baptism and old ones leave it by death, after the pattern of any other earthly society. If, however, we remember that the Church militant is only the lower fringe of the whole Church, we shall see the Church as an organism, a body which is constantly *growing*, which is being built up into the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ. And what is true of the Church as a whole is, I have maintained, true of the apostolic ministry, for that is the organ of the body's unity.

IV. Objections and Developments.

There are one or two objections to the view of the ministry which I have put forward which ought to be taken note of. I have heard it complained that, if one holds that a bishop or priest remains a bishop or priest after his bodily death, the necessary

implication is that through all eternity some Christians will be in a position of superiority in relation to others. I must confess that this seems to me to be a most extraordinary objection, but the fact that it has been raised is perhaps illuminating. For I suspect that a very similar objection underlies the common Protestant refusal to give any serious recognition to the saints; there appears to be a lurking feeling that there is something undemocratic in the suggestion that in heaven one star differs from another in glory. I can only reply that this objection seems to be based upon a totally false notion of the kind of superiority that a bishop has to a priest, or a priest to a layman. I was on one occasion astounded to find that a distinguished Free Church theologian genuinely thought that the Catholic doctrine of the ministry implied that a priest is *pro tanto* morally holier than a layman is. Any respect in which there is in fact superiority is surely totally unobjectionable; it is like the superiority which St. Paul ascribes to the eye over the ear and to the hand over the foot, a superiority which is entirely compatible with mutual need and mutual love. And presumably when we are made perfect in heaven, neither will the clergy pride themselves on their "superiority", nor will the laity envy them for it; so what harm will it do? The blessed are able, in Dr. C. S. Lewis's phrase, "to play great parts without pride and little ones without dejection".[26] In the words of Peter Damian's great hymn,

Caritas hoc facit suum quod amat in altero;
Proprium sic singulorum fit commune omnium.

But the very fact that the objection can be made is perhaps a tragic indication of the abuses to which the apostolic office has become subject in the course of the ages and to the kind of superiority over the laity which it has seemed to imply. We can hardly wonder at the misgivings of Protestants about episcopacy if it has appeared to them as typically embodied in Wolsey, Richelieu and Manners Sutton. And this all goes to show the

[26] *Arthurian Torso*, p. 145.

importance of having a theory about the historic episcopate and not simply accepting it as a fact.

Perhaps a more serious objection is that which finds it difficult to suppose that the ministerial character persists beyond the grave since it is hard to see what there can be there for the Christian minister to do. There are presumably no sacraments to celebrate, no sermons to preach, no parishioners to visit, no Sunday Schools to run. And whatever spiritual ministrations are needed by Christians beyond the grave the layfolk might seem perfectly capable of giving them to one another, without any need for clergymen. Furthermore, if the general Catholic teaching about the nature of purgatory and heaven is reliable, the Catholic priesthood, no less than the Gospel ministry of Protestants, would seem to have singularly little opportunity of exercise in the other world. I believe that this objection rests partly upon a misconception of the real nature of the ministry and partly upon a confusion between the essence of the ministry and its earthly exercise. To take the first point, I have noticed that in discussions between Free Churchmen and Anglicans about the ministry there has been a strong tendency upon the part of the Free Churchmen to look upon the ministry entirely in terms of pastoral activity, while the Anglicans (or at any rate many of them) have laid the primary stress on its sacramental and liturgical functions. In consequence, the Anglican clergy have seemed to the Free Churchmen to be almost entirely preoccupied with devising and conducting church services and to be lacking in concern for people's souls. Now it is, of course, unfortunately true that some of the Anglican clergy are "spikes". But it needs to be emphasized that, when we say that the primary function of the Christian minister is sacramental and liturgical, we are thinking of him neither as a machine for saying masses and pronouncing absolutions, nor as a professional organizer of inspiring ecclesiastical functions. It is indeed true that his priesthood is most fully and publicly exercised when he is standing at the altar as the celebrant of the Liturgy. But what is the Liturgy itself? It is the perpetuation in the Church's

midst of the redemptive act of Christ, the means whereby the people of God are made one and the sins and needs of the world are brought before the throne of the Father. And this, so far from excluding the pastoral character from the priesthood, necessitates it. For the pastoral activity of the Christian minister is concerned with saving men into the Church as members of Christ, so that they may be offered in Christ to the Father in the totality of their functions and activities, that their life and their liturgy may become one. The Eucharist is therefore both the source and the focus of the priest's pastoral action. And the Christian priest is a priest only by participation in the priesthood of the Good Shepherd, who gave his life for the sheep in order to bring them into the Father's fold and who identified himself with them to the point at which he himself became the Lamb of God that takes away the sin of the world.

So much for the first point. I said also that I believed that the objection with which we are dealing rested upon a confusion between the essence of the ministry and its earthly exercise. I mean by this that the ministry *is* something in itself apart from what it *does*. This is, of course, connected with the fact that in ordination a man receives what is technically described as an indelible *character,* that he becomes, not intellectually, morally or physically, but sacramentally and really, *different* from what he was before.[27] It is, of necessity, extremely difficult to say precisely in what this " character " consists, because, as in the case of other realities of the Christian religion, there is nothing else exactly like it; " every thing is what it is and not another thing ". Any description of it must be highly analogical. But it does give its recipient a share (a full share if he is a bishop,

[27] It should be remembered that the Anglican archbishops explicitly stressed the doctrine of sacerdotal character in their reply to the papal condemnation of Anglican orders in 1897. It should be added that it does not seem correct to say, as is sometimes said, that the Orthodox Church denies the indelibility of character. It does seem to hold that in certain circumstances the Church can suspend or, as it were, " paralyze ", the ministry of a degraded priest. But if he is subsequently readmitted to the exercise of his ministry, I do not think he is ever reordained.

a partial share if he is a presbyter) in the apostolate with which Christ has endowed his Church as the organ of its unity; and, while that apostolicity will be most clearly manifested in the priest's sacramental ministrations and supremely when he stands at the altar as the celebrant of the Eucharist, it attaches in one way or another to everything that he *does,* for it arises out of something that he *is.* And so he will take it with him beyond the grave. It should be added that though, according to the common teaching, sacraments will cease in heaven, there is a sense in which the Liturgy will not cease. For the worship of heaven is an organic, symphonic, differentiated and corporate worship; and it is significant that in the Apocalypse it is described under the figure of the Eucharist. So, after the Second Coming of Christ at the Last Day, in the General Resurrection (which is the Resurrection of Christ's Body the Church), there will be transfiguration but not destruction. The apostles will have received their thrones as the judges and patriarchs of the New Israel. They will be seated with their Master, who is himself the Apostle of the Father, at the Messianic Banquet, which, because it is the banquet of his crucified and ascended Body and Blood, is at the same time the perpetual Liturgy wherein the Father is glorified by the Eucharistic offering of him who is the Son by nature and who includes within himself all those who, because they are his members, are the sons of the Father by grace and adoption, and who in their organic unity are his mystical Body and Bride the Catholic Church, one flesh with him. And in this perpetual Liturgy, wherein the Church will for ever contemplate and adore the Father, gazing at him as it were through the eyes of Christ who is her head, everything will be transformed but nothing will be destroyed. However different its expression may be, the Church's apostolate and priesthood will remain, as "the whole and holy society of the redeemed and sanctified city is offered unto God by that great Priest who gave up his life in so mean a form for us to make us members of so great a head".[28]

[28] Augustine, *De Civ.*, X, 6.

There is a further point on which I must touch. I think a good many Protestants would agree that Christ has communicated his apostolic character to the Church, but they would say that it is the Church as such that is apostolic and not merely some one of its organs. Similarly they would say that the whole Church is priestly, and not merely the ordained presbyter; I have heard a high-church Methodist argue that every Christian by his baptism becomes a priest in precisely the sense in which Catholic theology alleges that a man becomes a priest by ordination. Now I do not deny that the whole Church is in a real sense both priestly and apostolic. But if nothing more is to be said than this it seems to be quite impossible to make sense of the plain New Testment fact that Christ chose from those whom he called unto him twelve whom he named apostles[29], and that after his Resurrection he breathed into them his Spirit, gave them the authority to bind and loose,[30] and commissioned them to teach and baptize all nations.[31] However, this will perhaps not seem strange if we return to the point from which we began and remember that the unity of the Church is the unity of the Holy Trinity. For the unity of the Holy Trinity is a differentiated unity, in which the Son is eternally begotten by the Father as apostle and priest. It is, I think, generally recognized to-day that both the apostolic and the priestly function of our Lord do not begin with the Incarnation but are the manifestation in human flesh of eternal realities; *missiones sequuntur processiones*. As the Epistle to the Hebrews insists, Christ's priesthood is a priesthood "after the order of Melchizedek",[32] grounded in the eternal realm. And his apostolicity and his priesthood are nothing more than the two aspects of his eternal generation. As begotten from the Father he is the *apostolos,* the one who is *sent,* who *comes forth;* as the loving and obedient Son, who delivers himself back to the Father in joyful and filial self-oblation, he is

[29] Luke vi, 13.

[30] John xx, 21-23.

[31] Matt. xxviii, 19.

[32] Heb. v, 6; vii, 17.

the eternal *priest* who offers himself as the archetypal sacrifice.[33] By his Incarnation this dual character of his sonship is communicated to his human nature; and by the baptismal incorporation of men and women into him it is communicated to the Body the Church. In so far then as the Church is his Body, *ecclesia de Christo,* she is apostolic and priestly, and so is every Christian, though not as an individual but as a member of the Church. This is entirely true and must not be minimized. There is, however, another truth that must be borne in mind. The Church is not only *ecclesia de Christo;* she is also *ecclesia de Trinitate.* Her life and unity are the life and unity of the Holy Trinity. The pattern of her life is the pattern of the life of God, into which she is taken up. And the life of God is not an undifferentiated but a trinitarian life, in which Father, Son and Spirit, though united, are distinct, and in which sonship, with its two aspects of apostleship and priesthood, is not common to all three Persons but is proper to the Son alone. So I would suggest, with all the deference that should accompany speculation in such high matters, if we remember that the Church is *ecclessia de Trinitate,* mirroring the pattern of the triune God, as well as *ecclesia de Christo,* mirroring the pattern of the Incarnate Lord, we can see how congruous it is that, in addition to the apostolic and priestly character of the whole Church as *corpus Christi,* there should be an apostolic and priestly character that adheres in the ordained ministry alone. Furthermore, if the Spirit is the principle of love, binding the Son to the Father in the inner life of deity and, so to say, making the procession of the Son from the Father something that does not split the Godhead but, by the act of filial response, contributes to its unity, then it seems wholly appropriate that ordination should be recognized as the peculiar work

[33] There is, of course, no suggestion that this eternal sacrifice is a sacrifice for *sin*; it is not a propitiation but a homage. Nor does it involve destruction; it is self-giving, not destruction, that is the essence of sacrifice, though when sacrifice is made in a world of sin the element of destruction is bound to be present, though even there it is subordinate to the element of transformation. Cf. Masure, *The Christian Sacrifice, passim.*

of God the Spirit, who confers the apostolic and priestly character upon the new minister as something which is not to set him up as separate from or antagonistic to the Church, but to make him an agent and instrument of the Church's unity. I must make it plain that I do not put forward the above reflections as proofs that there must be in the Church an apostolic and priestly ministry which is not just co-extensive with the Church itself; the existence of the ministry rests not upon theological speculation, but upon Scripture and tradition, as the Preface to the Anglican Ordinal asserts. But such speculation may be of value as providing *rationes convenientiae,* to illuminate and show the mutual coherence of truths that have been already accepted. And this is, after all, the only positive task that the human reason can perform in the sphere of divine revelation.

Having just made use of the appeal to Scripture and tradition, I will conclude by pointing out what, in the light of the view of the Church that I have been expounding, the nature of this appeal is. Only too often it appears, I am afraid, as purely reactionary and antiquarian, and therefore tends to exasperate many of those who are most conscious of the urgency of the Church's present-day task. If, however, we are conscious of our solidarity with the Church beyond the grave we shall see that the appeal to tradition is not an appeal to our remote predecessors but to our contemporaries. It is the guarantee that the whole Church believes the same faith. No more than the ministry is the Church's tradition to be looked on simply in terms of succession, but in terms of organic development and identity. The appeal to tradition has been defined, in a fine phrase, as "the democracy of the dead", and this is true. But, since God is the God not of the dead but of the living, and since those who die in Christ are alive in him, the appeal to Christian tradition is the appeal from the part to the whole. For we are "come unto mount Zion and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to innumerable hosts of angels, to the general assembly and church of the firstborn who are enrolled in heaven, and to God the judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect, and to Jesus the mediator of a new covenant,

and to the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better than that of Abel".[34]

[34] Heb. xii, 22-24.

CHRISTIAN INITIATION[1]

Anglican Principles and Practice

By F. C. TINDALL

I. Introduction.

I HAVE been asked specially to deal with recent discussions, both official and unofficial, in the Anglican Church, leading to a development of the traditions long existing in that Church. First, then, it will be convenient to give a brief sketch of what discussions there have been, both official and unofficial, in recent years; to several of them I shall have to refer from time to time.

These discussions have begun from the *practical* rather than from the *theological* side, from anxiety about the fact that the majority of those baptized at Church of England fonts never get established as confirmed and communicant members of our Church. The matter was briefly considered as long ago as 1897 at a Lambeth Conference, and again in 1914 and 1920 in the Canterbury Convocation. But in the last 15 years the discussions have had a more urgent tone. Just before the recent war, many of the younger clergy (and some not so young too) of different schools of thought were much exercised in their minds about the "indiscriminate" Baptism of infants. For example, a group of them at Poplar studied the matter carefully in relation to conditions in the East End and produced a short report; and about the same time the Social and Industrial Commission of the Church Assembly got together a representative group of younger clergy and laity to give their opinion about it quite frankly—and they did so, very frankly.

[1] A paper read at the Friends of Reunion Conference at High Leigh on December 13, 1950.

As a consequence the Archbishop of Canterbury, in 1937, appointed a Joint Committee to consider the problem. I was a member, and ultimately secretary, of that committee, and I have had the privilege of continuing as secretary of these official Church of England Committees on Baptism and Confirmation, except, of course, that at Lambeth, ever since. That first Joint Committee issued a very short report at the end of 1938; it was concerned with the *practical* problems and hardly faced the theological issues—indeed Dr. Vidler called it a "meagre and miserable" report! But the practical recommendations, which were not drastic, but aimed at improvements in detail regarding the administration of Baptism, were considered and adopted by Convocation in 1939, and the bishops were asked to send instructions to the clergy in accordance with them. The War interrupted that process, though a few dioceses, like Chichester, did officially adopt the resolutions, in synod or otherwise. No similar action was taken in the Province of York just then.

The work was established on a wider basis when, in May 1942, Joint Committees of both Canterbury and York were appointed to consider together the further subject of Confirmation. Our report was published at the end of 1944, with the title *Confirmation To-Day*. It gave a theological statement, on traditional lines, about Baptism and Confirmation and their relation to the Holy Spirit and to Holy Communion; it gave some startling figures and an interesting analysis of the present practical situation, suggesting various causes for the lapses from the Church after both Baptism and Confirmation and indicating the opportunities before the Church; and it put forward certain positive suggestions for consideration by the clergy. The results of the clerical discussions showed that the clergy were overwhelmingly conservative and desired no change in the present arrangements about Confirmation. But a very vigorous theological discussion developed, centring on the theological section of *Confirmation To-Day*. The 1945-47 issues of the magazine *Theology* showed some of this; but the most notable publications perhaps were Dom Gregory Dix's Public Lecture at Oxford in 1946, entitled *The Theology of Confirmation in Relation to*

Baptism, and the volume *Baptism and Confirmation* by the Bishop of Sodor and Man and others, in the same year.

As a result of this discussion, the archbishops appointed a Theological Commission to go further into the theological problems; and its report, *The Theology of Christian Initiation,* came out in January, 1948, showing a surprising measure of agreement among men of different schools of thought. The report was shorter than had been intended, since the Archbishop of Canterbury had asked us to have it ready for dispatch to the bishops who were coming for the Lambeth Conference, and only a full summary of views was presented. A further contribution to the theological discussion came in the Bishop of Derby's booklet, *Christian Initiation* (1947).

Meanwhile the "Baptismal Reform Movement" had been gaining strength, with its plea for stricter rules regarding the admission of infants to Baptism, and notice had to be taken of it.

So the Lambeth Conference of 1948, and more particularly its special committee on Baptism and Confirmation, considered both the theological aspects, developing to some extent those of *The Theology of Christian Initiation,* and also the practical aspects; and the Lambeth Committee's Statement has proved a valuable basis for our further work.

Finally, the Joint Committees followed this up, in 1949, with their further report, *Baptism To-Day,* summarizing both the theological and practical issues which have arisen in the Church to-day and referring questions about them to the clergy for their consideration. During this year, 1950, the clergy throughout England have been considering *Baptism To-Day* and the questions referred to them therein; reports about their findings are coming in from the various dioceses and will have to be collated and reviewed by the Joint Committees some time next year.

I should add that the special Theological Commission which produced *The Theology of Christian Initiation* is still functioning and is working at some of the problems raised at the 1948 Lambeth Conference.

Such have been the main discussions which are the background of what I have to say. I would emphasize that it is a very

live question in Anglican circles in this country just now, but apparently there has not yet been the same lively interest and discussion in other parts of the Anglican Communion throughout the world.

II. Theological Principles.

Anglicans are now generally agreed that we ought not to decide the practical problems before being clear (or clearer) about the theology behind them.

(i) *The Sacraments Generally.*

Two points concerning the sacraments which have been given more emphasis in recent Anglican theology have a bearing on the Theology of Initiation.

(a) *Grace and the Sacraments.*

Our theologians now stress the importance of thinking of Grace as personal, as a personal activity and relationship between God and man, as against the sub-personal, quasi-material, views of Grace which have sometimes been held. Some indeed, like the late Dr. N. P. Williams,[2] have gone so far as to equate "grace" with the Holy Spirit himself; others, like the late Dr. J. K. Mozley,[3] have preferred to think of "grace" as God in action, the personal working of the Holy Spirit upon the soul, rather than as God himself.[4] This latter view is reflected in the recent statement of Lambeth[5]: "The gifts of grace, therefore, are to be thought of always in terms of the operation and influence of the Spirit of God upon the spirit of man".

Along with this emphasis on grace as personal, there is also the emphasis on grace as prevenient. That the initiative is with God is a point often stressed, a truth which is safe-

[2] N. P. Williams: *Grace of God*, pp. 110/11.

[3] J. K. Mozley: *The Gospel Sacraments*, p. 54.

[4] Both views are found in Augustine, implicitly or explicitly, and also the sub-personal view as well.

[5] Lambeth Report, 1948, p. 110, 1.

guarded in the *ex opere operato* view of God's operation in the sacraments, provided it is interpreted, not in the mechanical, unethical way in which it has sometimes been held, but as expressing God's objective and absolute action, independent of the feelings or dispositions of minister or recipient. But, of course, man's response in penitence and faith is also necessary, if he is to receive the full benefit of the sacraments. This point about God's initiative and man's response was clearly made both in *The Theology of Christian Initiation* and in the Lambeth Report.

(b) *Sacraments as both symbolic and instrumental.*

The late Dr. Quick's distinction, in *The Christian Sacraments,* between the significance and the instrumentality of sacraments has now almost become a commonplace in our discussions. The point is already included in our Article XXV in the phrase, *efficacia signa,* effectual signs, effective symbols; but it had never (I think) been so clearly drawn out before Quick's famous discussion. The Anglican view, therefore, is that sacraments are signs, symbols, representative of God's creative and redemptive acts in history, and also instruments, means, through which the thing symbolized is effected. Thus the recent Lambeth Committee[6] said: "The function of the sacraments is both symbolic and instrumental; they are signs and means of grace. They represent dramatically the creative and redemptive acts of God, and mediate them to the faithful".

(ii) *Initiation and its Effects.*

In recent Anglican discussions about Initiation, certain developments of view or changes of emphasis can be distinguished; they will be indicated at the relevant points in the general survey. I shall not expound our Article XXVII on Baptism, though I shall refer to it.

[6] *Ibid.* pp. 108/9. Cf. *The Theology of Christian Initiation,* p. 25. This sort of emphasis is now quite general.

(a) *Adult and Infant Baptism.*

1. More emphasis is now put on Adult Baptism plus Confirmation as the *norm* of Christian Initiation, with the element of conscious response, in penitence and faith, as in New Testament and primitive days. I do not propose to comment on the New Testament evidence—we have, indeed, all been specially grateful to Dr. Flemington for his book, *The New Testament Doctrine of Baptism,* which incidentally has been set for post-ordination study in several dioceses. And the subject has already been dealt with in this conference. But I would point out that the primitive pattern of the initiation of adults has been much stressed in our recent discussions. For example, Lambeth, 1948[7]: "The classic pattern of Initiation, as it is portrayed in the New Testament and crystallized in the primitive Church, with its clear emphasis on God's initiative and man's response to the preaching of the Gospel in repentance and faith within the context of the Body of Christ, must be the controlling pattern in this study" (of the twin ministries of the Word and Sacraments). Our recent Anglican documents point out that the early Christian Initiation of about the end of the second century at Rome (as indicated by the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus) had 6 main elements:

1. Renunciation of Satan and world.
2. Confession of Faith.
3. Immersion in water.
4. Anointing with oil.
5. Laying-on-of-hands by the bishop.
6. (Consummation in) Holy Communion.[8]

One cannot trace the whole of that pattern in the New Testament without special pleading; but the laying-on-of-hands is

[7] Lambeth Report 1948, p. 107. Cf. also Dix, *Theology of Christian Initiation,* and *Baptism To-Day.*

[8] *Theology of Christian Initiation,* p. 11. *Baptism To-Day,* p. 16. Cf. *Christian Initiation* (Rawlinson), pp. 6/7.

there, connected closely with Baptism in three passages (Acts viii and xix and Hebs. vi, 2)[9].

In spite of the fluidity in the use of terms in the first few centuries (whereby "Baptism" could be used for the whole complex of rites and not only for the immersion, and the "seal" could be applied to the whole, to the immersion, and to the laying-on-of-hands), Anglican writings now "recognize the fundamental connexion and unity of the rites of Christian Initiation".[10] Baptism and Confirmation (to use what has been the Western name since the fifth century) are regarded as complementary parts of a complex rite and we ought to regard them in that way in our teaching as the norm of Christian Initiation. This frank recognition, as seen not only in Dix and other writers, but also in the official reports, marks a very recent change of emphasis in Anglican theology.

2. Yet the majority of Anglicans are also agreed that Infant Baptism is defensible and justifiable, in theology and in practice. Many of us would agree that the evidence for the Baptism of infants in the first four centuries is quite scanty and that sometimes special pleading has tried to cover up the deficiency. But most of us would agree that the eventual establishment of the practice by the fifth century was justified, as a special privilege for the children of Christian parents. Thus *The Theology of Christian Initiation*[11] declares "that the Baptism of the infant children of Christian people is congruous with the doctrine of the Church as a spiritual family, race, and nation". And similarly the bishops in the Lambeth Commitee[12] said that they valued it "for the welcome which it gives to little children on their incorporation into the family of the Christian Church".

[9] The exceptional thing in Acts viii is not that the laying-on-of-hands was added to the Baptism, but that the two were separated.

[10] Lambeth Report, p. 108, 1.

[11] P. 21.

[12] Lambeth Report, p. 109, 4 = *Baptism To-Day*, p. 19 (iv).

Both documents[13] also stressed the value of Infant Baptism "as declaring the priority of God's act" and as showing "God's initiative" in the "salvation and sanctification of his people". I may remind you that the same point is put very strongly by Dr. J. S. Whale in his valuable book, *Christian Doctrine*[14].

Yet though most of us consider that Infant Baptism is still justifiable, our Anglican theologians now recognize that some adjustments in the theology are necessary because of it. Our recent discussions[15] show general agreement that Infant Baptism by itself cannot claim the full theological meaning which the New Testament ascribes to the Initiation of adults. The element of personal response, so conspicuous in the New Testament, has to be provided at some stage; it is provided, for Anglicans, in Confirmation. This is a point now much emphasized in Anglican theology.

It is interesting to note that Dr. Flemington[16] considers that "Confirmation or some similar rite" is needed for those who have been baptized as infants, and that the same line is taken in the recent report, *Church Relations in England*[17]: "That infant Baptism should be followed by another rite which provides for the expression and recognition of personal repentance and faith, would carry general assent".

Other modifications in the theology of Baptism consequent upon the Baptism of infants will be noted at other points.

(b) *The Effects of Christian Initiation.*

We regard Baptism as an effectual sign, an effective symbol, of certain things which may be roughly distin-

[13] *Theology of Christian Initiation*, p. 21. Lambeth Report, p. 109, 4.

[14] J. S. Whale, *Christian Doctrine*, pp. 164 and 166.

[15] e.g., *Theology of Christian Initiation*, p. 12; Lambeth Report, p. 109, 4.

[16] Flemington, *New Testament Doctrine of Baptism*, pp. 145 and 152.

[17] P. 32.

guished as follows. The first two are roughly the same for both adults and infants; but the other two need modification in the case of infants.

1. *Initiation*—into the eternal world. In our recent Anglican discussions, there has been greater stress on the eschatological conception of two worlds in connexion with Initiation. It has not been much stressed hitherto, but it is a characteristic feature now, as in *The Theology of Christian Initiation,* the Lambeth Report, and *Baptism To-Day*[18]. *The Theology of Christian Initiation* (p. 9) strongly emphasized the contrast between the two worlds in which the Christian lives—the natural world-order, transitory, sinful and under God's judgement, and the eternal world, the realm of light and life, where God is supreme and sin is overcome, and where grace, forgiveness and fellowship are manifest. The primitive rites of Christian Initiation (i.e. of adults) mark the acceptance of the convert into this eternal world; and Initiation cannot properly be understood apart from this eschatological aspect. So claimed *The Theology of Christian Initiation.*

But presumably the same point is involved when we think of it in other ways—as incorporation into the membership of the Church (*cf.* St. Paul's "baptized into one Body" —I Cor. xii, 13); or (as in our Article XXVII) as being grafted into the Church; or some would prefer to speak of entering a new covenant relation to God. But Christ, the Eternal Order, the Church—they are all there first: it is God's act, not something we do—the initiative is with him.

And Anglicans (as I have already said) have emphasized the value of Infant Baptism in this connexion. The bishops at Lambeth[19] said: "We particularly value the practice of Infant Baptism for the emphasis which it lays upon the initiative of God in man's redemption and in his translation from the Kingdom of darkness into the Kingdom of light".

[18] Cf. also the report, *Church Relations in England,* p. 31, line 6.
[19] Report, p. 109, 4. Cf. *Baptism To-Day,* p. 19 (iv).

We should therefore agree with Principal Micklem's contrast[20] between a dedication service and a Baptism: that a dedication ceremony is something that we do—parents and others dedicating the child to God—whereas Holy Baptism is something that God does, through his Church.

First, then, Initiation.

2. *Regeneration or rebirth.*

This is very akin to the first point, but there is a slightly different emphasis (and imagery)—more concerned perhaps with the personal status of the baptized. Most Anglicans would now, I think, interpret regeneration in terms of the contrast between the old natural life, with our natural birth, and the new spiritual life in Christ, as his spiritual sons, to which we are reborn by our new birth in Baptism. Our Article XXVII speaks of "our adoption to be the sons of God" (following out the Pauline conception in Galatians and Romans)[21].

We ought, perhaps, to note the late Dr. Quick's discussion of this point in his *The Christian Sacraments* (pp. 161/8). He thought of Baptism as "essentially the Sacrament of the divine Fatherhood, or of man's filial relation to the God of whom all fatherhood in heaven and earth is named". He considered that our baptismal teaching must necessarily depend upon the idea of God's Fatherhood: hence our rebirth into the heavenly family of God is so important, so that we can say "Abba, Father". (And in connexion with Holy Communion Dr. Quick wrote: "In the sacramental scheme of spiritual life, . . . a soul must be born into God's family before it can take its place at the family board".) In discussing the objection that this seems to deny that God is already the universal Father of all and that we are his children by virtue of our humanity, he pointed out that there is only one text in the New Testament (Ephesians

[20] Quoted in *Theology*, July, 1940, p. 7. Cf. also J. S. Whale, *Christian Doctrine*, pp. 165/6.

[21] Galatians iv, 4-5. Romans viii, 15-17. Cf. Galatians iii, 26-27.

iv, 6—"one God and Father of all") which might be cited in support of God's universal Fatherhood, and that the New Testament does suggest that we are brought into a special filial relationship to God through Baptism.

The recent report, *Church Relations in England* (pp. 31/2) refers to differences of opinion about the relation between regeneration and conversion. The two have been identified in the past by many Anglican writers, and some Anglicans would still identify them. But those of us on the Archbishop's Commission, which produced *The Theology of Christian Initiation* (of different schools of thought), considered that they should be distinguished[22]. We would consider that regeneration is in Baptism, and that conversion may come before Baptism, or after it (as with infants). The New Testament point of view, with Adult Baptism, would seem to be that conversion normally leads people to seek Baptism, by which they are regenerated by their second birth into God's family. Conversion is a change, sudden or gradual, of the centre of one's life (so that it is God-centred instead of self-centred); regeneration is a change of status (our adoption as God's spiritual sons), which would seem to be the view of our Article XXVII. ("Baptism . . . is also a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby, as by an instrument, they that receive Baptism rightly are grafted into the Church".)[23]

Regeneration or rebirth in this sense can also be predicated of infants, since it is not identified with conversion. To quote Dr. Quick again (*ibid.* p. 175): "The Sacrament of Baptism still stands for the fact that man needs a double birth, spiritual as well as natural, and membership in two families, a heavenly as well as an earthly". Infants do not earn sonship; but neither can adults—it is God's free gift. Yet the filial relation is there and can be a ground of renewal, as with the Prodigal Son. It is a case of "Become

[22] Cf. p. 21.
[23] Cf. also *Church Relations in England*, p. 32.

what thou art"—*Werde das du bist*[24]. The potentialities are there and have to be realized in the course of the years, through God's leading and guiding and our co-operation. The relationship of human parents with their babies in their families is a one-sided relationship at first, the parents' love and care meeting no conscious response; but that gradually comes. So also within the family of the Church, the conscious response of the child to God can and should gradually grow, so that the relationship between God and the child becomes *two-sided,* not merely God's love and care for the child, but the child's trust in and love for God[25].

3. *Forgiveness of sin.*

Anglicans have no difficulty in regarding the Baptism of adults as being an effectual sign of the forgiveness of *actual* sins and spiritual cleansing. As our Article XXVII puts it, "the promises of the forgiveness of sin . . . are visibly signed and sealed". Baptism in the New Testament is clearly connected with the remission of sins, whether from the obvious analogy of the washing, or the vivid Pauline analogy of a death and resurrection, a death, by drowning, to the old, sinful life, and a rising out of the waters to newness of life in Christ. But Quick reminds us (p. 169) that "Baptism only effects the beginning of a process of which it symbolizes the end and the whole". There is no magical change.

But when we consider sin in relation to the Baptism of infants, some modification in the theology is obviously necessary. Anglicans are at last trying to face that fact after avoiding it for so long. There can be no forgiveness of *actual* sin—infants have committed none. To talk of the forgiveness of *original* sin seems to me to be meaningless. If there were such a thing as original guilt, that would need forgiveness, but I quite frankly regard Augustine's views about original guilt not only as purely speculative, unscrip-

[24] Cf. *Theology of Christian Initiation,* p. 21.
[25] Cf. J. P. Hickinbotham in *Baptism and Confirmation,* pp. 28/29.

tural and lacking in catholic authority (as agreed in *The Theology of Christian Initiation,* p. 21) but also as morally and spiritually false. My appendix on the "Theology of Original Sin and Original Guilt" in *Baptism To-Day* gives my justification for such a statement. It is perhaps significant that, though I alone am responsible for that appendix, the members of the Joint Committees thought it right to print it in such an official publication, whereas in 1938 any such statement was deemed inexpedient. Our 1662 Baptismal Offices admittedly reflect Augustine's extremer views concerning original guilt, and the 1928 revision has helped us much.

But we would at the same time maintain that truth of experience to which Augustine gave the misleading term original sin—"the moral and spiritual weakness or handicap, the tendency towards evil rather than good, inherited by us all".[26] We maintain it, not merely as against Pelagianism, but because it is true to experience, as affirmed by St. Paul in Romans vii, 15 ff. But it is not something which needs forgiveness; sin is the wrong word for it—it is rather a spiritual infirmity or weakness which needs God's grace and power to remedy it.

I would say that the initial sacramental imparting of that much-needed divine power comes at Baptism, and I think that Dr. Quick would have supported that[27].

But there is the further point, that we are born into an order where sin reigns, even though we are not personally responsible or guilty; and at Baptism the child is reborn into the realm where God's grace abounds and where "the benefits of the divine forgiveness are at work."[28] That, of course, is regeneration, not forgiveness of any sin. But the

[26] *Baptism To-Day,* p. 47.

[27] Cf. Quick, *Christian Sacraments,* p. xvi. "I find no intellectual scandal in believing that in the baptism God actually receives and blesses an unconscious child, and sows the seed of spiritual life in its nascent soul".

[28] *Theology of Christian Initiation,* p. 21.

Baptism can be regarded as symbolizing the universality of sin in a fallen world and the need of God's cleansing and redemption, without effecting any *personal* forgiveness for the child. In that respect, the symbolic rather than the instrumental aspect would have to be stressed, as Dr. Quick pointed out[29].

It is on such lines that many Anglicans are considering the necessary modifications regarding the sin aspect of Infant Baptism.

4. *The Power of the Spirit.*

All Anglicans could, I think, agree that the power of the Holy Spirit is given, if we are referring to the whole complex rite of Christian Initiation.

But, as is well known, there has been disagreement about the operation of the Holy Spirit in Baptism and Confirmation, ever since the 90's, when Dr. A. J. Mason and Father Puller, S.S.J.E.[30] maintained that the primitive view was that the gift of the Holy Spirit was given only in the second part of the rite, in Confirmation and not in Baptism. They asserted that any apparent evidence that the Holy Spirit is given in Baptism is to be explained by the use of the term " Baptism " to cover the *whole rite* of Initiation. Dom Gregory Dix has revived this view in his pamphlet, *The Theology of Confirmation in Relation to Baptism.*

If the argument is fully valid, it would mean that the references in our Baptismal Services to receiving the Spirit through Baptism are unjustified and ought to be cut out.

One very fair Anglican discussion of the evidence is that by Bishop Kenneth Mackenzie in the S.P.C.K. volume *Confirmation* (Vol. I. Chap. VI); he regards the evidence as inconclusive.

Many of us find it difficult to accept Dr. Mason's distinction between an operating of the Holy Spirit from *with-*

[29] *Ibid.* 170/2, 174, 179.

[30] Mason, *The Relation of Confirmation to Baptism*; Puller, *What is the Distinctive Grace of Confirmation?*

out in Baptism, and his coming to *indwell* the soul at Confirmation. Dr. Quick once said that he found himself incapable of discussing this view, since he could not understand what the distinction between an "external" and an "internal" action of the Spirit meant. It is surely difficult to conceive of God's personal activity in so spatial a way.

So the Archbishops' Commission[31] has said, "rather would we stress the positive conviction that from infancy onwards the Holy Spirit gives the baptized the utmost that they are capable of receiving at whatever stage of growth they may have reached". And the Lambeth bishops[32] said, "the dissociation of the Holy Spirit's operation from any part of the Initiation is strongly to be deprecated, as is also the attempt to measure his operation quantitatively".

In this connexion, people sometimes distinguish between water-baptism and spirit-baptism, as if water-baptism means just Baptism while spirit-baptism means Confirmation. Most of the members of the Archbishops' Commission disliked this distinction and asserted that there was no trace of it in the New Testament and the Early Church. The contrast was rather between the water-baptism of John the Baptist and Christian Baptism which was a Baptism in water and spirit, the outward and inward parts of a single sacrament[33].

There is a further point concerning the relation of Confirmation to Baptism, where some modification seems to have been taking place since 1946, involving the meaning and purpose of Confirmation. With the separation in the West of these two parts of the primitive rites of initiation, there came (as Dr. Dix has reminded us so forcibly) a forgetting of the initiatory aspect of Confirmation and the giving of a new interpretation to it. The meaning of the double rite of Baptism plus Confirmation was ascribed to Baptism alone.

[31] *Theology of Christian Initiation*, p. 15.
[32] Lambeth Report, p. 110.
[33] Cf. *Theology of Christian Initiation*, p. 10.

In the end, medieval theologians[34] ascribed to Baptism alone both a complete initiation into the Church and also the gift of the Spirit; while Confirmation was regarded as an independent sacrament of strengthening.

Gregory Dix in his pamphlet (like Mason) traced this medieval view to the Whitsun sermon of the late fifth-century bishop who is usually referred to as Pseudo-Eusebius of Emesa. Parts of that sermon were borrowed by the ninth-century author of the *Forged Decretals,* who ascribed them to Pope Melchiades. And Dr. Dix made merry at the expense of the bishops in the Upper House of Canterbury, who in the debate on *Confirmation To-Day* in May, 1945, stood staunchly by the doctrine which had come down to them through the *Forged Decretals,* quite unaware of that source.

It is true that our Church in its services adopted, through the Reformers, the general medieval view of Baptism and Confirmation—Infant Baptism being regarded as sacramentally conveying full Christian Initiation, with a gift of the Spirit, while Confirmation was regarded primarily as a rite of " strengthening ". And, as Dr. Quick and the Bishop of Derby have pointed out, the adaptation of theology due to the practice of Infant Baptism and the postponement of Confirmation had inevitably to take this sort of line.

But the Church of England has done, what the Roman Church has not done—she has restored an initiatory element in Confirmation. The need for personal responsibility is stressed by requiring instruction and catechizing in connexion with Confirmation; and that was still further emphasized by requiring the ratification of the Baptismal Vows (added in 1662). The Ratification of Vows[35] is essentially a recapitulation of the baptismal interrogation in Infant Baptism and is a means of discovering whether the repentance and faith promised by the Godparents have in fact developed. If they have not, progress to the next stage of Initiation is not allowed.

[34] *Baptism To-Day,* p. 16, summarizing T.C.I., p. 14.
[35] Cf. *Theology of Christian Initiation,* pp. 18/19.

In that way (the Archbishops' Commission maintained) an important initiatory element in Confirmation has been restored; the element of conscious response has been provided for. This point about the initiatory element in Confirmation is a comparatively new emphasis in our theology. The Archbishops' Commission has thus considered that it may be possible on these lines to find a synthesis between the primitive and the medieval view of Confirmation.

Baptism To-Day (p. 17) thus summarizes the point of view of the majority of the members of the Archbishops' Commission: "Full Christian Initiation should . . . be thought of as a process beginning with a request for Baptism, and concluding with the first Communion. The classical order is: 1. Preparation and Examination; 2. Baptism; 3. Confirmation; 4. First Communion. When Baptism is given in infancy, 1. has to be taken in two parts, (a) by sponsors, (b) in person, so that the new order is 1(a), 2, 1(b), 3, 4. Confirmation in the Anglican system has thus a threefold significance. The *Candidate* is confirmed, by the laying-on-of-hands. But before this, the *Vows* are confirmed. And further, the *Baptism* is confirmed, in the ancient sense of Confirmation as the completion of the initiation".

III. Anglican Practice.

I have deliberately spent more time over the theological principles, since the trends of thought cannot always be very clearly discerned. Now at last I come to deal, more briefly, with the practice—under three headings:

(i) Adult Baptism.
(ii) Infant Baptism.
(iii) The Problem of Godparents.

(i) *Adult Baptism.*

Baptism To-Day (cf. p. 34) indicates that many of us think that the present position about Adult Baptism is not very satisfactory and that we seem to be missing a big opportunity of showing what it ought to be like.

We regard Adult Baptism plus Confirmation as the *norm.*

With us now, as in primitive days, it can be preceded by instruction, and the conditions of personal repentance and faith can be fulfilled. Thus the full primitive significance of Initiation is attainable and ought to be manifested in our services. There is a chance to show the full meaning of Baptism and Confirmation as initiatory. Yet it is rarely taken. The Baptism often takes place privately in church, and the Confirmation seems to be regarded as much more important. It is so very different from the impressive services of Christian Initiation of the early days of the Church.

It may be that we are more sensitive and shy about such things in these days, or that we do not expect people to have sufficient courage. May I remind you of the thrilling story of the Baptism of Victorinus Afer, in A.D. 362, as described by Augustine in his *Confessions*. Victorinus had been Professor of Rhetoric at Rome for many years, a public figure, teacher of senators and philosophers, and he was converted in later life through reading the Scriptures. The presbyters at Rome made the offer to the old man that he should make his public profession of faith privately (as could be done in such cases). But no!—he had taught pagan philosophy publicly; he would make his Christian profession publicly. He went to the appointed place, in the sight of all the faithful, to make his profession, and (Augustine says) "there ran a low murmur through all the mouths of the rejoicing multitude, Victorinus! Victorinus! Sudden was the burst of rapture, that they saw him; suddenly were they hushed that they might hear him". And afterwards he was welcomed with love and joy into the fold.

I suppose there are not many Victorinus' about nowadays. But we Anglicans can think longingly of what influence such an example would have in these days of carelessness and indifference. So both the Lambeth Conference and *Baptism To-Day* have recommended that more prominence should be given to Adult Baptism, and especially that a combined service of Adult Baptism plus Confirmation should be drawn up on more primitive lines. Our Convocation Joint Committees will probably be working at that suggestion in the near future.

(ii) *Infant Baptism.*

Most of us Anglicans have no difficulty about the Baptism of infants from good Christian homes and families. In such cases we know that the Initiation will be completed at Confirmation. The child need not be left outside God's family—its moulding within the Body of Christ can begin without waiting for the moment of conscious response.

But with other than good Christian homes and families, the position is much more difficult. Should the children of those who do not practice the Christian religion at all be baptized indiscriminately, or should there be some delay or even refusal? There seem to be three main points of view in our Church to-day about this question; they are set out in our latest report, *Baptism To-Day*,[36] and all three points of view were represented among the members of the Joint Committee which produced it:

(a) First, there are those who would not refuse or delay the Baptism of infants, whatever the circumstances.

Some of those who take this line appeal to the Prayer-book itself, to its rubrics, its Baptism Services and its general standpoint.

Others point to the circumstances in this country where parents have regarded Baptism as a privilege offered for their children, even though they are not religious themselves, and where any kind of test or discrimination between families (especially in rural districts) would be quite invidious.

Others again appeal to our Church's unique position as the Church of the English nation, with a responsibility to all those nominal members who still regard the Church of England as *their* Church.

Those who take this line (of never refusing or delaying Baptism) are against multiplying rules and regulations in the matter; they trust that greater care about the service will be sufficient in time to give a high dignity to the sacrament.

One point can be made on the other side. It is sometimes said that if we practice indiscriminate Baptism, with-

[36] Pp. 24-30.

out any tiresome regulations, it is a good way of making and keeping contact with people who do not otherwise come to church. Dr. Vidler[37] has pertinently asked: Why should not Holy Communion, the other Gospel Sacrament, be used in the same way? Indeed (he pointed out), some of those who would rigidly exclude devout Nonconformists from Holy Communion in all cases, are at the same time willing to baptize children from non-Christian homes in almost any circumstances. There is a point there to be borne in mind.

(b) Secondly, there are those who advocate reform, who desire much stricter discipline in the administration of Baptism. They point out that many parents regard Baptism as rather like vaccination, as having the child "done", or as the way in which the child gets its name, etc., and that so few of the baptized continue as practising members of the Church. They consider therefore that Baptism should be administered only when there is some assurance that the child will be brought up as a Christian; where there is no such assurance, Baptism should be refused or delayed. There ought instead to be a catechumenate, a period of probation and instruction as in the Early Church, to which such children could be admitted in infancy; or some service of blessing, something to show that the child was not being entirely rejected.

This is the general position taken by the "Baptismal Reform Movement". I ought to emphasize that the "Baptismal Reform Movement" does not want to abolish Infant Baptism; it only wants it confined to those children whose parents are really practising Christians, and of whose Christian upbringing there is therefore some assurance.

Some of the difficulties felt about such proposals are referred to in *Baptism To-Day* (p. 28). For example, it is asked, Why should children suffer because of the faults of their parents? But they are, alas! already suffering because of their non-Christian home. Or we are reminded that our

[37] In *Theology*, July 1940, p. 6.

Lord said, " Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not ". But the text has no direct reference to Baptism, and the child could be welcomed at a service of blessing. I personally feel that the chief difficulty is that of forming a fair judgement and discriminating between different families in the same parish, especially in small country parishes, where the difficulty is more acute than in large towns.

There is, indeed, a more drastic proposal (p. 28) which would avoid such discrimination between families. It is that ultimately Baptism should be deferred in all cases to the age of consciousness, that there should be no Baptism of infants; that all infants should be blessed or dedicated or admitted to a catechumenate at a special service, and that Baptism and Confirmation should be administered together later, to responsible adults, as in the earliest days of the Church. This view, as a long-term objective, is held by Dr. Jalland and others, but it does not seem to be held by many people and is not the view of the " Baptismal Reform Movement " as such. I imagine that very few Anglicans will think it right that, because Infant Baptism ought to be delayed in some cases, it ought to be delayed in all.

(c) Many of us have found it difficult wholly to accept any of these points of view. In *Baptism To-day* (p. 29) we have called our point of view "A Waiting Position "—but it is not a matter of sitting on the fence! We would deprecate any widespread exclusion of infants from Baptism and the establishing of a catechumenate for them. But we do consider that it is sometimes necessary to delay the Baptism of infants, and that such delay should be permitted; but that until the doctrine of Infant Baptism has been more clearly thought out, we ought to aim at improving the present practice rather than at any radical reforms.

The point is sometimes raised: Suppose infants die unbaptized, as the result of any greater discipline in administering Baptism, are we not endangering their eternal salvation?

Christian thought has unfortunately been too much influenced concerning that by Augustine's views. If Augustine's extremer views (I am not suggesting that all his views were extreme—they are at least 80 per cent. unexceptionable)—but if his extremer views are true, that all infants are guilty because Adam fell, and that any who die unbaptized are eternally damned (though admittedly in his more humane moments he thought that *their* eternal punishment would be of a milder kind than that of adults); and if, as he thought, Baptism is the means of avoiding such a horrible future; well then, obviously, Baptism should be as indiscriminate as possible, so that we can save as many as possible from a horrible fate. But can we accept such views as true? Can we justify such views from the New Testament? I do not think so, nor can I believe in a God who would act in such a way. And in any case, there is always the safeguarding theological principle, " God is not tied to the Sacraments ".

(iii) *The Problem of Godparents.*

We have had many discussions about the choice and qualifications of Godparents, and about the promises and vows which they are expected to make in the Baptism Service. At clerical and other meetings you hear quite opposite views expressed. Some think that the system of Godparents is no longer effective, others think them still most essential. Perhaps it depends largely on the kind of Godparents chosen and the reasons why they are chosen. If they are chosen so as to pay them a compliment or lest they be offended, or with an eye to the presents they might give, they are not likely to be very effective. But if they are chosen as representatives of the Church, who will realize the very solemn responsibility which is involved, that is another matter.

The Lambeth bishops and our Joint Committees (in *Baptism To-Day*) have agreed that the key to the situation is probably the parents. If the parents are faithful Churchpeople, they can well be Godparents (as they were in the earliest days of the Church till the end of the fifth century). If the parents are not

faithful Churchpeople, one at least of the Godparents ought to be a confirmed and practising member of the Anglican Communion. So the line suggested at Lambeth and in *Baptism To-Day* is that parents should be allowed to be Godparents; and that all Godparents should have been baptized, and one at least be a confirmed and practising member of our Church. Some maintain that that minimum is not always possible; others think that more should be demanded; this is one of those middle ways of which the Church of England is so fond.

There is the further point about the promises and vows which are made in the Baptismal Service. This has been a live issue recently in the York Convocation in connexion with a new service of Baptism which it has been drafting. Some bishops want the sponsors to take the vows in their own name only, and not on behalf of the child (which they think is an unfair attempt to bind another by such vows).

The Lambeth Committee and the Joint Committees have, however, suggested that *both* should be done, that if Godparents are asked to profess their own faith and practice in the service, it should be in addition to the promises they make on behalf of the child, and not in substitution for them. This has now been followed in the draft of the York service.

These issues concerning the Baptism of Infants and about Godparents are involved in our revision of the Canons (or rules) of the Church of England now proceeding. Within the next year or so, battle will be joined between the contending points of view, and one cannot forecast the result. But the clergy, to say nothing of the laity, are mostly very conservative and do not like changes. It is difficult yet to judge how far the present lively movement for reform, moderate yet real, has influenced them. The reports which are due in from the dioceses by the end of 1950 may give us some indication.

I have been concerned to expound and describe, rather than to develop a thesis. My summary has not, of course, covered every point, but I hope I have said enough to show that in our theology a change of emphasis is taking place in some respects, towards more primitive ideas, yet retaining what we hope is best

in the later development under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and that regarding the practice of Baptism some important, even fundamental, issues are being considered and will in due time have to be decided.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

By W. N. CHAPLIN

The widest extension of education in the Roman Empire synchronized with its decline. It is probably too pessimistic to infer from this that the spread of education is a cause of the decay of civilization, but it is an historical fact that the particular type of education in vogue at the time did contribute to the destruction of the civilization it was intended to improve or, at least, uphold.[1] It can therefore be inferred that the provision of educational facilities is not enough in itself. The type of education provided may make the difference between the success or failure of an educational system, between the improvement or the destruction of the civilization in which the devisers of the system believe. At a time like the present, when education is being extended as widely as possible, without any agreement as to aim or as to method or as to what is to be taught, it is salutary that this fact should be emphasized; but as it is frequently contended that an aim for education should be provided, that it should be based on

[1] The schools of rhetoric " hastened rather than hindered the decadence of public life ".—A. F. Leach, *The Schools of Mediaeval England,* London, 1915, 19. " And now indeed rhetoric, divorced from real usefulness, became a dangerous thing; its influence upon Latin literature of the Silver Age is obvious; its prominence in the education of the early Empire was at once a symptom of unhealthiness and the cause of speedier corruption."—William M. Smail, *Quintilian on Education,* Oxford, 1938, xv. See also *The Schools of Charles the Great,* J. Bass Mullinger, London, 1877, 12.

Christianity[2] it is not only salutary, it is necessary. Indeed, a survey of the historical background of a Christian education may serve to show both how essential it is to have a clear aim for an educational system and how far it is desirable that that aim should be Christianity.

The roots of European education are pre-Christian. The Greeks held that education should consist of the liberal arts. These, they considered, were necessary for the formation of the mind of a free man. Not only must education consist of these arts but any others, mechanical pursuits, fit only for slaves, the practice of which might impair the development of the mind, must be excluded. It was a system of education based on, and growing out of, a slave economy.

In the Roman Empire the Greek ideal of a liberal education was modified so as to make all the other arts subordinate to rhetoric. The institution of Professorships of Greek and Latin Rhetoric by Vespasian in A.D. 68 marks the first recognition of the State's responsibility for public instruction.[3] Quintilian held the appointment of Professor of Rhetoric until his retirement in A.D. 90, when he wrote his great work on education, the *Institutio Oratoria*,[4] in which was concentrated the wisdom and experience that had been accumulated on the subject. The advice he had given to the Flavian Emperors and the influence of this book gave the shape to education for centuries. Yet neither the advice nor the book were conceived for universal application. They were de-

[2] A Headmasters' Conference has resolved that "the Christian faith should be the basis and inspiration of their work". On August 5, 1943, Archbishop Temple said, in the House of Lords: "All education must be religious or atheistic—there is no neutrality. You cannot have a neutral education to which you append religious instruction as one subject alongside history and geography. It will have its real value only if it is felt to pervade education as a whole". Similar statements are made in the Norwood Report, especially, "we believe that Religious Instruction is but a part of Religious Education as a whole". *Curriculum and Examinations in Secondary Schools*, 60. See also viii and 67.)

[3] Smail, *Quintilian*, vi.

[4] *Ibid.* vii.

vised to fit the circumstances of the time. It is for this reason, for instance, that he excludes philosophy from his scheme.[5] In the most important feature of his system—the study of rhetoric—he was, however, adapting education to the past. Rhetoric under the Republic had been, for the ambitious, the road to power, for others, a means of service to the State. Under the Empire it became a thing of words and phrases, of epigrams and euphuisms.[6] Quintilian did not foresee the changes that an autocracy would effect and, as a result, education was dominated by rhetoric as European education was dominated "by logic in the Middle Ages, and as it has been since the Renaissance by humane letters. Rhetoric lay in wait for the boy as he left the hands of the grammarian, and was his companion at every stage of his life. It went with him through school and university; it formed his taste and trained or paralyzed his mind".[7]

When the Christians were able to control education, then, they were faced with the problem of whether to make it Christian and if so, by the further problem of how this was to be done. Of the three parts of education, the aim, the method and the content, they were at least fortunate in being clear about the first. Their aim was to produce Christians as opposed to pagans. The method it never occurred to them to change and as a result much of their work was vitiated. The importance of the actual content of education they did see clearly, as it has not always been seen since, as it is not always seen to-day. In fact, it was forced on them by the very nature of pagan education. "The instrument with which both schoolmaster and professor fashioned their pupils was pagan mythology and pagan history. The great literatures of the past supplied the theme for declamation and exercise. Rules of conduct were deduced from maxims that passed under the names of Pythagoras, Solon, Socrates and Marcus Aurelius. It was inevitable that the thoughts of the grown man should be

[5] *Ibid.* xvi, xvii.

[6] *Ibid.* xv. A. Gwynn, *Roman Education from Cicero to Quintilian*, Oxford, 1926, 245, 247.

[7] *The Cambridge Medieval History*, Cambridge, 1911. I, 569.

expressed in terms of paganism when the education of the youth was upon these lines. And this education was for all not only for the children of unbelievers".[8]

Seeing the effect of such training on their children, conscious of its influence over their own minds, the Christians considered what could be done to change it. They thought, as we might say, that it was not enough to hope that the Christian faith would be the basis and inspiration of their work, but that it must pervade the content of what they taught. The literatures of Greece and Rome which, unless education was to be revolutionized by a complete change of method, must form the style and mould the minds of their pupils was pagan through and through. "If we grasp this, that the old literature was packed with the old religion, and not only packed with it but permeated by it, we have within our ten fingers the secret of the 'Dark Ages', the real reason why the Christian Fathers fought down literature and almost prevailed to the point of stamping it out".[9]

Their solution of this problem was to change not the method but the content of education. Tertullian thought that children must go to the pagan schools, since they must be educated, but that no Christian ought to teach in them. This compromise was not generally adopted. The children attended the schools, adults became teachers of rhetoric and, sometimes, teachers of rhetoric became Christians.[10] Throughout the third century they tried to make the great Latin writers such as Virgil and Cicero, Christian and, later, to adopt classical forms of verse for Christian themes.[11] They tried to oppose a Christian literature to that of the pagans[12] and to create a rival to it, partly to show that they did not wish to break entirely with the past.[13] Some did not wish to abolish art altogether, because they realized the appeal

[8] *Ibid.* I, 570.

[9] A. T. Quiller-Couch, *The Art of Writing*, Cambridge, 1921, 195.

[10] William Boyd, *History of Western Education*, London, 1932, 82, 83.

[11] F. A. Puech, *Prudence, étude sur la poésie latine chrétienne au iv^e siècle*, Paris, 1888, 16.

[12] *Ibid.* 17.

[13] *Ibid.* 23.

to certain minds and thought that every man ought to be able to attain to God according to the nature of his own spirit,[14] while others aimed at creating a Christian literature so that the beautiful should not be separated from the useful and the true.[15] Unfortunately they had too much respect for the sacred text to allow their imaginations free play in dealing with biblical themes and their work remained flat and uninspired, by any of the nine Muses at least, until they turned to allegory and at length produced something which would compensate *" le lecteur du courage qu'il faut pour affronter tant d'insignifiance et d'ennui "*.[16]

In the middle of the fourth century, the Emperor Julian prohibited Christians from being teachers of rhetoric[17] on the ground that they could not honestly carry out their duty of expounding the classics if they considered them to be utterly misguided. On the contrary, they should confine their expositions to Matthew, Luke and other writers whom they really reverenced.[18] It looks as if Julian thought that the Christians were in danger of neutralizing the influence of the classics by the spirit of their expositions. The justice of his references to the Gospels seems to have been accepted by some of the Christians, and as a countermove a certain Apollinarius and his son produced " a grammar consistent with the Christian faith, a version of Bible history in epic and dramatic forms and a Gospel improved into would-be Platonic dialogues " so that education could be carried on without the use of pagan works.[19]

The attack by Julian seems to have given the Christians the idea of changing the content of education, because, as both he and they perceived, it was having a profound influence on the minds of the pupils. This idea did not affect education, as a whole, at once. Few ideas do. On Julian's death, the Christians

[14] *Ibid.* 24.
[15] *Ibid.* 31.
[16] See also *Camb. Med.*, I, 569-571.
[17] Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, chapter xxiii.
[18] A. Gardner, *Julian*, London, 1895, 239.
[19] Gardner, *op. cit.* 241. See also Gibbon, chapter xxiii.

returned to the schools " with a sense of victory gained "[20] and made no attempt at reform; but the idea became embodied in the writings of St. Augustine and in that way was to influence education for a thousand years. In his *De Ordine* and *De Doctrina Christiana,* St. Augustine insists that rhetoric is necessary for the presentation of Christianity but " he made two modifications which subsequently found a more general application. In the first place, he attempted to derive the content of grammatical and rhetorical instruction from the Scriptures and other Christian writers . . . In the second place, he advocated the making of compendiums of all kinds of knowledge subsidiary to the main interests of the learner . . . making it unnecessary for the Christian to spend his strength on many subjects for the sake of a few items of knowledge ". Juvencus, Sedulius, Prudentius and many others had already written works which could be used in the first way and " as all three of these authors had at one time or other been teachers of rhetoric, it may be presumed that it was part of their intention in writing to provide text-books for use in schools ".[21] St. Augustine founded a school for preparing men for the ministry. This idea was adopted by Pope Leo I and " the example set by Rome was followed by several bishops in Gaul ".[22] It may be assumed that St. Augustine's modifications of the usual curriculum for the elimination of the pagan classics were put into practice in his own school and in those which used it as a model, but it took some time for these innovations to affect education as a whole owing to the course which the history of Europe was taking at that time.

So long as the Roman Empire existed so long did the schools of grammar and rhetoric persist unaltered.[23] Even in the twilight of the first barbarian invasions they carried on in favoured places, but as the breakdown became more complete they disappeared from all the provinces of what had been the Empire of the West

[20] *Camb. Med.* I, 570.

[21] Boyd, *Hist. of West. Educ.*, 95-97.

[22] A. W. Parry, *Education in England in the Middle Ages,* London, 1920, 23.

[23] *Camb. Med.* I, 570.

except parts of Italy.[24] When schools reappeared in those countries they were brought back by the Church and were attached to monasteries or cathedrals.[25] These schools were refounded after the model of St. Augustine's school for the ministry[26] and it was in them that this Christian literature was predominantly used as the model of rhetoric and the compendiums as the sources of information.[27] Later, the influence of the schools which had survived in Italy and of scholars from the Empire of the East[28] led to the use of pagan classics in some schools in some periods.[29]

The establishment of a Christian education preserved some part of the classical heritage through the sheer necessity of understanding the Bible and other Christian books, of conducting the church services and calculating the date of Easter and other festivals,[30] but it undoubtedly led to a severe restriction on the limits of intellectual freedom. "The pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, the disinterested devotion of the intellectual powers to philosophy and speculation was no longer recognized as commendable or permissible".[31] The introduction of "profane letters" into the schools of England[32] by Theodore of Tarsus

[24] *Camb. Med.* V, 766. Boyd, *Hist. West. Educ.*, 99-102.

[25] "With these leaders (i.e., St. Augustine and Cassiodorus) came the development of Christian school learning in the midst of the barbarism which destroyed civilization in Western Europe and, with it, education in the Roman imperial schools". *The Encyclopaedia and Dictionary of Education,* London, 1921, 326. "In this manner the great revolution was gradually effected. To the municipal school there succeeded the cathedral school; the *grammaticus* of the former was supplanted by the *scholasticus* of the latter, the Christian preacher occupied the place of the professor of rhetoric." *The Schools of Charles the Great.* J. Bass Mullinger, London, 1877, 32.

[26] Parry, *Educ. in Eng. in the Mid. Ages,* 24.

[27] Boyd, *History of Western Education,* 92, 93.

[28] *Camb. Med.* V, 766-767, 772.

[29] *Encyc. of Educ.* I, 330.

[30] Bass Mullinger, *Schools of Charles the Great.* 31. The decision that copying manuscripts was a useful act for a monk also preserved a great deal.

[31] *Ibid.* 33.

[32] Bede makes a marked distinction between scholars who are proficient in sacred and profane, and those whose knowledge was confined to sacred, literature.

extended these limits. It also introduced an element into education which, in due time, was to destroy its Christian character. It was probably from Northumbria that the pagan authors were re-introduced into the schools of the Continent by Alcuin, there to strike a discordant note and give rise to strife and argument for centuries to come.[33]

" From the days when Tertullian first denounced the ancient literature, down to the days of Bossuet and Fénélon " there was an ebb and flow of this controversy.[34] " The ancient authors were not entirely forgotten at any time during the Middle Ages and there were even periods of distinct revival as early as the time of Charlemagne and of the Ottos of Germany. These earlier movements, however, seem sporadic when compared with the revival in the twelfth century ".[35] This ebb and flow was felt in education. When the pagan classics were in favour, they supplemented the Christian literature as models of rhetoric. When they fell into disfavour, the Christian writers of the third and fourth centuries were used.[36] In the reaction that followed the great classical revival of the twelfth century, Jacques de Vitry preached a sermon before the students of the University of Paris in which he said: " In spite of the value of the art of eloquence which we derive from the poets, properly called authors (*auctores*) it is better to choose for our instruction those works which contain moral teaching, such as those of Cato, Theodulus, Avianus, Prudentius, Prosper Sedulius and above all the versified bible. Do not books of this kind suffice without turning to the historians for excitations which lead to debauch and vanity?"[37]

A few years later the ancient classics had so far been forgotten that John Garland wanted them to be re-established by law,[38]

[33] Sir J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, Cambridge, 1921, I, 476-477.

[34] Bass Mullinger, *Schools of Charles the Great*, 10.

[35] L. J. Paetow, *The Arts Course at Medieval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric*, Urbana-Champaign, 1910, 12.

[36] *Ibid.* 20, 22, 23.

[37] *Ibid.* 21-22.

[38] L. J. Paetow, *The Battle of the Seven Arts*, Berkeley, 1914, 16-17.

and this victory of the Christian authors in the schools held until the Renaissance, though probably there was never a complete uniformity. "As soon as the elements of grammar were mastered, some simple text books were read, such as the Fables of Aesop, the exceedingly popular Distichs attributed to Dionysius Cato (a series of moral maxims), or the Eclogues of Theodulus (i.e. Gottschalk). Some classical authors were sometimes studied as well, parts of Virgil, Ovid, and Horace in particular, although it was rare for any classical text to be read thoroughly or completely. Apart from Virgil, who was regarded as semi-Christian, specifically Christian authors such as Prudentius, Lactantius, Sedulius, or Juvencus were preferred, Lactantius being particularly popular in the fifteenth century."[39]

At the beginning of the Dark Ages, after several generations of the control of education by Christians, the aim was to produce Christians and the content was mainly Christian literature, but the method had been taken over unaltered from the pagans and it was that of the rhetoricians, with its concern only for the presentation of arguments and its complete disregard of truth. " It may be said with truth that rhetoric retarded the progress of the Faith, and that Christianity when it conquered the heathen world was captured by the system of education which it found in force. The result of rhetorical training is very plainly seen in all the literature of the period and in the characters of the writers. Even the Fathers are deeply tinged with it, and Jerome himself admits that one must always distinguish in their writings between what is said for the sake of argument and what is said as truth. Though perjury and false witness were heavily punished, lying was never an ecclesiastical offence, and rigid veracity cannot be claimed as a constant characteristic of any Christian writer of the period except Athanasius, Augustine and (outside his panegyrics) Eusebius of Caesaria ".[40]

This neglect to alter the method, combined with the necessity that was felt to confine the intellect within certain limits, those

[39] *Camb. Med.* VIII, 692.
[40] *Camb. Med.* I, 571.

recognized as salutary by the Church of that time, these two influences gave its distinguishing character to the Dark Ages. Rationalists, echoing Lecky, have placed the responsibility for the intellectual defects of the period on Christianity rather than on the evil legacy of the rhetoricians. However the blame be apportioned, defects did exist in an age when education was controlled by the Church, so that they merit profound consideration by all who advocate a Christian education.

One defect was that Truth was subordinated to edification. This was particularly noticeable in the monastic chroniclers, who are, in that respect, but the mirror of their age. In his *Historia Novorum,* Eadmer says that men investigate the deeds of the past to console and invigorate themselves. Henry of Huntingdon in the preface to his *Historia Anglorum* also mentions the consoling effects of history and says: "The attentive reader will learn in this work, both what he ought to imitate and what he ought to eschew; and if he becomes the better for this imitation and this avoidance, that is the fruit of my labours which I most desire; and in truth the direct path of history frequently leads to moral improvement". Even William of Malmesbury who, of all the chroniclers between Bede and Matthew of Paris, comes nearest to being an historian, in the prologue to his *Historia Regum,* says: "I will narrate freely whatever may be a spur to the lazy, a curb to the rash, of use to men of this age or of interest to those of the next".

The other defect was that this view of education led to the suppression of many efforts to find Truth. In the attempt to keep education Christian and with the eye of the educator fixed too exclusively on the target of moral improvement, a dead hand was laid on much intellectual and scientific speculation.[41] The Rationalist historian Lecky has, with justice, summed up the merits and the defects of the Dark Ages. "In active benevolence, in the spirit of reverence, in loyalty, in the co-operative habits, they far transcend the noblest ages of Pagan antiquity, while in that humanity that shrinks from the infliction of suffering, they

[41] Boyd, *Hist. of Western Ed.,* 101.

were superior to the Roman, and in their respect for chastity, to the Greek civilization. On the other hand, they rank immeasurably below the best Pagan civilizations in civic and patriotic virtues, in the love of liberty, in the number and splendour of the great characters they produced, in the dignity and beauty of the type of character they formed". "... A boundless intolerance of all divergence of opinion was united with an equally boundless toleration of all falsehood and deliberate fraud that could favour received opinions. Credulity being taught as a virtue, and all conclusions being dictated by authority, a deadly torpor sank upon the human mind which for many centuries almost suspended its action".[42]

It is not accurate to place all the responsibility for these shortcomings on Christianity as Lecky, and the Rationalists generally, do. The credulity and the toleration of falsehood and fraud are due, in part at least, to the rhetorical method of teaching. The intolerance of unorthodox opinions may be traced, in part at least, to the fear of the hold which the pagan religions had on hardly won converts and partly to the great ignorance and illiteracy of all classes. The breakdown of civilization and the devastations of the repeated barbarian invasions made it impossible for the Christians to carry on where the pagans had left off. They had to start again, almost from the beginning, helped only

[42] W. E. H. Lecky, *History of European Morals*, London, 1911. II, 14-15. As there have been some who have put the emphasis on character training so strongly that it has tended to eliminate intellectual development, it may be well to quote two other passages from this historian. "There can, indeed, be little doubt that, for nearly two hundred years after its establishment in Europe, the Christian community exhibited a moral purity which, if it has been equalled, has never for any long period been surpassed." That—and this. "Yet few persons, I think, who had contemplated Christianity as it existed in the first three centuries would have imagined it possible that it should completely supersede the Pagan worship around it; that its teachers should bend the mightiest monarchs to their will, and stamp their influence on every page of legislation, and direct the whole course of civilization for a thousand years; and yet that the period in which they were so supreme should have been one of the most contemptible in history". (*Ibid.* II, 11-12).

by the memory of what the ancients had achieved.[43] Nevertheless, education at that time could fairly be called Christian and its undeniable defects show that it is not enough merely to say that education should be based on Christianity and to leave it at that.

From the eleventh century, the influence of the rhetorical method on education began to wane.[44] Logic became the dominating subject from that time until the end of the Middle Ages and dialectics the method. In so far as the rhetorical method was abandoned[45] it was merely superseded by the very similar unrealities of the Schoolmen. This method, with its deductions from ancient authorities, made the acquisition of new facts almost an impossibility.

At the end of the Middle Ages, after a thousand years of the dominance of Christianity, education was not yet completely Christian. If the monks had not preserved the classics, and if some of the secular clergy had not persisted in using some of them in the schools, European civilization would have been greatly impoverished, but that preservation and that teaching kept alive something that was essentially pagan. The content had not been made altogether Christian, the method was still one which limited the development of the intellect, but after a thousand years the aim of education remained unaltered.

There were defects in the Christian education of the Dark Ages some, if not all, of which can be attributed to the rhetorical method. Possibly because of the substitution of logic for

[43] See Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science*, London, 1949. 65 *et passim.*

[44] Foster Watson, *The Old Grammar Schools*, London, 1916, 6. The Board of Education *Report of the Consultative Committee on Secondary Education*, London, 1938, 406 (The Spens Report.) L. J. Paetow, *The Battle of the Seven Arts*, 20.

[45] " The rhetorical method and the consequent study of classical authors never died out entirely ". J. W. Adamson, *A Short History of Education*, Cambridge, 1919, 89. " There is no evidence of the systematic teaching of Rhetoric in the Middle Ages." Foster Watson, *The English Grammar Schools to* 1660, London, 1908, 440. " Rhetoric, in the old Roman sense such as Quintilian used it, never flourished in the Middle Ages ". L. J. Paetow, *The Battle of the Seven Arts*, 24.

rhetoric, a more favourable verdict has been given on the Christian education of the Middle Ages. "That there was much of real worth in the teaching of medieval schools and universities is now admitted by all; a great deal of honest hard work was done, and men learnt to think with wonderful rapidity and clarity. The pre-eminence of logic and oral disputation did at least lead to a high standard of deductive reasoning and acute argument. The right use of definitions was understood and followed, while the mental training involved in the ready application of fine distinctions and subtle differences was at once severe and salutary. If the medieval teacher was not allowed to question many of his premises, he was allowed considerable latitude in reasoning from them; religion was honoured; philosophy and theology were esteemed more highly than ever since."[46]

The restriction on the development of the intellect and of knowledge which followed from the prohibition of both teacher and student from questioning their premises was not due to Christianity. The willingness of medieval scholars to accept this restriction, for it was not only the exercise of authority that made them do so, was due to their reverence for the ancients in general, but especially for Aristotle.[47] Scholars were restricted partly by the adoption of the logical method but much more by the necessity to acquire, to understand and to clarify the knowledge inherited from the civilizations of Greece and Rome. Such limitations of the intellect are not, therefore, inherent in a Christian education.

The educational system of the Middle Ages which was certainly based on Christianity had, then, much to commend it and it was not confined to an inconsiderable fraction of the population. "There had been many schools in Chaucer's England, but there were many more on the eve of the Reformation". In fact, England had "acquired a fine system of secondary educa-

[46] *Camb. Med.*, VIII, 716.

[47] H. Butterfield, *The Origins of Science*, 2-3, 21, 85, 86.

tion ".[48] The further comment of the writer of social history on this fact is heavy, not to say sinister, with significance for the history of education. " Thus were prepared the social and intellectual changes of the next century, by the training up of a new middle class of scholarly laymen and scholarly priests, for both had their parts in the great movements that shortly took place. Grammar schools were not, as used to be thought, the result of the English Reformation: they were its cause ".[49]

There were, of course, other and more potent causes of those movements unconnected with the schools; but the part played by the educational system in producing them was important. The mere provision of educational facilities had not been enough in itself to prolong the civilization which the founders of these schools wished to uphold. On the contrary, something in the education provided contributed to its downfall. As with the Roman Empire, the widest extension of education in the Middle Ages[50] synchronized with the decline of medieval civilization.

Not only did the system of education contribute to the destruction of the civilization it was created to preserve, but, what is more significant for our particular purpose, through the neglect to integrate content and method with aim, it changed the very aim of education, it destroyed itself, in the age that was to come. For the Renaissance brought about a revolution in education. The content was changed. Virgil, of course, was retained but the late Latin Christian authors were superseded by pagan classics of the Golden Age. " You throw out Christian authors ", Erasmus makes the opponent of the New Learning say, " and introduce pagans. You forbid the knowledge of chaste

[48] G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History*, London, 1944, 74. The basis for this statement is the work of A. F. Leach, but it was probably not quite so good as his enthusiastic claims would convey. See N. Wood, *The Reformation and English Education*, London, 1931, 2-13, and G. G. Coulton, *The Medieval Panorama*, Cambridge, 1938, 385-390.

[49] *Ibid.* 75.

[50] A similar extension occurred over a large part of Europe. *Camb. Med.* VIII. 694, 695, 717.

writers and put lascivious authors before our youth".[51] The Statutes of Colet for St. Paul's School in 1518, illustrate the change that was then taking place. "I would pupils were taught always in good literature both Latin and Greek, and good authors such as have the very Roman eloquence joined with wisdom, specially Christian authors . . . I say that filthiness and all such 'abusyon' which the latter blind world brought in, which rather may be called 'blotterature' than literature, I utterly abanish and exclude out of this School" . . . "Colet, in truth, was only partially over the starting point of the Renascence, for the Christian authors referred to above were non-classical, viz. Lactantius, Prudentius, Probus, Sedulius, Juvencus".[52] Ten years later, Wolsey, who thirty years before had been, for six months, master of Magdalen College School,[53] put his ideas of a grammar school into an address to the masters of his new foundation, Ipswich Grammar School. In it he changes the content completely and it probably had an influence far beyond that particular school. "The Address, therefore, may be regarded as an early Renaissance grammar school manifesto, and as such is a distinct advance on Colet's statutes for St. Paul's School, with his inclusion in the curriculum of early medieval Christian poets, who were non-classical in both matter and style".[54] Ten years after that the Continental educationist, Sturm, advocated a "compromise between Humanism and historical Christianity" for his school at Strasbourg, "but the Christian Latin poets who were proposed by Colet to be read at St. Paul's fail to appear in the Strasbourg lists; nor are they found in the mid-sixteenth-century curricula of Winchester, Eton or Westminster".[55] Pagan literature had been re-instated as the content of education.

[51] Adamson, *Short Hist. of Ed.*, 110.

[52] Foster Watson, *The Old Grammar Schools*, 12, 13. Adamson, *Short Hist. of Educ.*, 118-119, calls it a curriculum of compromise, but A. F. Leach says, more accurately, "This was, however, not progress, but reaction". *Schools of Medieval England*, 280.

[53] Adamson, *op. cit.*, 119.

[54] Foster Watson, *op. cit.*, 19.

[55] Adamson, *op. cit.*, 159.

The rhetorical method was also restored to its dominating place.[56] "The humanists made a dead set at dialectic in the schools. Rhetoric or the art of oratory they encouraged, but the dialectic or the art of argument they discouraged. The reason apparently was that dialectic had become indissolubly connected with scholastic theology, and had little to do with the poets who formed the main study of the humanists. Like mathematics it presented too severe a study for those who found the whole end of life, literature and education in *belles lettres* and the art of expression".[57] Under the influence of the Renaissance, the schools returned to "a study of grammar (including in this term literary appreciation of authors) and rhetoric (which served as systematic analytical study of good Latin style)".[58] The teaching of rhetoric had been emphasized by Wolsey and "the Elizabethan schools included it, if not specifically as a separate subject, at least in the manner and spirit of reading classical authors as well as in the exercises of the theme and oration".[59] The content and method of education had become once more those advocated by Quintilian, "the lode-star of humanist education".[60] With the unreflecting ardour of reformers, the scholars of the Renaissance re-introduced into European education the method which had contributed to the destruction of the Roman Empire, had retarded the development of Christianity in the Dark Ages and in the centuries about to come was to retard the development of European civilization.

Finally, the reversal of the efforts of a thousand years, the aim of education was changed. "It was the substitution of humanism for divinity, of this world for the next, as the object of living and therefore of education, that differentiated the humanists from their predecessors".[61] The main difference consists in the object laid down. Whereas the thirteenth century

[56] Spens Report, 405, 407.
[57] A. F. Leach, *Sch. of Med. Eng.*, 270-271.
[58] Foster Watson, *The Old Gr. Sch.*, 8.
[59] Foster Watson, *The Eng. Gr. Sch.* to 1660, 440.
[60] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Ed.*, 164.
[61] Leach, *Sch. of Med. Eng.*, 248-249.

friar says that "all the studies of learners ought to be for theology, that is, to tend to the knowledge of God", his fifteenth century followers aim at moulding "the nature of man as a citizen, an active member of the State".[62] If the schools of medieval England had helped to produce "the great movements", the Renaissance and the Reformation, the intentions of their founders had gone singularly astray.

This change did not take place without opposition. It was opposed by "old-fashioned scholars who thought that 'poetry' (their contemptuous name for literature in general) was an entirely inadequate substitute for the systematic curriculum of pure grammar, logic and philosophy which had long prevailed in schools and universities. Some saw an even greater objection in the character" of classical literature.[63] It was not, however, only reactionaries and obscurantists who opposed the change. It was seen that "two radically different philosophies of life" were in conflict. "The Humanism of Europe had its roots in the ancient non-Christian civilization". Not only did classical literature embody "the worship of false gods", the cult of which "depraved spirits resulted in a depraved morality, to which so much of classical literature, in poetry particularly, was witness" but a reasoned conviction grew up "that Christianity and Humanism represented principles of conduct which it was very difficult, if not impossible to reconcile. The latter taught by implication that man's nature in its essence is good and perfectible by human means. The former expressly declared that man's nature has been vitiated at its very source by sin, and that divine grace alone can remove the taint. The two join issue on the question, Is there such a thing as Sin ?"

The clash between the two philosophies was most violent in Italy. "The Italian humanist aspired above all else to exhibit *virtu* in his own life. In noble natures, this meant respect for personality; the aim of education was for them the development of personality in each. In natures less noble or ignoble, *virtu*

[62] *Ibid.*, 250.
[63] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Ed.*, 110.

consisted chiefly in standing out from the herd, in being 'somebody'; each thought of culture as a mode of 'self-expression' and as a disregard of conventional standards generally. It was assumed that the 'self' to be expressed was by nature a self which ought to be expressed, that it was its own standard and its own justification". From this development of what might have been considered a harmless literary movement grew "the combination of ruthless cruelty with refined scholarship" found in so many men of the Renaissance, "the loosening of moral ties" that was "visible amongst scholars, ecclesiastical and public men" and "the anti-Christian spirit" that "was thought to be embodied in *The Prince* (1513) of Machiavelli". "Humanism, so understood, was the negation of Religion; and Humanism was apt to retort that Religion was irrational and superstitious. This, and no mere questions of more or less Latin, of Latin better or worse, or even of literature *v.* scholasticism, was at bottom the issue which sixteenth-century educators had to face".[64]

The victory went, for a time, to Humanism; but it was not even the best Humanism, as it developed in the schools. "The very Roman eloquence" became a slavish aping of Cicero. The dictum that no one could be called a Ciceronian who used a single word not included in Cicero's works "is exaggeration; but a study of rhetorical instruction as it was given in the English schools of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries proves that it was but the exaggeration of caricature". For fashion decreed that the only good Latin was Ciceronian Latin and the schools had to supply the demand. Also, for many men "imitation was the only way by which, in striving to attain *virtu*, nobodies might appear to be somebodies". Such forces were too much for the Erasmian Humanists who wished to combine the best in classical culture with the best in Christian civilization. "The controversy respecting Ciceronianism was in fact a crucial one in the history, not only of classical education, but of all forms of school work". The outcome of the struggle was "the triumph of the study of rhetoric as distinct from pure humanism, of language and modes

[64] Adamson, *ibid.*, 110-118.

of expression over literature, of form over content, a victory of grammar-books, phrase-books and similar compilations. The result was a new scholasticism, with Cicero for its Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas and the two classical literatures for its Bible ".[65] Such, then, was Renaissance education. In aim, method and content, it had reverted, as nearly as possible, to pre-Christian times.[66]

[65] Adamson, *ibid.*, 126-129.

[66] The founders, or re-founders, of the post-Renaissance grammar schools did not, however, intend that the curriculum should be entirely secular. Religious instruction is enjoined on the master (*The Schools Inquiry Report,* I, 120-121), but so far from considering that there was anything non-Christian in pagan literature, they order it to be used as a source of morality. One of them did realize that all classical authors could not be so used, for Thomas, Lord Wharton, in his statutes for Kirkby Stephen in 1566, says: " The master shall interpret and reade to his schollars those authors which may induce and lead them to vertue, to godliness and to honest behaviour, and to the knowledge of humanity, but not to wantonness or sauciness ". However, he continues, " he shall read to them the Ten Commandments, in the Latin tongue, as is used in the realme of England, for the most part, and Cato, Aesop's Fables, Tully's Offices, and *De Amicitia* and *De Senectute* &c.". This reliance on pagan literature and also on the rhetorical method is shown even more clearly in the Ordinances drawn up by William Holland for the Grammar School at Steyning in 1614. The nineteenth reads, " Item: That the seeds of religion may be sown in the hearts of children, there to grow and bring forth fruits in their whole lives following, it is ordained and ordered, that on every Saturday, . . . the said schollars . . . shall be taught principles of religion; and the more learned schollars shall conn by heart some catechisms in Latin, and the meaner sort shall learn some catechisms in English . . . and upon every halfe holiday, or saint's eve, they shall come likewise at one of the clock after dinner, and then some of them shall decline briefly in grammaticall or rhetorical questions, repeat Latin phrases, or do such other scholasticall exercises as shall be thought meet by the schoolmaster for the furthering of the Latin and Greek tongue ". *Charity Commissioners' Report,* II, 317. The same spirit appears in Elyot's views on education. " The height of all study is to read Aristotle, Plato and Cicero; and, in his enthusiasm, Elyot names these writers (in his treatment of moral philosophy) before he mentions the Bible ". *Encyc. of Educ.,* IV, 1542.

The triumph of paganism did not last long uncontested. The persecution of Mary's reign drove many of the clergy abroad, mainly to Switzerland, where they encountered the influence of Calvin, rather than to Lutheran Germany. When they returned, many of them became leaders in the Church and in education and they gave a new impetus and a new direction to education for a hundred years. Under their influence, the schools, or many of them, gave much more religious training as " the ecclesiastical and religious first line of defence in scriptural, historical and classical knowledge circulating from the schools " and even as a preparation for martyrdom.[67] The study of the Bible was essential to Protestants. " Personal salvation, in a sense, depended, indirectly at least, on the power of reading, which thus became a necessity of education for religion's sake, and if we may add that some degree of power of interpretation was also necessary as part of the demand for the exercise of private judgement, a trained educated mind was also, inferentially, essential ". To understand the Bible, a knowledge of the " holy " languages in which the earliest biblical manuscripts were written was necessary, and appeals to patristic literature for the purposes of the great religious controversies of the period demanded a knowledge of Latin and Greek. The return to a Christian aim for education produced a " recoil against the impurity to be found in classical writings ".[68] This is another instance of educators considering, like the early Christians and the Humanists, that a change of aim requires a change of content.

The Tudors had attempted to control and mould education so as to support their political and ecclesiastical system.[69] Yet Hobbes maintained " that the boys became so impressed by the studies of the civil conflicts which had taken place in ancient Greece and Rome, that when they became men they sought to emulate the ancients by a civil war against their own king ". An

[67] Foster Watson, *The Old Gr. Sch.*, 52, 89, 88.
[68] *Ibid.* 71-72, 96, 93-95.
[69] *Ibid.* 72. Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 188. N. Wood, *The Reformation and English Education*, London, 1931, viii.

intensive study of Cicero might certainly have produced such an effect and, as a matter of hard historical fact, "the grammar schools had helped to produce the doughty champions of the Parliamentarians, men like Selden (Chichester Grammar School), John Hampden (Thame Grammar School), John Milton (St. Paul's) and the redoubtable Oliver Cromwell himself (Huntingdon Grammar School)".[70] Something in the educational system had contributed to the destruction of the political system it was devised to uphold.

Whereas the Renaissance had led to the use of classical authors as a counter-authority to that of the Church, the Reformation raised up a counter-balance in the reading of the Bible in the home. At the end of the fourteenth century, Wycliffe had had the Vulgate translated into English in order that it might be so read. In the middle of the fifteenth, Bishop Pecock noted with puzzled astonishment, that the Lollards made it their "bisynes for to leerne the writing of the Bible, as it lijth in text, namelich the writing of the newe Testament", and that "thei bisien hem silf forto leerne and knowe the Bible, namelich the Newe Testament, in the forme at it is writun word bi word in the Bible".[71] Their descendants were still studying the Lollard translation of the Bible from the Vulgate in this way on the eve of the Reformation and they were the first recorded Englishmen to read Tyndale's translation of the New Testament from the Greek.[72] They did this in the spring and summer of 1526 and from that year the habit of reading the Bible became more and more widespread among the English people. "The popular education of the Reformation was given not so much in schools as from the pulpit and through Bible-reading. English public opinion was deeply affected by such translations as Tyndale's

[70] Foster Watson, *op. cit.*, 128, 130.

[71] Reginald Pecock, *The Repressor of Over-much Blaming of the Clergy*, 53, ed. 1860, quoted E. Arber, *The First Printed English New Testament*, London, 1871, 40.

[72] The evidence for this is to be found in my article, "Lollardy and the Great Bible", *The Church Quarterly Review*, No. 256, Vol. CXXVIII, London, 1939, 210-235, especially 211, 225 and 231.

New Testament (1526) and the Genevan Bible of 1560". The teaching of such books, conveyed both through the arresting novelty of the text and the marginal annotations, "was Calvinistic and strongly politico-religious; its effect was to augment enormously the volume of the anti-catholic stream flowing from Wyclif, and to establish Puritanism as the political and theological system of thought of many Englishmen".[73]

Men had been using their individual judgements, by appeal to the Bible, for nearly a hundred years when Bacon wrote his *Novum Organum* to advocate the use of inductive reasoning from observed phenomena instead of the medieval method of deductive reasoning by syllogism from accepted authorities. Whether he was entirely original or not[74] this may be taken as the beginning of the scientific method.[75] Some of the Puritans wished to introduce this new method generally into schools, under the influence of Comenius,[76] but the Civil War prevented anything coming of the scheme. Nevertheless, this willingness to enlarge the limits of knowledge and education is in the spirit of the Puritans who took part in the Putney Debates of the Commonwealth Army in the years 1647-1649. "Within limits the spirit of Puritanism is not only active, but experimental. Naturally the experimental spirit will be operative only in those sections of the party which conceive that the necessary point of compromise between the ideal and the demands of actual life have not been revealed". "The Bible embodies a revelation complete and unalterable; but there is still room for progressive comprehension, progressive interpretation; and it is here that free discussion can (as Milton maintains in *Areopagi-*

[73] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 135-136.

[74] See *Seventeenth Century Studies*, Oxford, 1938, 21-31. Also Butterfield, *Origins of Modern Science*, 88-89, 93.

[75] Not of the "scientific revolution". That was a revolt against the authority of Aristotle and it was helped in some important ways by the Church. See Butterfield, *op. cit.*, 9-10. Much of what had to be overthrown came from the Greeks, not Christianity. *Ibid.* 7-8, 95. See also 66.

[76] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 182-183. Boyd, *Hist. of Western Ed.*, 247.

tica) minister to the discovery of truth and to agreement in the truth. 'I am verily persuaded', said John Robinson to the departing pilgrims, 'the Lord hath more truth yet to break forth out of his holy word'." "The Christian, Henry Robinson urged, ought continually to grow not only from grace to grace, but from knowledge to knowledge".[77] "And this liberty of disquisition is as great a means to keep the truth as to find it. The running water keeps pure and clear, when the standing pool corrupts. The true temper and proper employment of a Christian is always to be working like the sea, and purging ignorance out of his understanding, and exchanging notions and apprehensions imperfect for more perfect, and forgetting things behind to press forward".[78]

If English education had been developed in that spirit, a truly Christian education might have been evolved. The historian has maintained that the intellectual revolution which brought the Middle Ages to an end "was effected far less by the classical revival than by the failure of scholasticism to satisfy the craving for further knowledge".[79] The grammar schools and universities of the seventeenth century were failing to satisfy a similar craving and they continued so to fail in the eighteenth and during part of the nineteenth. The scientific revolution was ignored; the scientific method was not introduced into the schools. Education and the intellectual development of the nation were not allowed to meet.[80] If men imbued with the spirit of these Puritans had gained control, education might have been revivified repeatedly to satisfy the fresh demands of each succeeding age. Instead, what happened was—the Restoration.

"There is no doubt as to the decadence of the grammar schools from 1660 onwards"[81] There were several causes for

[77] A. S. P. Woodhouse, *Puritanism and Liberty*, London, 1938, 45-46.

[78] *Ibid.* 259.

[79] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 133.

[80] S. J. Curtis, *History of Education in Great Britain*, London, 1948, 51.

[81] Foster Watson, *The Old Gr. School*, 128. See also Spens Report, 11.

this decadence,[82] but the fundamental cause was, in the opinion of the historian of the period, the loss of aim. Puritan England considered the knowledge of Latin and Greek as necessary for the intensive study of the Scriptures. The grammar schools were regarded as an instrument in building up a theocracy. "With the collapse of the Puritan ideal as a national scheme of life, and the self-assertion of rationalism in the 18th century, the 17th century significance of the ancient languages was lost, the living force of an intensive ideal being no longer behind them, the schools lost vitality and influence. The inference seems to be that curricula are subservient to the educational aim".[83] This is to approach the integration of aim, method and content from a different angle. We have seen how something in the method or content of an educational system can frustrate its aim. Here we find the loss of aim frustrating a method and content which had been producing good results. It is tempting to relate the character of an age to its system of education, tempting but dangerous in the face of a complete lack of accurate research on the subject. Nevertheless, it seems probable that there is some educational significance to be discerned in a comparison between the high seriousness of much of the public life in Church and State in the century between the return of the Marian exiles and the collapse of the Commonwealth with the gorgeous obscenities of the Restoration and the elegant futilities of the Age of Reason.

The decadence that had set in with the loss of this ideal at the Restoration continued for generations. "During the eighteenth century the endowed schools remained impervious to new ideas".[84] The main cause was probably the loss of this "intensive ideal" of the Puritans, but another important reason for the decline was the refusal or inability to add other and more obviously utilitarian subjects to the curriculum. Various attempts were made to develop schools with wider curricula[85] but the en-

[82] See Foster Watson, *op. cit.*, 129-134, and Spens Report, 11-13.

[83] Foster Watson, *op. cit.*, v-vi.

[84] Spens Report, 11.

[85] Foster Watson, *op. cit.*, 131-133. Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 175-187. Spens Report, 8-13.

dowments enabled the grammar schools to outlast these rivals, although the numbers attending them continued to fall until in 1797 Lord Kenyon was able to use the phrase "empty walls" as a description of them.[86] At the beginning of the nineteenth century it appeared as if classical education was dying out.

The public schools had been affected in the same way as the grammar schools, though not so drastically. They, and with them classical studies, were revived by Arnold of Rugby. In his Sermon on Christian Education he explains his aim. "Undoubtedly he is perfectly educated who is taught all the will of God concerning him, and enabled through life to execute it. And he is not well educated who does not know the will of God, or, knowing it, has received no help in his education towards being inclined and enabled to do it". "Some perhaps have been puzzled . . . how to reconcile with a profession of religious or Christian education the devotion of so much time to studies not supposed to be religious and certainly not in themselves necessarily Christian. Now the reason is, because the words of a rule are much sooner learnt than the power of applying it universally; and that whilst the Scripture itself alone furnished the former, the latter must be sought for in sources exceedingly various, and extracted from them by long and laborious process. Undoubtedly that is useless in education which does not enable a man to glorify God better in his way through life; but then we are called upon to glorify him in many various ways according to our several callings and circumstances; and as we are to glorify him both in our bodies and in our spirits with all our faculties, both outward and inward, I cannot consider it unworthy either to render our body strong and active, or our understanding clear, rich and versatile in its powers; I cannot reject from the range of religious education whatever ministers to the perfection of our bodies and our minds, so long as both in body and mind, in soul and spirit, we ourselves may be taught to minister to the service

[86] *Encyc. of Ed.*, 734. This seems to have been literally true of three schools, Berkhamsted and St. Albans, see *Victoria County History, Hertfordshire*, II, 78, 66, 67, and Steyning, see *Gentleman's Magazine*, London, 1804, lxxiv, 806. but cp. *Char. Comm. Rep.* X, 313.

of God "[87] This was the spirit in which he carried out his work and which "passed through Rugby boys to Oxford and Cambridge and so to English education as a whole".[88] Arnold had provided an "intensive ideal", and the dying method and content of a liberal education were revivified.

The statement that this spirit affected "English education as a whole" requires considerable qualification. It is true of the universities and the public schools; through them it had a great influence on the grammar schools and that is probably as much as the statement is intended to convey; on the State schools that were being created the influence was small. *The Schools Inquiry Report* of 1866 on endowed schools shows that, in them, religious instruction was a separate subject and not an integral part of the system, and no attempt is made to alter this. "No good master", the report says, "entrusted with the education of the young can fail to feel that their moral is of at least equal importance with their intellectual improvement, and many would find themselves unable to speak freely on the highest moral questions, if they were compelled to absolute silence on religious questions.[89] It must be remembered that our schools as they are, and as the parents expect them to be, are not merely, as they conceivably might be, places where instruction only is imparted, but places for the formation and training of character. And, if so, it seems doubly difficult to draw in practice a sharp line of division between what is secular and what is religious in the school life".[90] Their attitude towards boarding schools, where the master takes the place of the parent, makes their opinions even clearer. They consider that: "It seems unreasonable that a master shall receive a boy into his house; shall be responsible for his moral training; shall be responsible for what, if possibly less important to the

[87] J. J. Findlay, *Arnold of Rugby* (1897), p. 132, quoting the "Sermon on Christian Education". Quoted by Adamson, *English Education*, 1789-1902, Cambridge, 1930, 67.

[88] Adamson, *Eng. Ed.*, 67.

[89] This was the interpretation placed on the Cowper-Temple clause in many State schools. Adamson, *Eng. Ed.*, 365-366.

[90] *Sch. Inq. Rep.*, I, 41.

boy himself, is still more important to the school as a whole, the influence which he exercises over others; and yet shall not be free to use the means which he would naturally employ for his education". They finished their consideration of the problem by deciding that "there seems good reason to retain the long established practice of including religious instruction in the work of schools. And indeed there can be not doubt that to include the duty of giving religious instruction in the schoolmaster's work adds greatly to the dignity of his office and to his own sense of responsibility, gives a higher tone and character to the whole of the school life and presents education both to parents and to boys in its only true light".[91] The upshot of it all was that religious instruction should be retained in the syllabus, not a very extreme decision and one that falls far short of Arnold's position.

The section of the educational system which Arnold's influence did not reach was the elementary schools for the poor. In the Middle Ages a good deal of elementary education had been given in the Song Schools of the Cathedrals and Collegiate Churches[92] and by the chantry priests,[93] but most of this was abolished by the Chantries Act.[94] It was not till the end of the seventeenth century that the Church made any serious attempt to supply this deficiency by the movement to found charity schools. Some sort of Christian education might have grown up in these, since their purpose was "the education of poor children in the knowledge and practice of the Christian religion as professed and taught in the Church of England".[95] This movement spread rapidly in the reign of Anne but the suspicion of Jacobite sympathies among the parish clergy roused the hostility of the Hanoverians and it faded out before the middle of the eighteenth century.

[91] *Ibid.* 41.

[92] A. F. Leach, *Sch. of Med. Eng.*, 6-7.

[93] Wood, *The Reformation and English Education*, 4-12.

[94] A. F. Leach, *English Schools at the Reformation*, Westminster, 1896, 95-97.

[95] *Account of Charity Schools*, 1707. See Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 198.

A similar movement, which was to have better fortune, was that which produced the voluntary schools. This movement had its roots in the philanthropic impulse that was manifested in the Society of Friends and the Evangelical party in the Church of England and "the feeling and belief which a hundred years earlier had created charity schools now moved the philanthropists to provide elementary education on the great scale".[96] Lancaster, the founder, with Bell, of this type of school, perceived at once the obstacle which was to impede the progress of this movement and finally to destroy it. Party politics had caused the failure of the charity schools and it was sectarianism exacerbated by party politics which prevented the full development of the voluntary schools. Lancaster saw that the great obstacle in the way of popular education becoming a national concern was "a sect-making spirit . . . and that in every party".[97] "The grand basis of Christianity is broad enough for the whole of mankind to stand on and join hands as children of one family. This basis is, 'Glory to God, and the increase of peace and good will amongst men'." He considered that "an education founded upon 'general Christian principles' might be made universal".[98] Mrs. Trimmer thought, or possibly felt might be the more accurate word, that such Christianity was not Christianity at all and by a vigorous attack she prevented Lancaster's view from prevailing.[99] Too much, however, may be made of her influence. Sectarian divisions were deeply rooted at the time and would probably have done their work without her interference. The suspicions, as between Protestant and Roman Catholic and between Church of England and Nonconformist, that these schools were being used to attract children to the creed of their owners appear on nearly every page of the evidence given before a Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Education of the Lower Orders in 1816 and 1817.

[96] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 242-243.

[97] A Comparative View. See Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 247.

[98] Adamson, *op. cit.*, 248.

[99] *Ibid.* 249-252.

These divisions were the practical manifestation of a clash of theory which had taken place at the end of the eighteenth century. Thomas Sheridan had maintained that "the education of youth should be particularly formed and adapted to the nature and end of its government . . . The best education upon any other principles may make good men, but it cannot make good citizens". Against this, William Godwin had contended that "this whole proposition of a national education is founded upon a supposition which has been repeatedly refuted in this work, . . . that unpatronized truth is inadequate to the purpose of enlightening mankind".[100] There seems little real difference of opinion here. An undirected education may produce enlightened men; but history seems to show that a man so enlightened may not prove to be a good citizen of the State that educated him. On the other hand, the man who has been educated to be no more than a good citizen of the State may not be an enlightened man and will certainly be no more enlightened than the State that devised his education. It was the fear that State education would deprive the individual of his civil and religious liberty that decided English politicians, and public opinion generally, against it in the nineteenth century. The educational problem of the period "was to make instruction universal without making it State-directed, to ensure religious and political liberty amongst an educated people". The solution of this problem was "the voluntary system" by which each sect founded and supported its own schools.

This was not a final solution. Education could not be divided into sectarian departments. Moreover there was a growing demand for removing religion out of education altogether. Indeed, the religious question was "*the* crucial issue of English education in the nineteenth century".[101] It was crucial more because it was made so by party politics than because it was educationally insoluble. "Dr. Temple, who has himself been a

[100] Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, 1793. See Adamson, *op. cit.*, 217.

[101] Adamson, *English Education*, 94.

schoolmaster, . . . said he believed the religious difficulty was immensely exaggerated and that once we were inside the school it vanished".[102] Nevertheless it was the religious difficulty which broke the voluntary system, "to which English education was incalculably indebted for a hundred years" and the Education Act of 1902, designed to prolong it, virtually brought it to an end.[103]

It looks as though it was nothing but religious controversy that prevented the voluntary schools from developing a Christian education in the nineteenth century. The "Cowper-Temple clause" of the 1870 Act was a compromise intended to close the sectarian differences by prohibiting any sort of "distinctive" religious catechism in schools. It had a consequence that was not intended. "Religious instruction which had at one time constituted the pivot of the teaching, became a mere adjunct thereto, which might be taken or left. The idea of a curriculum which should form an organic whole was thus destroyed, and education in the popular schools became destitute of a master purpose".[104] This lack of a "master purpose" may be the reason why the Victorian system of education, judged merely as a bulwark of the State and not as an instrument of "Progress", may be said to have failed. The extensions of the franchise after 1832 created new motives for the increase of popular education.[105] Instead of a philanthropic impulse to educate the lower orders, Members of Parliament gradually realized the necessity to "educate our masters". There was a steady movement throughout the rest of the century towards compulsory universal State education. But, if the aim of this educational policy was to prolong and support Victorian civilization, it failed completely. The newly-enfranchised voters educated under the 1870 Act elected Parliaments which by successive legislative measures have created a social revolution.

[102] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 310.

[103] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 348.

[104] Adamson, *English Education*, 359.

[105] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 264.

The scientific revolution in the seventeenth century was a great landmark in history, comparable only with the rise of Christianity.[106] New facts, new kinds of facts, were discovered and a new method was used. If they had been introduced into the schools and universities a new content and a new method would have been given to education. Moreover, science might not have become divorced from religion. The ideas of the Old Testament and of the New had been expressed in conformity with contemporary knowledge. Not the least of the intellectual feats of the Middle Ages was the unification of religion with the knowledge of the Ancient World. If science had been introduced into education, the interplay of new knowledge and old truths might have produced a similar unification, not, like the massive attempt of Descartes, at a single stroke, but by a more gradual and continuous process. Herbert Butterfield says that the work of certain writers "prepared the minds of men for the *Origin of Species* in 1859".[107] That, no doubt, is true of the minds of some men. Of the minds of the great majority of men at that time it can only be said that they were entirely unprepared and they were unprepared because of the content and method of their education. When at length science was introduced into the schools it was the content rather than the method that was taught.[108] With it, or slightly preceding it, other subjects diluted the traditional curriculum. In the endowed schools classical studies were scarcely challenged at first and the new subjects gained ground very gradually, but in the State schools the time given to them was greater and as the classical tradition did not exist in them it affected them more profoundly and with greater rapidity. The classics held a moral code embedded in them, not the highest, in some ways evil, but at least a code. The new subjects, especially when taught under the influence of "Science", by no means necessarily the same thing as the scientific method, and with religious instruction walled off into a tiny fraction of the time-table, provided a curriculum that was a-moral.

[106] Herbert Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science*, 174.
[107] *Ibid.* 209.
[108] Spens Report, xxxviii.

Religion was practically eliminated from education, not so much because a Christian education was considered undesirable as because no agreement could be reached on the sort of Christianity which should be applied. In the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth when the elimination was taking place, it could be assumed that a religious and moral education would be acquired in the home. This assumption can no longer be made. The growth of agnosticism and rationalism has meant that some part of such moral instruction as is given will not be Christian, while the rise of a generation of which a large portion has no clear religious belief or moral code has made it probable that the example set by the parents will be non-Christian and possibly anti-Christian.

A new situation, then, has arisen. If the majority of children are to receive any moral training at all it must be in school. The questions then arise: shall this instruction be given in a period or periods specifically reserved for it or shall a moral significance be given to education as a whole and also what code of morals shall be adopted?

There is one other aspect of the subject on which history can throw some light. When all is done—and said, when the aim is agreed, the method devised and the content chosen, any system of education will depend for success or failure on the characters of the individual teachers. When all else has faded, what will remain is the impact of one personality on another and it is in its influence on personality that Christianity has a unique power. "Christianity has, I think, suffered peculiarly from this cause. Its moral action has always been much more powerful upon individuals than upon societies, and the spheres in which its superiority over other religions is most uncontestable, are precisely those which history is least capable of realizing".[109] Yet the change has been profound. As the same historian says in another place, "under its influence, doctrines concerning the nature of God, the immortality of the soul, and the duties of man, which the noblest intellects of antiquity could barely grasp,

[109] Lecky, *History of European Morals*, II, 147.

have become the truisms of the village school, the proverbs of the cottage and the alley".[110] There has been a reaction against these doctrines since he wrote, as there is against all doctrines that become truisms and proverbs, and they are by no means so universally taught now, nor believed; nor is it recognized with sufficient clarity that these "duties of man", without which a world order of justice and peace is impossible, are inseparable from Christianity. However, doctrines are not the life blood of Christianity, as he tells us in another passage. "It was reserved to Christianity to present to the world an ideal character, which through all the changes of eighteen centuries has inspired the hearts of men with an impassioned love; has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has been not only the highest pattern of virtue but the strongest incentive to its practice; and has exercised so deep an influence that it may truly be said that the simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and all the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been the well-spring of whatever is best and purest in Christian life. Amid all the sins and failings, amid all the priestcraft and persecution and fanaticism that have defaced the Church, it has preserved, in the character and example of its Founder, an enduring principle of regeneration".[111]

If the history of education demonstrates that it is necessary to integrate aim, method and content, it shows just as clearly the necessity of deciding on the aim, the "intensive ideal", the "master purpose". In 1911, Foster Watson in the preface to his book on *The Old Grammar Schools,* says that as a result of the "collapse of the Puritan ideal" the schools "lost vitality and influence. The inference seems to be that curricula are subservient to the educational aim. Hence replacing the 'Grammar' Schools by modern Secondary Schools and merely substituting the vernacular, sciences, mathematics and modern languages for

[110] *Ibid.* 2-3.
[111] *Ibid.* 8-9.

the old classics, still leaves the educational question to be determined: What is the intensive background of ideal to which these subjects are to relate themselves? It is this consideration which will, in the long run, measure the value of our new 'Secondary' Schools relatively to the old Grammar Schools—rather than the comprehensiveness of the list of subjects included in the new curricula". In 1918, F. W. Adamson concluded his *Short History of Education* with the observation that "the years between 1870 and 1903 witnessed a development of English public instruction which has no equal in our history . . The machinery is there; the country has yet to decide for exactly what purpose and how best the machinery shall be employed; as witness the Act of 1918". These observations are just as true to-day as they were when they were written. Individual educators may have clear aims in their own minds; many have; but they are not necessarily helpful to those of others; they may be mutually destructive. One aim, widely to be found, is education for citizenship. Indeed, the Spens Report says that "all teaching should contribute to this end".[112] Such an aim would, or might, limit the development of the individual to the service of the State. Almost equally widespread is the theory, actively hostile to the one just mentioned, that the whole aim of education should be the development of personality. This aim lies wide open to the criticism, already quoted, of the self-expression of the Humanists. "It was assumed that the 'self' to be expressed was by nature a self which ought to be expressed". A third theory, once perhaps more widely held than now, is that the purpose of education should be the acquisition of knowledge for its own sake. This apparently noble aim may be the reason why mankind has reached its present pass where its intellectual achievements have outstripped its moral development. On the other hand, concentration on character training to the neglect of the intellect may lead to the situation in the Dark Ages when "a deadly torpor sank upon the human mind". One other aim is that education

[112] Spens Report, xxxvi.

should be based on, should be pervaded by, Christianity.[113]

There are dangers in basing a system of education on doctrine or dogma, or in integrating it in any way at all. The truth may be suppressed or perverted so that it shall not conflict with orthodoxy. The search for truth, for reality, may be hampered by too great a respect for accepted dogma. Some forms of intellectual speculation may be prohibited as they were in the Middle Ages and, while generations will be stultified, the frustrated energies, when released, will create a catastrophe which will destroy all it was hoped to preserve. "The intellectual revolution was effected less by the classical revival than by the failure of scholasticism to satisfy the craving for further knowledge".[114] Those are the dangers of any integration under any principle and they have appeared when education was predominantly Christian in the past. That is not to say they are inevitable or that they are inextricably connected with Christianity. A conception of Christian education as inclusive as Arnold's, as dynamic as Henry Robinson's, growing "from knowledge to knowledge" and "exchanging notions and apprehensions imperfect for more perfect", above all, one which contains "the principle of regeneration" of the "character and example of its Founder", would not only avoid them but would contain and control the other aims just mentioned. The acquisition of knowledge, the development of personality, the service of the State and training of character would be controlled by moral considerations and yet the intellect would not be confined. There are dangers in the integration of the aim, the content and the method of education; but history shows that the "master purpose" of a system cannot succeed unless integration is carried out and that content and method lose their vitality without an ideal. Unless some master purpose, some ideal, can be found for education, if the chaotic conditions that prevail at the present time are allowed to continue, some historian of the future may have occasion to write that the widest extension of education in Britain synchronized with its decline.

[113] See the quotations above, note 2. Also *University Reform in Germany*, London, 1949.

[114] Adamson, *Sh. Hist. of Educ.*, 133.

REVIEWS

CHRIST AND TIME. By O. CULLMANN. (S.C.M. Press.) 18s.

THIS is a translation from the French of an important work by the Swiss scholar, Professor Cullmann of the University of Basle. It is a fresh and illuminating treatment of the Biblical pattern of Time and Eternity, and has a second importance in introducing the reader through its bibliography and footnotes to some of the debates which have been going on in Continental, and particularly in Swiss, theological circles during the last ten years. It is a well-merited rebuke to our insularity that some at least of the names quoted as significant writers have not been heard of in England, and of the others some at least important works, like those of Rudolf Bultmann and Martin Werner, are not by any means as accessible as they should be.

Professor Cullmann starts from the standpoint of the Erlamgen school which treated of Biblical Theology as a *Heilsgeschichte,* Beck Auberlen, von Hofmann and Kahler being its principal exponents. Cullmann would extend the term to cover the theme of the Bible as an *Offenbarungsgeschichte,* Revelational history as well as redemptive history, and there is little doubt that this extension of meaning is important.

The three chief Continental controversies to which Cullmann, almost *en passant,* feels himself to be making a contribution are, first, the discussion, almost the uproar, caused by the publication of Rudolf Bultmann's *Offenbarung und Heilsgeschehen* which to our shame has never been made available to English readers. Bultmann attempts to demythologize Jesus on the basis of his Form Critical studies. Cullmann, while agreeing with the Form Critical method, has not yet "shaken hands with such desperate resolutions". The principal points made by Cullmann are first that the *muthos* is rather more integrally related to the history, and the history more dependent upon the *muthos,* than Bultmann allowed for, and that there are some grounds for doubting whether *muthos* is really the correct term to use at all. The second main controversy in which he participates *en passant* is the attempt by Martin Werner, of Berne, to apply to the history of Christian Doctrine the consistent or futurist eschatology of Schweitzer. According to Werner classical Christian theology becomes increasingly an *ersatz* substitute for the genuinely futuristic eschatology of the Primitive Church, and that

the reason for the construction of this substitute commodity was the disappointment in the expectation of the imminent *Parousia*. There are some slight analogies with the position held by F. C. Burkitt with regard to Gnosticism in his work *The Church and Gnosis*. Here Cullmann is at his best. He argues, on the basis of the Gospel evidence, that the balance of the evidence is that Jesus did envisage an interval between his resurrection and his *Parousia* and that, in principle, the duration of the gap is a merely secondary matter. He suggests that the real motive for the change, at least in form of later Christian theology, is too narrowly framed by Werner. The real problem was the reconciliation of the Hebrew and Christian concept of time and eternity with that of the Hellenic world. Moreover their impact was not restricted to Christianity among the world's religions, though here the effects were most noticeable. It can also be wondered whether the effect was so notable a de-eschatologizing after all, since the earliest pre-credal formulae do not appear to contain any references to eschatology whereas the later creeds emphatically do. If Werner were right, why the *inde venturus*? The third controversy is the perennial one of the Barthian synthesis. To this Cullmann is continually making contributions. The reader will find his trouble well repaid in working these out for himself.

Cullmann's principal thesis is that the Biblical pattern of the relation of time and eternity is a linear one, which he supports strongly by a consideration of the fundamentally successional character of the Biblical terminology. His mind, like your reviewer's, is essentially a geometrical one, which feels most happy when it can construct a figure to serve as a blueprint. The two vital diagrams are the Christ line on page 84 (where the reader should note that the term *Parousia* in the two lines of Judaism and Christianity do not mean the same thing; see, for this, whatever else he may prove, T. F. Glasson's book on the Second Advent) and the other on Christ, the Church and the world, on page 188. Your reviewer would like to add a third, of two cones placed sharp end on, in the manner of an egg boiler, on p. 178, to represent the old dispensation narrowing down to Christ and the new dispensation broadening out from him. It is clear from the preface to the second edition that Cullmann has been criticized on the Continent for being too much under the influence of the diagrams, but there is every reason to regard this criticism as fundamentally ill-grounded.

The main thesis of the first part of the work is to prove that the Biblical notion of Time and Eternity differs widely from that which later passed from Hellenism into classical Christian theology. This is, in the main, true, and it is of the utmost importance

for a fair treatment of Cullmann's thesis that he disclaims the intention of writing as a dogmatic theologian. The question whether a real synthesis between the two can or should be made is not the question which he is asking, still less is he seeking to offer a solution. He would clearly oppose a Hellenization of Christianity on the point and remains agnostic and slightly sceptical whether Hellenism can, in this particular, be successfully Christianized. Perhaps he is unduly sceptical here, but the question needs rethinking. He accuses his Continental critics, who take him up on this point, of having failed to reckon with his chapter on God's Lordship of Time. Towards a synthesis might be noted that the Bible is concerned primarily with religion considered as Revelation and therefore is naturally *quoad nos* in its characterization of Eternity. The human mind can only move readily within the successional atmosphere of Time. Cullmann admits that the strict temporal framework is slightly strained by the writers of Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel. Is he completely just to Hebrews? Certainly scratch his Hellenic setting and you find a Jewish insight into time. But surely the Hellenic doctrine of the two worlds is uneasily blended with the Hebrew and Christian doctrine of the two ages. There is a slightly dubious treatment of Hebrews xi, 1, on page 37, which might suggest that he is a little too anxious to underrate the influence of Greek thought on the writer. The Johannine reference, which he admits to the full, is a tendency to see the judgement not only as a future event but also as a present process.

What is, perhaps, more important, is that his time-line is not merely to be judged as a mere matter of temporal sequence. It is concerned rather with the content of time. That is made abundantly clear, for example, in the treatment of the term *Kairos*. But in this case is not the footnote on Bergson, on page 69, a little undiscerning?

The real difficulty is the phrase, on page 72, in the important chapter on God's Lordship over Time which speaks of the Eternal One as having control over the whole time-line in its endless extension. The conception of God as outside the time-line and therefore as much more than "Which is and which was and which is to come" seems there implicitly admitted.

An interesting *apercu* on page 140 seems to give the true reconciliation between the two concepts of Realized and Futurist eschatology. It has been rightly maintained of recent years that each theory was right in what it asserted and wrong in what it denied, without any further progress being apparently made. On Cullmann's theory, a synthesis begins to come into sight. If the *telos*, or goal, is now to be judged in relation to a midpoint in history the contention of the Realized Eschatology school can be success-

fully vindicated. If the future stages of human history are not thereby voided of theological significance, the element of truth in futurist eschatology can be successfully kept in view. The analogy between the decisive victory in a war and the ultimate victory sheds a flood of light on the problem.

A number of points of detail are dealt with in a fresh and interesting manner. The treatment of the principal points in which the adoption of a Hellenic standpoint with regard to Time and Eternity, illustrated from the Gnostic movement, is brilliantly handled. Docetism is especially well expounded with some curious modern analogies. The relation between Church and State, a live contemporary issue, is dealt with in full, but not everyone will find it convincing in every detail. The eschatological significance of missionary preaching is a theme not often handled. While it is possible to dissent from the judgement that it is represented by the White Horseman of the Apocalypse and " that which restraineth " in II Thessalonians, it is a long while since it received so worthy a theological vindication. The eschatological significance of the Holy Spirit is again well insisted, though it is permissible to wonder whether the doctrine of his Person and Work, which might be deduced from some passages, reaches the Constantinopolitan standard. Cullmann might well reply that he was merely concerned to expound certain aspects of the N.T. account of the significance of the Holy Spirit rather than to give a full theology of the Spirit. The reader is warned not to take the conclusions which Cullmann draws from his earlier work on the Primitive Christian Confessions as necessarily defensible. The data are important and beyond question, the inferences drawn from them subject to damaging criticism.

His treatment of the once-for-all character of the epochal events of the *Heilsgeschichte* is well and finely drawn. Certain conclusions drawn from them in the realm of ecclesiastical affairs might, however, be open to legitimate criticism. It is good to find a Reformed theologian who realizes that the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharistic does not mean a belief in the repetition of the unrepeatable. The work of Vonier, Masure and de la Taille, in the Roman Catholic communion, and the general trend of Anglican Eucharistic theology on the point, is quite clear. But his reference, on page 169, to the relation of our Lord to the Eucharist hardly does justice to the concept of the Lamb who had been slain in the Worship-Visions of the Apocalypse. Nor is it easy to be satisfied with his treatment *en passant* of the Apostolate here. It is certainly true that the N.T. speaks of the Church as being founded upon the apostles and prophets, and that a foundation can only be laid once.

But in a real sense the foundation pervades the whole building and tenons from the foundation run up through the whole fabric. His introduction shows that he realizes that there is more thinking to be done about the relation between Scripture and Tradition. Your reviewer is heartily in accord with him on the subject of the primacy of Scripture, and he has said enough to show that he realizes the necessity of tradition. But is the matter adequately disposed of by a reference to second-century traditions which have happily found no place within Scripture? The real point about tradition is the validity of just such an experiment in theologizing as underlies the whole attempt to reconcile Biblical and Hellenic thinking, behind which his whole thesis is an attempt—and a thoroughly legitimate attempt—to penetrate.

Such criticisms, however, do nothing to destroy the fundamental importance of the book for the study of eschatology, which has all too long been the poor relation in theological issues. The treatment is thoroughly Biblical, the conclusions far from radical, if judged from Continental standards, and, if it encourages the signs of a rebirth of interest in eschatology in Anglican and other circles, it will have achieved its intention.

Both translator and printer have made a first class job of the production, which is a worthwhile addition to the library of any serious student of the subjects which it treats.

H. E. W. Turner.

Behold Thy King Cometh: A symposium edited by Brother Edward. (The Canterbury Press.) 5s.

Hope is a Christian virtue. That is curious, and perhaps unique. Many religions treat faith as all-important, because they treat the past as all-important: they find their security in a kind of Deist fatalism, based on this or that past revelation of truth. Many philosophies have taught the golden rule of doing to others as we would be done by—something very near to the second half of the law of love: but they have failed because they were rooted in a barren virtue, a tragic courage—stirring and admirable but quite out of the reach of ordinary men. Many mystery cults, based maybe on the cycle of the seasons, on the alternation of light and darkness, have had something in them which was nearly hope—a kind of longing for reality, a yearning for life, a vague and teasing nostalgia: but that is not what Christians have meant by the virtue of hope. Christians have always taken time very seriously indeed. Not as a measure of eternity, but as a very real dimension within

eternity. Religions which live in the past, or even in the present, do not take time seriously enough: they tie themselves up to a particular point of time only. There are, indeed, Christians to-day who do exactly that: they link up their apprehension of God to a particular revelation of God in the past—to a theophany on the mountain top, to the continual memorial of the sacrifice of the death of Christ, to the Cross itself, to the Sermon on the Mount, to Pentecost: but in none of these can God be contained.

Christian theology covers the whole of time, the past, the future, and the present, in the sweep of the theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Love.

But this sweep of Christian theology has lost its comprehensiveness. We still tie ourselves in faith to the past. We find the Real Presence in an act of remembrance: we insist that that remembrance is not just a gentle backward look, but a bending back of Time upon itself; so that our Communion holds the present and the past together side by side. But we are like Theseus—we have a line to lead us back safely, but we have no clue to guide us to the centre of the labyrinth. We have kept our faith in the past, but we have lost our sure and certain hope in the future. We have forgotten that Christ will come again, that the Resurrection hope is inseparably bound up with the Second Coming, that without it we are of all men most miserable. The early Church looked backward to the Cross and empty tomb, and forward to the *Parousia*; whilst we look lingeringly back to the joy of primitive Christians which was only what it was because they looked forward, not back.

But the Christian hope lies too firmly embedded in our Creeds and in our Liturgy to be forgotten for long. "We may indeed be thankful", writes Brother Edward in his preface, "for the Church's witness in giving us the season of Advent, for the words of our Consecration prayer—'and hath instituted and commanded us to continue a perpetual memorial of that his precious death until his coming again'—and the familiar hymns still do much to keep the hope and doctrine before us."

The decline of the Christian hope, directed through the *Parousia* to the Resurrection, was due to two things. The first was, as Mr. Wheeler says, "the establishment of Christianity as the State religion by Constantine". This life became so much more worth living for Christians, that even those who did not join the Church only for reasons of policy began to forget the need of rebirth into a new life. The resurrection hope became the much more modern desire for survival after death. Our World, still held in the death-grip of demonic forces, seemed no longer to need the same kind of rescue: an ethical and spiritual revival would suffice,

and could be effected by a renewed Pentecostal outpouring.

The second cause of the decline of the Christian hope must undoubtedly have been the highly coloured symbolism of the millennarians. This struck the cultured leaders of the Church as childish, and Papias was put down by Eusebius of Caesarea as a man "of very mean capacity" for his millennarian views. None the less, the millennarians kept their grasp on an essential doctrine which we have let slip. Much in this book shows that the reign of Christ, with the faithful, is not a doctrine which can lightly be dispensed with. Father Benson and Father Puller are quoted in support of the view that the conversion of the world by the Church will not take place until the Second Coming: the Church's task is to fill up the number of the elect: then will follow the conversion of Israel, which will mean the conversion of the world (Acts iii, 19-21: Romans xi, 15, 25f).

The mind of the ordinary man, even of the ordinary Christian, is resistant of a literal hope of the *Parousia,* and Mr. Wheeler analyses the main reasons for that resistance in his essay. It seems far away, it is unimaginable, our Lord himself did not teach it with any certainty, and anyhow it has not happened. To these he opposes mankind's persistent interest in far-away things and the future, the irrelevance of imagination (many true things are unimaginable), the witness of the early Church to our Lord's teaching, and the fact that our Lord refused to point to a day or hour for the return.

Dr. Spencer, in the essay which follows, goes far to show that St. John did not spiritualize the Church's hope, as has been too often maintained, in the sense of explaining away an embarrassing belief. The *Parousia* does not necessarily belong to the Gospel, though there are references to it. The Gospel, Dr. Farrer has said, was St. John's meditation on the Incarnation. If we want his meditation on the Last Things, we must go to the Apocalypse: there we shall find St. John's views on the second coming—or, rather, his illustrated edition of the Church's teaching. Dr. Spencer might have made more of the revolutionary possibilities opened up by Dr. Farrer's *Rebirth of Images,* and his vindication of the unity of authorship. If the St. John of the Gospel wrote the Apocalypse, then indeed the doctrine of the *Parousia* comes into its own. His essay, however, shows very clearly that we cannot get on without the doctrine, any more than we can live without the hope.

Father Curtis writes: "Let us give up once and for all the attempt to persuade by efforts on the controversial plane those who have not the gift of faith. It will only lead to the materialization of our hope, through our attempt to bear it witness." If that

maxim were more often accepted, the *Kerygma* would be more effectively proclaimed. His essay takes the Christian hope out of time altogether, and places it in a new dimension. That is not to say that he spiritualizes the hope of the coming: his is not a "realized eschatology": in the category of transfiguration, the coming reign of Christ is a reign on earth, a reign in the future, a reign at the end of time which yet covers the whole of time. For the secular and indifferent it is still a *Dies Irae,* but for Christians the emphasis is upon "Look up, for your redemption draweth nigh".

The Jews are a part of the process of the coming Kingdom. They are not to be allegorized into the Christian Church, nor reduced into too small a righteous remnant. They are the chosen people, and the promises of God are faithful. Their sufferings throughout the centuries since Christ have been inconceivable, and yet in their sense redemptive. By their rejection, they saved others, themselves they could not save: yet by those others they themselves shall be saved, and the receiving of them will be life from the dead. Their part in the process is, again, unimaginable—and yet there is a certain intuitive rightness about it. Dr. Simon's essay is on this theme.

M. Khodre's short essay links up the Eucharist, and Sunday, with the expectant Church and the coming of the Lord of Glory, and redresses our unbalanced emphasis on the past.

Mysticism, Catholic or other, has too much looked up and looked too little forward. In history as in mystical experience the coming of Christ is through the dark night: there must be the great tribulation, for man or nation or Church—then comes the end. There is an easy way, but it leads elsewhere. We then arrive at the Millenium—not necessarily a thousand years—for which the Church once prayed *Maranatha,* and now scarcely prays at all: "the Spirit and the Bride say, Come". A part of the tribulation will be the coming of Anti-Christ. So Mr. Lovell's essay on Catholic mysticism, and Canon Abbott's extract from his Oxford sermon, lead us back to Brother Edward's final essay "Concerning Antichrist". This is as vigorous and suggestive as any part of the book, and is a wholesome antiseptic. It is tempting, and always has been tempting, for Christians to suppose that the tribulations, when they come, will be chiefly for the ungodly. For those Christians who themselves cry from out of tribulation that may well be. But the Kingdom lies on the other side of suffering, and there is no road round. Antichrist must come, before Christ comes again in such a way that every eye can see him. If we are not all martyrs, we must all face martyrdom—we must all be confessors: that at least

refers to those who find their way to the Kingdom *before the Parousia;* their only way is through the wickedness of the world. When the number of the elect has been filled, and Christ comes in his Glory with all his saints, the time of martyrdom may be over: the qualification for entry may be a different one — a great humility, willing to accept the guidance and judgement of those we have despised. But perhaps that way may be no easier than the other.

This is a much needed book, and one may hope will form the foundation of sermons. It is a subject on which congregations are usually most attentive.

H. A. Blair.

The Old Testament: Newly translated from the Latin Vulgate by Mgr. Ronald Knox at the request of the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Vol. II. 1949. pp. 741-1604. (Burns Oates and Washbourne.)

Merely to have translated the whole of the Bible from the Latin Vulgate into English is a tremendous achievement; but when the English of that translation is a delight to the ear, and the foundations of the translation are seen to have been laid on a sound basis of competent Hebrew, Greek and Latin scholarship, then the thing surely becomes a wonder, a portent. Moreover, it constitutes a forcible argument for the superiority of a translation produced by a single hand over one produced by a committee of bishops and scholars. Obviously the first draft of any translation must be the work of a single hand; but by the time such a draft has passed through the various panels appointed to deal with its scholarship and its English, any distinctive characteristics it may have possessed will have been ironed out into a dead level of colourless dullness. Of course this argument will at once be countered by the instance of the English Bible of James I; but that was an age of great prose, and, moreover, one has a strong suspicion that a single master of prose was responsible for the final form of that translation to a greater degree than is commonly supposed. Against that may be cited the case of the revision of 1881, than which it would be hard to find anything less inspired. Nor does the case of that revision prove that multiple responsibility is a safeguard in the matter of scholarship, for in hundreds of instances the correct translation proposed by the Hebrew scholars among the revisers was rejected or relegated to the margin.

There can be little doubt that if Mgr. Knox's version had passed

through the hands of a series of panels and committees, its distinctive charm and individuality would have been wholly obliterated. The Holy See in its ancient wisdom did not forget that the Latin Vulgate was the work of a single scholar, one moreover who would have been a thorn in the side of any panel, and so we are enriched by this delightful labour of love, which will undoubtedly, in due time, become an English classic.

An interesting feature of this second volume is that it contains, in an appendix, an alternative translation of the Psalter made from the new Latin version of the Psalms published by the Pontifical Biblical Commission in 1947. Comparison of the two shows that the new version is generally closer to the Hebrew text and meaning than the Vulgate. A brief illustration may be taken from the comparison of Ps. xxiii, 1-2, in the two versions: Vulg., "*Dominus regit me, et nihil mihi deerit. In loco pascuae ibi me collocavit. Super aquam refectionis educavit me.*" R.V., "*Dominus pascit me: nihil mihi deest; in pascuis virentibus cubare me facit. Ad aquas, ubi quiescam, conducit me.*" Comparison with the Hebrew will show that the new version is much closer to the original than the Vulgate. It is interesting to observe that, while the new version has "*in valle tenebrosa*" for the Vulg. "*in medio umbrae mortis*", Mgr. Knox has rendered both by "the shadow of death all around me." It is generally acknowledged that the Hebrew word rendered "shadow of death" has acquired that meaning by a Massoretic mispointing, and really means "deep gloom", the suggestion of "death" not being found in the word.

The second volume of the translation contains the greater part of the poetry of the Old Testament, and hence affords a more extended view of Mgr. Knox's skill in the rendering of Hebrew poetry than was possible from the first volume. It is apparent that the translator has created a stylistic form, a special poetic diction, to convey to English readers something of the tumultuous rush of Hebrew rhythms. Here is an example from the tremendous dirge over fallen Babylon in Isaiah xiv: "What, fallen from heaven, thou Lucifer, that once didst herald the dawn? Prostrate on the earth, that didst once bring nations to their knees? I will scale the heavens (such was thy thought); I will set my throne higher than God's stars, take my seat at his own trysting place, at the meeting of the northern hills; I will soar above the level of the clouds, the rival of the most High. Thine, instead, to be dragged down into the world beneath, into the heart of the abyss. Who that sees thee there, but will peer down at thee and read thy story: Can this be the man who once shook the world, and made thrones totter; who turned earth into a desert, its cities into ruins; never granted prisoner

release? For those others, honourable burial, each in his own palace; thee the grave itself rejects, like a withered root, like a thing unclean. Rots thy corpse unrecognized, beneath yonder coverlet of men slain, that went down to the deep pit together; no fellowship hast thou with those others, no share in their sepulture, thou who didst lead thy country to ruin, thou, who didst bring destruction on thy people." The maxim holds good, "*de gustibus non est disputandum*", and there will no doubt be those to whom these inversions and this brocaded richness will not appeal; nevertheless, everyone will surely agree that there is nothing flat or colourless here, and when this version is put to the test of being read aloud, it comes through with flying colours.

One of the greatest difficulties with which a translator must contend is how to avoid overstepping the narrow boundary between legitimate paraphrase and what might be called *midrash*, or individual interpretation. All translation involves interpretation, and the danger is increased where, as here, we have a translation of a translation; each remove from the original increases the possibility of error. On the whole it may justly be said that Mgr. Knox has not overstepped the boundaries, and very often his paraphrases are not only felicitous but illuminating. As an example of the translator's treatment of a difficult passage, difficult both in the Hebrew and in the Latin, we may look at Ps. lxviii (V. lxvii), 13-14. The Vulgate reads: "*Si dormiatis inter medios cleros, pennae columbae deargentatae, et posteriora dorsi ejus in pallore auri. Dum discernit caelestis reges super eam, nive dealbabuntur in Selmon.*" Mgr. Knox's rendering of this is, "Live in peace in the midst of your inheritance, and riches shall be yours like the silver that covers the dove's wings, like the sheen of gold on its back. He who dwells in heaven has strewn the ground with the wealth of kings, like the snow that lies white on Salmon."

Here it may be remarked that "*inter cleros*" cannot mean "in the midst of your inheritance", and that St. Jerome, for reasons of his own, has transliterated the LXX κλήρων possibly intending to give the Latin "*clerus*" a meaning to which it has no right. One might have expected that the reason for rendering "*cleros*" by "inheritance" would have been given in the footnote. Moreover, "strewn the ground with wealth of kings" can hardly be said to be a translation of "*discernit reges super eam*"; neither the Hebrew nor the LXX gives any warrant for such a rendering. It is interpretation, possibly justified by the general sense which the translator has given to the whole passage, but not translation. In the same passage occurs a good example of a felicitous touch in the rendering of "*pallore auri*" by "sheen of gold".

In undertaking to indicate the disagreements between the Latin and the Hebrew the translator probably found that he had assumed a heavier burden than he was aware of when he began his herculean task, and it would be unfair to expect all such disagreements to be indicated. Nevertheless, it must be confessed that the footnotes are the vulnerable point of the book. While often interesting and valuable, they do not always seem to be aware of the present position of Hebrew scholarship with respect to doubtful points. But this does not detract from the enormous value of the translation itself, or from our gratitude to the author of it. Of him the saying of Hillel is surely true, "He who has gotten to himself words of Torah, has gotten to himself the life of the world to come."

S. H. Hooke.

Policy for the West. By Barbara Ward. (Allen and Unwin.) 12s. 6d.

This is an eminently sensible book—sensible in its analysis of the present situation and almost equally sensible in its suggestions for dealing with it, though not every one of these may win general acceptance. It is perhaps best on the economic side, as befits the work of a former sub-editor of *The Economist,* and its economic chapters might with advantage be made compulsory reading for both doctrinaire "planners" and doctrinaire supporters of "free enterprise", and above all for those members of our present governing party who still refuse to recognize that, as the author puts it, "there is not enough to go round: not all the advances of modern science and modern technology have yet contrived to change the fact that in any modern community there are more wants than there are means to satisfy them", and that continued emphasis on "welfare" without increased production will not only stultify the defence programme of the free world but will make it impossible to create that "expanding economy" which, as she shows, is as much needed as any defence measures if the Communist challenge is to be permanently countered. Though, as she says in discussing the differences between the American and the British economic outlook, "the British are surely right in their contention that only an accidental conjunction of historical, social and geographical factors in the nineteenth century made possible an *automatic* expansion of the world economy: change those underlying factors and automatic forces can begin to contract the economy as certainly as they formerly increased it", yet "the Americans are surely right in their continued insistence that efficiency, productivity and expansion depend upon these often despised economic forces. The British, in losing confi-

dence in automatic forces, appear all too often to have lost faith in competition and efficiency as well. Every report on industrial productivity brought to Britain from America in the last two years reveals the technical backwardness of much of British industry, the unenterprising management, the opposition of trade unions to technological progress, the extension of the concept of protection until it seems a means of protecting men against the impact of new ideas or the need for better work".

Yet the author realizes, and makes it plain to her readers, that economics are not the crux of the matter. "Economics", she points out, "tend to receive predominant attention because they make up such a large part of the details of policy—once that policy has been decided"; but fundamental decisions such as the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact are "essentially and entirely political". Moreover, these political decisions themselves, if they are to achieve their object, the permanent "containment" of the Soviet power for aggression, need to be taken by people who really believe in the values which they profess to be defending, as strongly as the Communists believe in their own creed.

In her final chapter on "Faith for Freedom", she observes that, to judge from the timid discussions of ways and means which fill the columns of the Press in the western world, most of us fail to realize that here, and not in Russia, are to be found the really radical ideas which can transform human life. "The world to-day presents the astonishing spectacle of Western man sleeping unaware on the powder keg of his own revolutionary philosophy and the Stalinists leaping up and down, proclaiming as a new revolution a view of man and society which was old when the pyramids were built". The Greeks and the Jews brought into a world hitherto dominated by belief in fatality and in a static society the "transforming ideals of justice and liberty" which have ever since differentiated the West from Asia and Africa and the rest of the world; but "Marxist Communism restores the old fetters of fatality and tyranny . . . . The free and morally responsible human being with rights and duties and aspirations which transcend any given social order vanishes . . . because there is nothing beyond the social order. Every act of human life, every thought of human minds is entirely conditioned by the general state of material events at that time . . . once again men are bound to the melancholy wheel of their social conditioning . . . . The Western vision fades and in the darkness there are glimpses of Moloch and Baal and the terrible gods of state and circumstance reasserting their ancient sway". We need, therefore, to regain what we seem sometimes to have largely lost—our faith in "the concept of freedom, moral responsibility and will". The thesis could have been further developed; but this might have

been difficult for a member of that Roman Church whose record, to put it mildly, has not been one of encouragement towards intellectual freedom. As it stands, however, it is practically the same as that of Bertrand Russell, Gilbert Murray and other freethinking liberals; and it is encouraging to find that such a statement of the positive as well as the negative aims of western policy can win acceptance from the extreme Right to the extreme Left of the religious scene.

Agreement, indeed, can be carried further than this. The author sets out to prove—and in our view succeeds in proving—that there is, in economics, "a working basis for collaboration between planners and anti-planners", and, in politics, between nationalists and federalists; and she makes suggestions for overcoming differences and difficulties on specific issues such as the Schumann Plan, the rôle of Germany in European defence and economic aid to South-East Asia, which, whether adopted or not (in the last case it is to be feared that no Asiatic Government will have the courage or the common sense to accept them), show at least that none of these questions need offer an insuperable obstacle to Western unity. No difficulties are shirked, but the treatment of the whole subject is an example of the faith and confidence which the author preaches and practises.

One warning, however, must be given to readers of this edition: it is evidently a reprint from an original publication in America and, as such, is not only American in its spelling to a degree somewhat disconcerting in the work of a British writer but also seems addressed primarily to an American public. For example, the recipe for an anti-inflationary policy set out on pages 138 and 139 is clearly adapted to American rather than to British conditions. Nevertheless, as we have said, it can and should be read with profit in British governing circles; and a French translation might do much good in Paris. Indeed, it should be read everywhere, and we hope it will be.

L. Collier.

Episcopacy and the Royal Supremacy in the Church of England in the XVIth Century. By E. T. Davies. 137 pp. (Basil Blackwell). 10s. 6d.

Two of the most important problems of the day are those of Christian unity and the relations between Church and State; the first raises the issue of episcopacy and the second that of establishment. Moreover, the two are more closely related than is always recognized; and both call for ecclesiastical statesmanship of a high order

to ensure that, in working towards their solution, there shall be no violence done either to the facts of history or to the fundamental principles of theology. For these reasons, this small book, by the Director of Religious Education in the Diocese of Monmouth, possesses a measure of topical interest over and above that which it must have for students of the sixteenth century. Mr. Davies is not concerned to recount once again the evidence for the outward continuity of the episcopate in England (" stories about mock consecrations are no longer entertained by impartial historians ", p. 2), nor to investigate the attitude of the Church of England at this period to non-episcopal Churches abroad (which has been done so recently by Professor Norman Sykes). His purpose is to present the teaching of the Anglican formularies and writers about episcopacy on the one hand, and about the Royal Supremacy on the other; and to discover the practical effects of the Royal Supremacy upon the episcopate in England during the vital decades following the breach with Rome.

" It is evident unto all men diligently reading Holy Scripture and ancient authors, that from the Apostles' time there have been these Orders of Ministers in Christ's Church; Bishops, Priests, and Deacons . . . . " We are reminded that this familiar assertion about the threefold ministry in the Preface to the Ordinal (1550) does not stand alone. The same doctrine was implied in the Article on Penance in the Ten Articles (1536), stated explicitly in the Bishops' Book (1537), reproduced in the King's Book (1543), repeated in the 35th of the XLII Articles (1553), and again in the 36th of the XXXIX Articles (1571). Indeed, " there are few doctrinal issues on which the Anglican Church showed greater consistency during the transition period of the Protestant Reformation, and there is no evidence that she was prepared to consider any deviation from the historic ministry which she had always possessed " (p. 11). Episcopacy was not regarded as a mere device of church government; it was not a question of choosing this from a number of equally good alternatives. And this unanimity is all the more important since it is in formularies of this kind, and not in the writings of any one theologian, that we find the official mind of the Church of England. Yet Mr. Davies also shows that, despite minor divergences and considerable differences of emphasis, the contributions of Jewel, Whitgift, Cranmer, Bancroft, Bilson and Hooker, point in the same direction. (The summary of Thomas Bilson's *The Perpetual Governement of Christes Church* (1593) is especially useful.) If no Anglican writer declared explicitly that episcopacy is *jure divino*, " the implication that this institution is by divine right is clear enough. Otherwise, there seems no reason why . . . [they]

. . . should have claimed that bishops are the successors of the Apostles . . . . It was because they believed that behind the apostolic authority there was a higher authority which was ultimately transmitted to the bishop, that they insisted upon the connection between the episcopate and the apostolate" (p. 57).

From one point of view, the acceptance of the Royal Supremacy may be described as the price the Church of England was compelled to pay for her emancipation from the papacy. Not a few of the bishops themselves had serious misgivings about it, and Mr. Davies would go so far as to say that "it came within an ace of depriving the episcopal office of all spiritual meaning" (p. 70). It is a serious matter, for example, when the power of bishops as Ordinaries is virtually suspended for a quarter of a century, as was the case between 1534-1559, when Royal Visitations replaced Episcopal Visitations. Yet if, for a generation, the Royal Supremacy imposed burdens upon the Church sufficient to threaten her existence as a spiritual body, the fact remains that, in the long run, far from doing permanent harm to the episcopate, "it preserved the episcopal character of the Church in this period" (p. 79), when it might otherwise have been abolished by the Puritans or reduced to a shadow by the papacy after the Council of Trent. "There is no evidence that Elizabeth, any more than Henry or Edward VI, usurped the sacerdotal functions inherent in the episcopate" (p. 82). Nor can the Royal Supremacy be condemned merely on the grounds that it helped to fix Anglican doctrine, for the vital question is not whether the doctrine were set forth by the Crown or by Convocation, but whether the doctrine were true or false; and "there is no reason to believe that the doctrinal reformation in the Church of England in the sixteenth century would have been any different if the Supremacy had not existed, or if it had been different in its nature and scope". (p. 86).

Richard Hooker distilled an imposing mass of official and unofficial Anglican teaching in one sentence, when he wrote: "There is not any man of the Church of England but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth; nor any man a member of the commonwealth, which is not also of the Church of England." Taking over the medieval conception of the one society, the Anglican theologians of the sixteenth century found it inconceivable that the king, who was head of the State, should not also be recognized as the temporal head of the Church in his dominions. Presbyterians might profess ardent support for the royal power, but they also defended a "two-kingdom" theory which might equally well lead to republicanism. The Church of Rome might continue for a time to uphold the "one society" conception, until the inconvenience of

an alleged heretical king made it necessary for tyrannicide to become a part of Jesuit political doctrine. Against both sides the Anglican stood firm. The king was God's vicegerent, wielding the power of the sword, and political obedience was therefore a religious duty. As the head of a Christian State the king is as responsible for the religion of his subjects as for their material welfare. Yet he remains *rex* and can never be *sacerdos*; he can make ecclesiastical appointments but never exercise sacerdotal functions; he cannot himself define doctrine, but when it has been defined he can enforce it (or refuse to enforce it) as the official teaching of the Church. The Anglican ideal of the Christian Commonwealth is a noble ideal: "Anglicanism takes a view of the civil power, the magistrate, and political authority, which is essentially religious .... The protestant nonconformist has played an invaluable part in saving Britain from a secular Leviathan, but it is his danger to despair of society and to withdraw from it. Anglicanism takes a risk in its connection with the modern State, but this connection may still prevent society from becoming completely secularized. Modern society needs an established church more to-day than ever." (p. 127).

It is a pity that Mr. Davies' book could not have been published more cheaply. It is also a pity that it could not have been made to read more attractively: extensive quotations from official documents, together with resumés of the teaching of the leading theologians, occupy much the larger part of it, and they are valuable indeed; yet the reader may be excused for thinking that too much material has been squeezed within too small a space. There are several misprints: e.g., this (for *thus*), p. 9, l. 18; omission of full stop after "Ordinal", p. 9, last line; labout (for *labour*), p. 81, l. 2; "provenance" is meaningless in the context of p. 8, l. 22 (understand *province*?); something has gone wrong with the sentence beginning "Scripture leaves much . . . ", p. 47, ll. 27-30. There is no index; and, in the absence of a bibliography, references in the footnotes ought to have been given in a less abbreviated form.

THOMAS WOOD.

THE SHORTER OXFORD BIBLE. Adapted and edited by G. W. BRIGGS, G. B. CAIRD and N. MICKLEM. (Geoffrey Cumberlege. Oxford University Press). 7s. 6d. School Edition 6s.

THIS abridgement of Holy Scripture has an advantage over its predecessors in being constructed on a definite plan; it attempts to bring coherence and perspective into the heterogeneous material and

to emphasize the unity of Old and New Testaments by following out one theme, that of the People of God, in a continuous development from Abraham to the Apostolic Church. This object determines the arrangement of the selected passages, which include almost all which can be regarded as essential, and give a conspectus which should be adequate for those for whom it is intended, the general intelligent reader and the student of school age. Its use in schools is facilitated by syllabuses for primary and secondary pupils which are provided in an appendix. The order of the Old Testament passages is largely chronological—a definite advantage. It concludes with sections on the Prophets, the Priests, and the Wise Men in which the development of religious thought, the elaboration of Jewish worship, and the transition between the Old and New Covenants are well illustrated.

When they pass to the New Testament the editors are faced with new problems in the treatment of the Gospels and Epistles. The Gospels are presented in the form of a consecutive story, to which extracts from Mark provide the clue: these are indicated by a marginal line; the passages from the other evangelists are inserted judiciously in so far as their place can be determined. Our Lord's teaching is gathered together in a separate section. Here there are regrettable omissions, mainly of a theological type, but yet essential to a just survey; for example, the section on prayer is jejune and there is little mention of worship; there is no treatment, consecutively, of sin and forgiveness, or of our Lord's relationship to his Father, or of the significance of his Passion. It might be replied that such matters occur incidentally throughout the extracts from the Gospels. Yet the general effect is a disconcertingly ethical rather than theological representation of his teaching. Probably the plan of the edition necessarily defeats any attempt to extract passages of sufficient length on the divine nature and work of our Lord, which are often revealed in scattered phrases, symbolic acts, and interpretations; so that complaint on this score may be unfair to the editors. But the general effect of the Gospels as a whole, is lost in any series of extracts, however carefully chosen. The treatment of Acts is admirable: omissions are judicious, the abbreviation of speeches and curtailing of connective matter are well done, and the continuity of narrative is preserved and enlivened. The most difficult problem, that of the Epistles, is solved on bold, perhaps overbold, lines. The material is divided into two sections, "The Christian Way of Life" and "The Christian Faith", and cognate passages, from any writers, are grouped together to illustrate practice and doctrine. This, for the general reader and for school use, cuts a clear path through what is too often an unintelligible tangle, relating the whole to practical needs and to the

Apostles' Creed. It also seems to indicate the consensus of spirit and of belief in the apostolic Church. To criticize it for occasional incongruity of juxtaposition, and for the inevitable loss of meaning through loss of context, would be to apply too rigorous canons to such a work. The reader will have a better general idea of the content of the apostolic letters, but his impression of the writers and their distinctive outlook and approach will be blurred. There are brief explanatory introductions to each section: they are inclined to facile generalization, which does not always hit the point of a passage. Certain phrases, such as "Esau was a gentleman" (p. 21), "Under more prudent government Israel might have become a great imperial power" (p. 101), "They had each special sources of their own" (p. 151), are jarring: and others such as "To know a man's name was to know his character" (p. 26), "This solemn communion service" (for Abram's covenant sacrifice) (p. 14), "The fundamental idea of sacrifice was 'gift'" (p. 181), are misleading.

But on the whole the introductions do what is required, and they do not lose sight of the central theme of the continuity of the divine purpose nor of its relevance to the present day. The type and set-up are all that could be desired, and a word of praise is due to the binders for the perfect flat opening of any page.

This abridgement tries to do more than other shorter Bibles. It seeks to interpret as well as to abbreviate, to give a general picture of what the Bible means as a whole, as well as to present the essentials of what it says. Nowadays its line of interpretation is well established, but not all teachers have time or knowledge sufficient for presenting it to their pupils; and to the general reader it will certainly bring a better perspective and coordination. This great merit should outweigh any criticism which may be made on the extent to which the New Testament material is rearranged: indeed this defect, if defect it be considered, will render the abridgement less likely to be used as a substitute; it should give better understanding, and excite a desire to read the original text in full.

C. B. Armstrong.

The Letters of Saint Athanasius concerning the Holy Spirit. Translated with Introduction and Notes by C. R. B. Shapland. (Epworth Press). 25s.

Mr. Shapland is warmly to be congratulated upon the production of a valuable addition to the resources in English on Patristic literature in general and to the study of St. Athanasius in particular. It is, indeed, surprising that these four letters to Serapion, so important as evidence for the movement towards the closer definition of

the doctrine of Holy Spirit, have not previously been translated into English. The introduction and notes provided lose nothing by comparison with those of the French translation of the same documents by Joseph Lebon in *Sources chrétiennes.* It is possible that Lebon is better on points of reading, but annotations on the subject are meagre in comparison with those of Mr. Shapland.

The introduction is based upon a careful though critical study of the best modern treatments of a complex and difficult subject. The vexed question of the relation between the Tropici and Pneumatomachi is ably handled. Both represent in a certain sense an Arianism of the Holy Spirit combined with substantial orthodoxy with regard to the Son. Tempting as it might be to identify or to approximate the two schools of thought, there are such differences of outlook and ethos as reflected in the points which their orthodox opponents make against them that some account must be made of the significant differences. Mr. Shapland is wholly right in seeing the Pneumatomachi, falsely as Loofs has shown associated with the name of Macedonius, as a body of ultra-conservative Semi-Nicenes who, while prepared to accept the substance of the Nicene Faith with regard to the Son, were unwilling to carry their argumentation further with regard to the Holy Spirit. They represented an important and respectable body of opinion. The Tropici, on the other hand, appear to have a more directly Arian flavour. Persuaded of the correctness of orthodox conclusions with regard to the Son, they retain their Arian method of argument with regard to the Holy Spirit, and retain their conclusions as a kind of theological Verdun. So far as we can tell, they represent a local Egyptian phenomenon. Whether the heretics against whom Didymus wrote were lineal descendants of these Tropici or not would repay more detailed examination than Mr. Shapland finds it relevant to make.

Why are they called Tropici? The term, as H. N. Bate showed in his article on "Some technical terms of Greek exegesis" in the *Journal of Theological Studies,* Volume XXIV, may refer to the application of technical methods to the exegesis of Biblical texts. Such methods were noted by the orthodox to be specially characteristic of the use of the Bible by the heretics. The difficulty is that the evidence at least of these letters does not show any particularly outstanding application of these methods, and the possibility ought to be considered at greater length than Mr. Shapland allows of alternative explanations of the term. He does, in fact, on page 86 mention Montfaucon's rendering of the word as "versatiles"—a contemptuous designation like turncoats, a possible allusion to their desertion of the Arian opinion with respect of the Son without a corresponding advance in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. One of

the lines of argument in the letters is concerned to show the impossibility of stopping at any such halfway house. Such a hypothesis would be no more radical in character than the conclusion of Loofs, accepted by the majority of scholars despite the demurrer of Holl that Macedonius had nothing to do with the heresy which so often bears his name. It is, of course, possible that the word was used in two senses, the Tropici themselves claiming the title as descriptive of their pretended greater precision in Biblical exegesis, while the orthodox used it in the pejorative sense. Such ambiguities are by no means unknown in Patristic study. The Alogi, for example, may have described themselves as Anti-Logos-ites whereas their orthodox opponents took the term in the sense of Irrationalists. The term Gnostic may have been used by members of the sect of themselves in the sense of "Knowledgeable", whereas to their Catholic opponents it bore the connotation of "Know-alls".

The notes are normally models of careful and detailed exegesis, exactly the type of documentation which must precede any considerable advance in the field of Patristic study. No really important topic is left without treatment on a fair scale, and not only are the necessary parallels in other writings of St. Athanasius given but allusion is made to corresponding passages in earlier or contemporary Fathers. Valuable exegetical material is collected, but such notes are saved from the danger of degenerating into a mere catena by an analysis of the different shades of interpretation in the various writers noted. References to recent literature might, however, with profit, have been more numerous, particularly in languages other than English. C. Hauret's thesis, *Comment le defenseur de Nicee a-t-il compris le dogme de Nicee*? has much valuable material on the subject of the Holy Spirit as well as on the doctrine of the Son. A recent article in the *Journal of Theological Studies* by my friend and former pupil, Mr. H. R. Smythe, treats of the exegesis of Amos iv, 13, in St. Athanasius and Didymus—a topic of which these letters are full and on which Mr. Shapland had much to say. It may well have appeared too late for even a reference to be made. Gross's study on *Le divinisation du chretien d'apres les peres grecs* is a full-scale treatment of the doctrine of deification and has some good pages on St. Athanasius. The allusion to the reserve of St. Basil might have been strengthened by a reference to de Ghellinck's *Etudes Patristiques et Moyen Age*. Angel Christology and Pneumatology is discussed in learned though perverse fashion in Martin Werner's *Die Entstehung des christlichen Dogmas* while the use of the term pneuma of the Son is studied with his usual learning by Loofs in his *Theophilus von Antiochien*.

Minor blemishes can be briefly noted. Paul of Samosata and Eustahthius of Antioch should be added to the list of those who

describe the Wisdom as the Holy Spirit rather than the Son, thus rounding off the evidence for what may be suspected to have been an Antiochene exegetical pattern. It is not quite obvious why, on page 110, Justin Martyr is said to follow Tatian. On page 88 the description of both the Son and the Spirit as angels in the Christian interpolations to the Ascension of Isaiah should be noted. In view of his careful and surprisingly modern treatment of the authorship of the Apocalypse it is surprising to read of the extravagance in exegesis of Dionysius of Alexandria without further qualification or modification. The note on the relation of the Holy Spirit to baptism and chrism might well have made even clearer than it does that here are precisely the two most difficult questions on the theology of baptism. A reference to Dr. Mason's *What is the relation of Baptism to Confirmation*? might have enabled the reader to follow up the discussion for himself at greater length than was relevant to Mr. Shapland's purpose.

The printing is remarkably accurate. Origen once appears as origin ! and something has come adrift with a Greek word on the first line of the first footnote on page 88.

H. E. W. Turner.

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TWO REACTIONS TO GNOSTICISM

By H. A. BLAIR

A. Irenaeus.

Perhaps the most obstinate of the opponents of Gnosticism was Irenaeus, a man of some learning and great intelligence: he was not profound enough to sympathize with the philosophic truth which underlay the original system of Valentinus, but was clear sighted enough to realize the effect that these elaborate allegories would have on the main body of Christians. He was himself an Eastern, and began his life in Asia minor, at a time when Gnosticism was a real danger. He knew Polycarp, to whom Cerinthus (in his story) and other perverters of the gospel (in Polycarp's own epistle) were "the first born of Satan". He had had an opportunity of hearing those very traditions which Valentinus himself had heard, and of accepting or rejecting them. In Book III, cap. 3, 4, of his great work against heresies, he calls Rome and the churches of Asia repositories of true tradition. He was a badly frightened man, and like most strong men, at his most dangerous when frightened. He was frightened away from some of the Christian traditions: particularly he was frightened away from a belief in any authority given to Angels, fallen or unfallen. He was always anxious to disparage any form of mediated divine activity.

The determination to see in God a completely direct ruler and unmediated Creator is so evident in his "*contra haereses*", that it needs no references. It is the theme which introduces Books II, III and IV, and reappears very soon in Book V (cap. 4). It reappears almost *ad nauseam* at points throughout his whole work. Any evidence that we may find of a tradition of Angels commissioned to care for the world and the men in it, will be

evidence from a hostile witness, evidence given unawares, evidence given because tradition was so strong as to be beyond dispute.

His main object, which he overshot as men generally do in emergency, was to oppose the idea of a second creator God, or of a creation by Angels not in accordance with God's purpose. The creation was an idea in the mind of God, and not just a misguided ambition in the mind of a superhuman Being. In fact Angels do not come between God and his creation: men need not climb to God on any ladder of Angels, nor does God *need* agents. But though God needs no agents, Irenaeus was not quite certain whether God did in fact use agents in creation. In Book II, cap. 2,[1] he makes it quite clear that *even if* Angels did create the world, they themselves were created by the supreme God, who therefore was the real Creator:

> *"Qui autem ab Angelis mundum dicunt fabricatum, vel ab alio quodam mundi fabricatore, praeter sententiam ejus, qui super omnia Pater est, primo quidem ex hoc ipso peccant, praeter voluntatem primi Dei talem et tantam conditionem Angelos fecisse dicentes: quasi efficaciores sint Angeli quam Deus, aut rursus quasi ille negligens sit . . . . Si autem non praeter voluntatem ejus, sed volente et sciente, quemadmodum quidam opinantur; jam non Angeli vel mundi fabricator causae erunt fabricationis istius, sed voluntas Dei. Si enim mundi fabricator est, Angelos ipse fecit, aut etiam causa creationis eorum ipse fuit; et mundum ipse videbitur fecisse, qui causas fabricationis ejus praeparavit."*[2]

So far his argument is indisputable, but when in the two following sections he leads on to the statement:

> *"Proprium est enim hoc Dei supereminentiae, non indigere aliis organis ad conditionem eorum quae fiunt . . . "*

he is on less certain ground, unless *"indigere"* is as it were in italics: nor does the quotation from the fourth gospel *"Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et sine ipso factum est nihil"* put him on a surer foundation. For if God's creation can transgress his will, his Angels can transgress his will in what they make. And Irenaeus himself perhaps saw the anomaly; for he admitted the

[1] References are to the text in Migne's *Patrologiae*.
[2] II, 2: 1, 3. p. 714.

freewill of Angels, and spoke of their fall at the end of what was evidently a form of creed, or a quotation from the Kerygma of his day — a Christological section appended to the trinitarian creed-form which precedes it, linked by the words "and in the Holy Ghost, who through the prophets has preached . . .": the words which concern us are those which refer to beings who will be judged and then consigned to aeonian fire, "Spirits of wickedness, and Angels who have transgressed and apostatized"[3]: and again later we find an interesting echo of I Peter iii, 19f, which shews that the connexion of the long-suffering of God with unbelieving *Angels* in the days of Noah was no belief peculiar to the author of I Peter (whether Peter himself or not), but part of the traditional interpretation of the Christian Church of the first and second centuries — "(those who are more fortunately endowed with understanding may be able) to explain that God was long-suffering both over the apostasy of the Angels who transgressed, and over the disobedience of men".[4]

It seems as if Irenaeus were not perfectly sure of his ground. If he remembered from his youth in Asia minor, that men like Polycarp taught that Angels were God's administrators of the Universe, and had transgressed: if he had an uncomfortable half-memory of a tradition that their transgression had set the world askew (for he would have been too young to know a great deal about the Christian Corpus, as held in trust by presbyters and bishops): if he had heard, as a young man hears, teaching on these subjects, he would remember and reproduce unconsciously from it. It would hardly affect his main line of reasoning, which would be governed by the Gnostic danger: and indeed his conscious memories of Asia minor would be much more of warning against over-emphasis on Angels and Powers, than of positive teaching about them. But there would crop up here a phrase, there a text, and there a formula, showing a subconscious memory of positive Christian angelology.

That is, in fact, what we do find. We find that curiously recurrent text from the Septuagint — Deuteronomy xxxii, 8f.

[3] I, 10, 1: p. 552.
[4] I, 10, 3. cf. also III, 23, 3: p. 962.

Clement of Rome quoted it; and Justin Martyr, when Trypho quoted it to him in the Hebrew version, quoted the Septuagint reading against it.[5] Irenaeus quotes it[6] under the heading "Doctrine of the rest of the Apostles" — i.e. not the evangelists. He uses the text, as we should expect if he quoted it unconsciously, not in any discourse upon Angels, but to show that God himself originally made the human race one, and that it was only later that he divided it into nations:

"But in this passage he not only proclaims to the Jews who were not on his side that God is the maker of the world, but also that he made one race to dwell on the whole earth, as Moses also says:

"'When the most High separated the nations, he spread abroad the sons of Adam, he set the bounds of the nations according to the number of the Angels of God.' But the people who trust in God were *not now* (*jam non*) *to be under the sway of Angels,* but under the sway of the Lord . . . .".

It would be most helpful if we knew exactly what Greek words were translated by the Latin words "*jam non*". On the face of it, he seems to acknowledge an administration of Angels over the whole earth, until it was divided into nations, when Israel was withdrawn into the administration of God: "there was war in Heaven" — was it at that point that there came an angelic transgression, which split up the world of men, as it split up the Angels in charge of them? The actual transgression said to have divided the nations, as recorded in Genesis, was an illicit attempt to reach heaven and "make a name"—so that they should not be scattered abroad: it was in fact the attempt of man to set himself in the place of God. In the Pistis Sophia, this tradition is reflected in the story of the Angels who transgressed by teaching men mysteries, and again the story of the second Fall, of Sophia-Achamoth, who made an illicit attempt to reach God, and so fell from the Pleroma. Our passage from Irenaeus seems to give substance to such traditions, as part of the Christian corpus: it implies that the Gentiles in pre-Christian days (and by analogy, the heathen in post-Christian days) remained under Angelic archons.

[5] *Dial. Tryph.* CXXXI.
[6] III, 12, 29.

Irenaeus himself strongly opposes any idea that real power or government belongs to Angels or to the Prince of this world,[7] who is only "one of the Angels placed over the spirit of the air".[8] But this expressed opposition is only what we should expect from Irenaeus, and if anything it makes the previous quotation more significant.

A casual reference[9] to Angels finds a weakness in Irenaeus' logical armour:

"Haec enim Filius, qui est Verbum Dei, ab initio praestruebat, non indigente Patre Angelis, uti faceret conditionem, et formaret hominem, propter quem et conditio fiebat: neque rursus indigente ministerio ad fabricationem eorum, quae facta sunt, ad dispositionem eorum negotiorum, quae secundum hominem erant; sed habente copiosum et enarrabile ministerium. Ministrat enim ei ad omnia sua progenies et figuratio sua, id est Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, Verbum et Sapientia; quibus serviunt, et subjecti sunt omnes Angeli."

The Father, he says here, needs no agents or even ministers for his work of creation: he has indeed an ample and unutterable "management" in the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Word and the Wisdom; and then he adds inadvertently, "whom all Angels serve, and to whom they are obedient". If the Angels are servants of the Word and Wisdom of God, what warrant have we for supposing that they were excluded from the service of creation? Irenaeus clearly wished to suppose that they were so excluded, but neither logic nor tradition support his wish, on his own showing.

If we can accept the authority of a fragment from Irenaeus' book on the Resurrection, which appears in two slightly different forms in Syriac and Armenian,[10] he himself used in a kind of doxology a most unexpected phrase about the second Person of the Holy Trinity. The passage runs: "Ruler among kings: the Prophet among prophets: the Angel among Angels: the Man among men...", which may suggest an Angelic redemption

[7] V, 22, 2.
[8] V, 24, 4.
[9] IV, 7, 4.
[10] Ante-Nicene Fathers Library: Vol. IX, p. 183, fragments LIII and LIV.

(during the period between Easter and the Ascension, if one can speak in terms of periods) parallel to that of humankind, and reminiscent of the Pistis Sophia.[11]

In Book II there are various passages[12] which name the orders of the celestial hierarchy — Angels, Archangels, Thrones, Dominions, Powers, Virtues — which suggest that the Christian tradition could still not dispense with the Principalities and the Powers in heavenly places, even in the face of the Gnostic danger. Irenaeus, indeed, quotes St. Paul (II Cor. xii, 2-4) as proving their existence.[13] But one feels that, for Irenaeus, they are there and all very well there, until they begin to interfere. They are in fact there in multitudes, and he taunts the heretics with reducing their numbers to thirty.[14]

Through wrong emphasis, the Gnostics had begun to put to flight the Angels. Irenaeus himself was an Eastern, and wrote in Greek, but his reaction was that of the Western Church towards speculative heresies; whilst his inadvertencies shew the tradition of Asia minor and the early Church. Angels have begun to lose caste in the West already, and the process continued in Tertullian, Hippolytus, Minucius Felix, Cyprian, Victorinus of Petau: Novatian shewed more sympathy towards them: but in the Instructions of Commodianus (sec.3) even guardian Angels have been tarred with the anti-Gnostic brush; and in Lactantius they have become something of a liability to their charges. But one can see that Angels as a whole have begun to lose caste, in Irenaeus' day: the final words of his treatise sum up his attitude:

"Et unum genus humanum, in quo perficiuntur mysteria Dei, 'quem concupiscunt Angeli videre', et non praevalent investigare sapientiam Dei, per quam plasma ejus conformatum et corporatum Filio perficitur: ut progenies ejus, primogenitus Verbum, descendat in facturam, hoc est in plasma, et capiatur ab eo: et factura iterum capiat Verbum, et ascendat ad eum, supergrediens Angelos, et fiet secundum imaginem et similitudinem Dei."

[11] Horner's translation, S.P.C.K., p. 6, 12a; cf. Origen, in Ezech. Hom. I, 7, and elsewhere.

[12] Cap. 30, 3, 4, 6, 7.

[13] II, 30, 7.

[14] II, 7, 3-4.

Men, though nominally lower than Angels, yet possessed a mystery (in the Incarnation) which Angels would like to share but could not, through lack of God-given wisdom (had Irenaeus forgotten that our Lord was Angel among Angels?): and man would, through union with the Word, regain the image and likeness, and so mount up to a place above the Angels.

Of beings adverse to God, Irenaeus has less to say: his references to demons are casual, and arise when dealing with other subjects. In Book II, 6, he scouts the idea that creating Angels could have been ignorant of the supreme God: not only was it impossible to believe of Angels, but it was proved untrue of demons, who were cast out by invocation of the Divine Name even in pre-Christian times. He calls them "*terreni spiritus*"[15]: but that they were bound up with the fallen Angels is shewn by a reference in Book IV, 6, 6-7, to the testimony borne to our Lord by God himself and all grades of creatures—"*a Patre, a Spiritu, ab Angelis, ab ipsa conditione, ab hominibus, et ab apostaticis spiritibus et daemoniis*" (I accept Massuet's restoration of "*daemoniis*" from "*ab erroneis*"): the bracketing together under one preposition of demons and spirits of apostasy is sufficient indication. In various passages about the Angelic transgression, they and their leaders are constantly spoken of as guilty of apostasy.

Those powers referred to in the Old Testament as gods are, he says, demons:[16] their leader is not Prince of this world nor God of this world — Paul did not use this phrase (II Cor. iv, 5), as a rather unconvincing rearrangement of the punctuation proves. He probably refers to fallen Angels when he says[17] that no invocations of Angels were practised in the early Church — "*nec invocationibus angelicis facit aliquid, nec incantationibus, nec reliqua prava curiositate*" — that that is his meaning is maintained by Massuet, and it is borne out by the bracketing of invocations with incantations and cheap curiosity. At the same

[15] II, 2.
[16] III, 6, 3.
[17] II, 32, 5.

time it is true that Irenaeus would have disparaged any form of Angel cult.

He does not distinguish clearly between ghosts of evil men, and Angels, when he discusses the Devil's angels.[18] Men become evil angels by choice: none are such by nature. For the most part his demonology is that of the New Testament (I Cor. v, 5: Matt. viii, 29: xii, 24-28: II Cor. xi, 3: Rev. xii, 10), which is that of the Ethiopic Enoch, and the Clementine Homilies. "The demons are disembodied spirits, awaiting their final punishment, subject to Satan, who is head of a kingdom of evil, leads men and Angels astray, and whose functions are tempting, accusing, punishing".[19]

Though, therefore, he gives no clear teaching about demons, his work shews that he knew of two traditions: (a) of transgressing Angels who became demons, and (b) of sons of the Evil One, ghosts of those who deliberately choose evil in this life. Both of these together form Satan's kingdom, which has no power except over those who deliberately accept his authority. At the same time, the Devil, he said, is stronger than men, though not strong in comparison with Christ[20] — "*sed et diabolum cum dixisset fortem, non in totum, sed velut in comparatione nostra*".

Finally he denied the Gnostic claim to a secret tradition. That claim, as they made it, badly needed denial. No doubt there was a genuine corpus of apostolic doctrine, a *kerygma*, a catechism, certain secret symbols such as the fish, and (in my view) a formula of initiation and exorcism. The Church had her pearls which she did not cast promiscuously before swine. The Church had to say, with her Master, "I have many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now", to her young initiates: but as soon as her members were ready, the Church taught them. But the Gnostic claim was esoteric in a different sense: they taught that certain mysteries, formulae, names, had been given to the apostles for the use of the inner circle of Christians only — the *Pneumaticoi* — never to be divulged to the less gifted

[18] IV, 41.
[19] W. Ferrar: *Uncanonical Jewish Books.*
[20] III, 8, 2.

spiritually. Special allegorical interpretations of Scripture formed an important part of this secret tradition. All this Irenaeus denied emphatically:[21] but he did not deny and should not be taken as denying, the existence and importance of the living tradition of the Churches.[22] Again he denied the Marcionite claim that a special revelation had been given to St. Paul:[23] in fact the remarkable thing about Paul's revelation was the manner of its coming: he received his gospel by revelation, and not from man (Gal. i, 11-12), and yet it tallied with that of the apostles as a whole (Gal. ii, 2). If it had been special to Paul, it would have been far less remarkable: since it was not, the corroboration was compelling.

We may sum up Irenaeus' teaching on Angels and Demons:

(1) He tried to make little of Angels: but casual references show that there existed a tradition of a celestial hierarchy given charge over the world — a charge abused by them, from which the Chosen People and the Church were withdrawn.

(2) Fallen Angels and demons were only dangerous to those who willingly accepted Satan and his allegiance: some of the demons were human souls who had become "*Keres*".

(3) Supernatural beings were either fallen or unfallen: there was no half-way house. This applied also to men's souls after death: of these the good would be higher than Angels, and the evil lower than fallen Angels. There are therefore four categories in the spiritual world:

(a) The faithful departed.
(b) Angels, with a limited ministry upon earth.
(c) Fallen Angels, with Satan at their head.
(d) Ghosts of the wicked, become demons.

(4) There is no sign of any source other than Judaism and Christian tradition for his views: his bias was due to the reaction from Gnosticism.

[21] II, 26 and 27.
[22] III, 3, 4.
[23] III, 13, 1.

(5) The victory of God in Christ was complete and final. Any remaining power of the Devil over the Church was confined to the material world. His power over the spirit was illusory: his only weapon was fear: his claim to authority no longer had any foundation.

B. Clement of Alexandria.

Perhaps the most effective of the opponents of Gnosticism, Clement of Alexandria, presents a complete contrast to Irenaeus. Irenaeus had been full of practical commonsense, and his object had been to counteract the unhealthy occultism of debased Gnosticism, and the voluntary humility of their perverted angelology. In doing it he lost the concept of God as an indirect ruler, who works through agents in the heavenly places as also on earth; but who acted in the Incarnation in a new and unprecedented way, and thereby established a different kind of contact with men.

In Clement's opinion, the dispensation of grace through Angels was the normal channel — "to nations and cities have been assigned the regiments of the Angels: and perhaps even some of them, of one type, may have been set aside for individuals"[24] and "Thus therefore Divine aid penetrates into man's sphere and stands clearly to be seen, through the fellowship and encouragement of Angels: for it is through the Angels that the Divine power dispenses benefits, whether as visible agents or not. Such also was the manner of the Lord's appearing", i.e. proclaimed by Angels.[25]

Angels are guardians of children,[26] and Plato is quoted in support of this Christian doctrine.[27] They are at the same time agents for the punishment of the impure, and are fiery beings:[28]

[24] *Strom.* VI, 17, 822P, 157S: I have used Dindorf, 1869, for the text of the *Strommateis* and *Paedagogus*, and Stahlin, 1905, for the Exhortation to the Greeks.

[25] *ibid.* VI, 17, 824P. 161S.

[26] *ibid.* V, 14, 700-701P, 90-91S.

[27] Rep. X, 620E.

[28] *ibid.*

they are personified fires of purgatory. They are known as Watchers,[29] as in the Ethiopic Enoch and the Galilaean tradition. But the "true Gnostic" is already equal to Angels, and "never passes out of their holy keeping". He prays with them and with the saints.[30] But "perhaps our Saviour, in desiring that the gnostic should be perfect as the Father in heaven, that is, as himself — our Saviour who says 'Come ye children and I will teach you the fear of the Lord' — desires that the gnostic should no longer need the help given through the Angels, but being made worthy should receive it from himself, and have his protection from himself by means of his obedience".[31] Clement seems to hold that man's proper position is above the Angels and that eventually he will dispense with their aid, for he will rise above the passions.[32] In this he agreed with the Valentinians.

Clement knows of three waves of the heavenly hierarchy,[33] which were later elaborated by the pseudo-Dionysius in the orders of Seraphim, Cherubim, Thrones: Dominations (*kyriotetes*), Virtues (*dynameis*), Powers (*exousiai*): Principalities (*archai*), Archangels, Angels.[34] Clement's quotation is from Plato,[35] but his thought is rather of the three orders of the celestial hierarchy than of the Platonic Trinity. If such orders were recognized in Christian tradition, it would explain St. Paul's use of the terms, the references in Ignatius,[36] a significant fragment from Papias,[37] the emanations of the Gnostics, and the references already quoted from Irenaeus.

Clement speaks of "three gradations", which may or may not include the lowest order — Angels: if the Angels are within

[29] *Paed.* II, 9, 218P.

[30] *Strom.* VII, 12, 879P, 317S: also v. 853P.

[31] *ibid.* Hort and Mayor's translation of Book VII of the *Strommateis.*

[32] *Strom.* VII, 11, 870P, 313S.

[33] VII, 2, 833P, 299S.

[34] *vide* Hort and Mayor, note p. 210: cf. Col. i, 16, and Lightfoot *ad loc.*: Ephes. i, 21: Origen, *de Princ.* I, 5, 3.

[35] Ep. II, 312E.

[36] *Trall.* 5, *Smyrn.* 6.

[37] Fr. XI in Lightfoot, Ap. Fathers.

the three gradations, his use of εἶτα is loose, but not impossible: the passage reads:

"for on one original principle, which works in accordance with the Father's will, depend the first and second and third gradations: and then (εἶτα) at the extreme end of the visible world there is the blessed ordinance of Angels; and so even down to ourselves, ranks below ranks are appointed, all saving and being saved by the initiation and through the instrumentality of One. As then the remotest particle of iron is drawn by the influence of the magnet extending through a long series of iron rings, so also through the attraction of the Holy Spirit the virtuous are adapted to the highest mansion, and the others in their order even to the last mansion".[38]

The impression is of a continual traffic between heaven and earth of Angels (saving) and human souls (being saved): the Angels are even ministers of the salvation which depends on the One, nor does the Incarnation seem to have made Angelic ministration unnecessary. All things have been arranged so that souls may be saved through their own free efforts:

"Whatever is possessed of virtue changes to better habitations, the cause of the change being that independent choice of knowledge with which the soul was gifted to begin with; but those who are more hardened are constrained to repent by necessary chastisements, inflicted either through the agency of attendant Angels, or through various preliminary judgments, or through the great and final judgment, by the goodness of the Great Judge whose eye is ever upon us."[39]

The three orders of the Church are the terrestrial counterparts of the three orders in heaven: "The three degrees here in the Church, of bishops, priests, and deacons, are perhaps, I think, counterparts of the Angelic Glory, and of that administration"[40]

But there are Angels who have transgressed, and Clement, like Irenaeus, describes their transgression as "apostasis": "Besides these, Phocylides (who calls the Angels daemons) classes some of them as good, but some of them as vile (because we too have a tradition that some were apostate) in these words:

[38] Hort and Mayor, *op. cit.* p. 17: *Strom.* VII, 833-834P, 299S.
[39] *ibid.* 835P, 299S.
[40] *Strom.* VI, 13, 793P.

Daemons there are to govern mankind, some here and some elsewhere:
And some are appointed to drive away evil from souls newborn".

These are perhaps the offspring of Angels, as they claim to be, for they best know their own forefathers.[41] Their prince was known among pagan philosophers:

"The Devil (mentioned in pagan philosophy) and Prince of daemons Plato speaks of in the tenth book of the Laws as a soul of evil, in these words: 'The soul which indwells and pervades the mobile universe must surely be said to pervade heaven too? Is it then one soul or more? More, I shall reply on your behalf; and certainly not less than two, the beneficent, and that which has the power to work against it'".[42]

Again he says, quoting the *Phaedrus,* that some daemon has mingled pleasure with most things: and if we need corroboration of the Pauline belief that we are fighting against hostile and superhuman powers (he again quotes the tenth book of the Laws):

"the heaven is full of many good beings, but also full of their opponents—and more of the latter—so that we say that it is a deathless contest".[43]

The Angels fell because they pursued a transient beauty instead of the Eternal beauty of God:

"the proof of this for you is that the Angels who deserted the beauty of God for a fading beauty fell so mightily from heaven to earth".[44]

In this he follows the tradition of the Watcher story of Gen. vi, 1-4.

But there are other and meaner beings, who approximate to the Greek "*Keres*", and who are in fact spirits of the dead. They inhabit the figures of idols: the things sacrificed to those idols must therefore be avoided, for the sharing of a feast with these blood-sucking ghosts may establish a fatal contact:

[41] *Strom.* V, 13, 697P, quoting Plato, Tim. 40A.
[42] *ibid.* V, 14, 701-702P.
[43] *ibid.*
[44] *Paed.* III, 2, 14.

" those offerings are polluted and disgusting, the blood of which brings fluttering to them ' souls of dead corpses from Erebus '; ' for I would not that ye should have communion with devils ', says the Apostle, because the food of those who are being saved is different from that of the perishing. These things are to be avoided, not indeed because we fear them: for there is no power in them " (i.e., against Christians): " but for the sake of conscience which in us is holy, and for the disgust which we feel for the devils to whom the offerings are dedicated, we loathe them . . . . ".[45]

What power there is in evil belongs to the " Prince of the power of the air ";[46] for he, " the evil serpent ", " binds men to stocks and stones and images and other such idols in the dismal bond of superstition: so that, as the story has it, the living may be buried with the dead until they too rot away ".[47] The authority of his leaders, the fallen Angels, can be called " the bitter slavery of the ruling Daemons ",[48] which Christ came to destroy. They work within men and possess them as the Devil possessed Saul.[49] But the oracles are trickery, and the Greek gods were mere men, and not even good men at that:[50] Zeus is dead:[51] the Egyptian gods are just animals.[52]

Does he mean by this, that the objects of worship are just nothing? Or is he using the same kind of terms that Athanasius later used, when he described the state of death and non-existence to which the powers of evil belonged — which is clearly not what we mean either by death or non-existence? The Didache and Deutero-Clement before him had referred to " the worship of *dead gods* " — although it is clear from the context that they still had a kind of deathly life of which men had to beware.

[45] *Paed.* II, 1, 168P.
[46] *Protr.* I, 7P.
[47] *Protr.* I, 7P.
[48] *Protr.* I, 4P.
[49] *ibid.* I, 6P.
[50] *ibid.* II, 10P, 24-29P.
[51] *ibid.* 32P.
[52] *ibid.* 34P.

Hesiod spoke of "thrice ten thousand deathless daemons" in the world, protectors of men.[53] But how do they guard men, and from what? They are in fact not imaginary presences but real beings, and their lust for blood and debauchery prove it: "let us add this, that your gods are daemons inhuman and anti-human: and they not only delight in men's madness, but also make sport of murder".[54] Men matter more than daemons:[55] their shrines are nothing but tombs.[56] The daemons themselves are simply unclean spirits: "You yourselves have with reason called them idols and daemons, . . . how then can idols and daemons still be gods? (They are) disgusting and unclean spirits . . . haunting tombs and graveyards".[57] If the Magi boast that daemons are bound to them by spells, so much the worse for them.[58]

But it is absurd to profess that anything good, such as philosophy, is from the Prince of this world. He can, as St. Paul said, transform himself into an Angel of light (II Cor. xi, 14), and in that shape pervert good. But the good, the pretended philosophy, is only a bait, and disguises the falsehood within it.[59] Storms and plagues are the work of fallen Angels and daemons; so we find rainmaking and plague-driving successfully used by the Magi.[60] Material power is in the hands of the Prince of evil.

The astonishing thing about Clement is his sane and calm reaction to the Gnostic danger. Perhaps because the great Gnostic leaders spent some time in Alexandria, and because they had in them the seeds of some truth with the seeds of error, it was easier for Clement than for Irenaeus to deal sympathetically with the situation. Clement's way was the positive way of integration, not compromise: his method was to redirect and not

[53] *ibid.* 35P.
[54] *ibid.* III, 36P.
[55] *ibid.* 38P.
[56] *ibid.* 39-40P.
[57] *ibid.* IV, 49P.
[58] *ibid.* 52P.
[59] *Strom.* VI, 8, 773P.
[60] *Strom.* VI, 3, 754P.

to dam. He refused to be frightened away from Angels, or to take too lightly the danger from superhuman Spirits of darkness and their subhuman jackals, degraded from daemons to demons. His emphasis on the dirt and disgustingness of the spiritually diseased must have carried weight in a world which knew only too well the repulsiveness of leprosy, and the nauseating stench of the neglected purulent ulcer. But the Gospel was the best preventive of spiritual infection: and if through negligence, the infection was caught, its discipline was both cautery and cure.

So in these two great leaders of thought are found the beginning of two attitudes to heresy or distorted doctrine. The Church in the West began to say, "No. Nothing is good that is planted outside the precincts". The Church in the East was more inclined to say, "Much of what you say is true — but it is not enough: you have forgotten something". For two centuries the Western Church was near to losing the Angels altogether — it was in danger of either despising or over-emphasizing the Devil and all his works — until at last Augustine readjusted the balance: after that the pendulum swung back again, and the angelolatry and demonology of the dark ages exaggerated his readjustment. The best of the Eastern doctors — and especially the Alexandrians of the first four centuries — without panic or hysteria used the material of the heretics to build a structure of Christian doctrine which outlasted even the frantic controversies of the post-Nicene centuries. The later Easterns and even Alexandrians did not live up to their predecessors, in their attitude to heresy, as the later Christological controversies show.

However that may be, Clement and the Alexandrians (until Cyril) were constructive and balanced thinkers. So also was Irenaeus, but he was touched with the rigidity of the West in the matter of Angels. In summing up Clement's teaching, it is interesting to see that in spite of the difference in reaction from Gnosticism, the substance of the tradition about Angels and demons is substantially the same as in Irenaeus:

(1) Clement knew of a tradition of an Angelic hierarchy: it was arranged in "three gradations", not unlike the three grades

of the emanations of Valentinus. In the lowest gradation, beings were given charge over nations, cities, and perhaps individuals. They were indispensable to the divine administration, because indirect rule was God's method.

(2) Fallen Angels and demons were dangerous, as infection is dangerous to those who do not use preventive measures. Their power in the material world was considerable: they were natural forces, with personality, and antagonistic to men.

(3) The faithful Christian "gnostic" (Clement's sense) could probably pass through all three celestial gradations, and reach Christ.

The categories were:

(a) Angels of light, in their gradations.

(b) Fallen Angels.

(c) Ghosts, diabolic and sub-human.

The cause of the Fall was the mistaken choice of a good thing instead of a better (cf. Sophia's search after the false light, in the Pistis Sophia).

(4) Clement's language and system were mainly those of Greek philosophy. But his uncompromising adherence to Christian doctrine and tradition is undeniable. The unguarded utterances of Irenaeus corroborate the conclusion that Clement's angelology and demonology were in agreement with the main stream of Christian tradition.

(5) A complete victory had been won in the Aeonian sphere over the powers of evil. The fruits of this victory are dispensed to believers by Angels, unless their faith in Christ is strong enough to enable them to rise to the Presence without help from Angels. Meanwhile, he clearly believed that relics of temporal and material authority still belonged to the Prince of the power of the air.

C. Present Day Relevance.

For present day preaching, the important points to notice in the Christian tradition about Angels and demons are these:

(1) Prayer and the good life is a valid approach to God for

those who for one reason or another cannot pray or live *in the Name of Jesus Christ.* This approach is valid through the mediation of Angels.

(2) Immunity from demonic attack — from the mental confusion caused by fear — is only promised to practising Christians. This holds good for both Clement and Irenaeus: their differences of emphasis do not obscure the important "*kerygmatic*" points that:

(a) Rebellious Angels exist.
(b) They attack men with the weapon of fear.
(c) They cannot touch those protected by Christ.
(d) They can turn human souls into demons, if they have rejected Christ.
(e) Their power is real in Time, but unreal in Eternity.

THE CHRISTIAN AND THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

By B. M. G. REARDON

I.

The development of the science of history must be counted among the most characteristic achievements of the nineteenth century and as one of the most permanently valuable. The distaste for this discipline, therefore, now manifested in certain quarters, is, we may believe, no more than a temporary reaction against the limitations of a method the essential validity of which remains unimpaired. Assuredly the technical historian, for his part, still shows little inclination to submit his investigations to the *a priori* requirements of this or that "ideology". Doubtless the notion of pure objectivity in history is an illusion; but in conceding as much he would have no intention of deferring to those whose concern with historical fact is less to understand the past than to dominate the future. For it is in the future that the *philosophy* of history has its primary interest. Yet the coolness of technical historians towards over-large interpretations of historical data has done nothing to lower the prestige of *Geschichtsphilosophie* with educated persons who are not themselves professional students of history. Marxism, for example, purports to be a complete doctrine of man in society: at once a theory of his past, a determination of his future, a directive of his entire effort. Even M. Sartre and his followers, for all their clamorous insistence on contingency, are, it seems, well aware that history demands some explanation of its meaning and readily allow that the appeal of Marxism lies to a large extent in its ability to furnish an answer which is not only coherent and plausible but which, to a unique degree, has become an incentive to action. The technical

historian himself, so soon as ever he looks up from his immediate field of study, can hardly remain indifferent to ideas which bear upon the very presuppositions with which he works.

How, then, are we to account for the attraction which the philosophy of history so evidently possesses for modern minds? One obvious reason is that time itself has for us come to be regarded as a determining factor in the being of things and that *process,* in consequence, is not something which the systematic thinker can be content to ignore. Time and change, for modern Western thought, are not illusory. They are altogether too relevant to whatever conclusions we reach concerning the nature of the world and our place in it. Again, we to-day are very apt to be embarrassed by anything that appears to be merely fortuitous and unexpected; whereas the actual course of human events would seem to have been always bafflingly unpredictable. The resultant feeling of uncertainty in face of the future, especially when we reflect upon the order and harmony of nature as revealed by the physical sciences, is unsatisfactory and disquieting. Has not history also, we like to ask, an order and harmony of its own, and may not the clue thereto be discovered by analysis? Even as an historical survey is more shapely, more coherent, than a mere chronicle of events may we not turn to the philosophy of history in search of a wisdom of which technical history as such falls short? In other words, we demand of history that it should be rationally justifiable.

For the need of such justification has in our time, we feel, become urgent, since we are now once more—as Professor Arnold Toynbee would say—" living in history ". Things are happening to *us*. Further, the *tempo* of events has vastly accelerated, thanks to an astounding technical progress that has virtually abolished the obstacle of distance. But this more rapid movement of history has itself created a multitude of problems which in their cumulative effect have turned the present century into an era, almost without parallel, of crises and catastrophes. Events hasten upon us so fast that their meaning eludes us. Compared with the unhurried processes of the natural order history to-day has a pace which we can neither control nor keep up with. But

if, so far from being the masters, we are ourselves under the dominion of successive events, have we merely to bow to their brute factualness and blind inconsequence, or is it possible, by discerning in them a pattern and orientation, to attain at least to the satisfaction which comes of knowledge and understanding?

If, however, we are thus confronted with the decisive power of events—if it is they which make us rather than we who make them—what meaning has human action? Has not its very spring, which is consciousness of real freedom and responsibility, in fact been broken? If we are impotent in face of history's onward movement have we no alternatives but blank submission or futile protest? For Western man such a dilemma is deeply repugnant, and looking about him for some means of escaping it he has discovered at any rate a specious solution in a view of history which makes his recognition of necessity a rational act and a moral virtue. Marxism professes to give intelligibility and worth to action by basing it upon a philosophy which interprets the past — albeit deterministically — in the interest and service of the future. It professes — and its professions have won passionate acceptance — to give substance to hope.

Seeing, then, that the philosophy of history occupies so prominent a place in the intellectual outlook of our time it behoves us to inquire what precisely is meant by it. In essence we may, I think, describe it as an attempt to subsume under a law or principle of unity the diversity of human existence in time. But although such a law or principle may be based upon a reading of the past it is not merely retrospective: to be effectual it must "explain", with hardly less exactitude and assurance, the present and future. This claim to survey the current of history *prospectively* is of course what finally distinguishes the philosophy of history from history proper; but the latter also, plainly enough, is concerned not simply with the succession of events but with the purpose detectable in them, and is therefore concerned with results, with the measure of success achieved, with consequences indeed which not even yet (it may be) have worked themselves out. Whereas, however, the historian is interested in futurity to a limited degree only and with respect merely to certain selected

issues the philosopher looks to the future as a whole; what interests him are not the particular consequences of particular actions but the historical process itself in its widest scope. Hence we may say that the philosophy of history regards the historical process as though time had run its course and it were possible to take in the whole sweep of history from its inception to its finish, so that the "patterns" which from within history seem but obscure and confused, or even, for long centuries, imperceptible, now lie beneath the eye of the beholder clear and in order. History will thus have lost for the most part its appearance of contingency and that which in the current of time seemed unforeseeable will reveal itself in its logical connexion as having been the inevitable thing. We shall, in fine, see history *sub specie aeternitatis*.

It is an exceedingly large claim. But its temerity, far from giving pause to those who lodge it, seems rather to inspire them with resurgent confidence.

The philosopher who undertakes thus to interpret history rests his case apparently on two assumptions, the first of which is the inter-relation of history and truth. Truth is given to us only in history, and then not fully until history has reached its term. "Philosophy", in the words of Hegel, "is the thought of the world, and makes its first appearance only after reality has completed its process of formation". So also for the Marxist. There is no truth about man apart from his activity in history, and he can secure the due fulfilment of his nature and purposes only in action which accords with the demands that history — rightly understood — lays upon him.

The second assumption is of the inter-relation of reality and value. If truth is revealed in the unfolding of history, then the actual course of that unfolding, in each and all of its successive stages — with allowance for a margin of anomaly and error — is what it "ought" to have been. The opposition of the real to the ideal is false: whatever is is right, and such anomalies and errors as may be are bound eventually to disappear. Thus, according to Auguste Comte, the "theological" stage of human thought, though untrue in itself and now superseded, was neces-

sary and valuable in its time. Similarly for the Marxist the rise of the *bourgeoisie* was as indispensable as is its subsequent overthrow.

It is along such lines therefore that history is to find its justification: if not in every particular, certainly in its outline and broad movement. Contingency, in all issues that matter, is eliminated. The seemingly inconsequent assumes logical shape and the far-off future, no longer a mere query mark, is predetermined and in essentials foreknown. But what in the meantime becomes of human freedom? The more completely our philosophy succeeds in its aim of interpreting the past, present and future the less there is left to us of any real liberty of choice. The truth is, however, that even the most convinced adherents of a strictly ideological interpretation of history appear to be unable to rid themselves of an uncomfortable sense of tension between their professed determinism and their instinctive libertarianism. Can there be freedom without contingence? If we make away with all contingence must not our liberty — and our will for progress — go with it? The solution of the difficulty, we are told, is to recognize and welcome the force of necessity. But such an attitude, if conscientiously adopted, must surely sap the initiative required for practical action; and it is to be remarked that a thorough-going philosophy of history finds favour, even among its votaries, not without misgivings. For determinism, in itself, is not an attractive creed.

Some attempt has been made to circumvent this difficulty by virtually denying that history now has any future. In this view its formative or critical periods are already ended and we are living in the "last epoch". I may cite Comte's idea that the present age, the "positive", is the final stage of humanity's course, or the orthodox Marxist doctrine of the endless tranquillity of a classless society. It is like telling a captive that he should not chafe at his confinement inasmuch as there would be nothing for him to do were he free.

All the same, the answer of Marxist Communism has the merit of being among the most persuasive doctrines now current. At any rate it promises that we can both have our cake and eat it

too, with the argument that although the dynamic of history is known and the future determined there is yet room, and need, for our active co-operation *with* history, together with assurance of a "real" future in which contingence — or at least what it looks like — has its place and in which circumstances will arise that call for decision, intrepidity, perseverance and all other heroic virtues. The final meaning of history will remain unchanged, and its course may not be deflected; nevertheless action — not dumb-show or shadow boxing, but genuine determinative action — must continue. The evident contradiction is to be reconciled in the cardinal dogma that within history there is a human agency which perceives the direction of the whole process, realizes the vital rôle it has itself to play, cooperates with history and hastens it forward upon its true course. This human agency wherewith destiny lies acts by virtue not of its opinions but of its historical situation. What we have to do with is not simply an abstract principle or law of interpretation, a conclusion of academic research, but a living, concrete force, apart from which a mere *theory* of history would be sterile. The instrument for the fashioning of the ultimate condition of a classless society is not an aspiration but an historical fact: the expropriated masses, the proletariat, awakening to knowledge of their status and responsibility. The resulting revolution is the crucial turn of history. The appeal of such a doctrine is manifest and for multitudes has become an unanswerable faith. While for Hegel history was mainly a thing past and over, his incuriosity concerning the future doubtless explicable by his high satisfaction with the achievements of his own era, for Marx it is only beginning: the challenge, the interest, the hope, the promise are all in the present and future. To that extent the ethical value of Marxism is superior.

Thus the logic of history is history, and not simply abstract principles which one distils from it or reads into it. But the idea of a human agency impelling it towards its goal is capable of far-reaching development. It is in fact a form of messianism. The "Messiah" may be a single person, a man of destiny; or he may be a group or class. In any case the right course for mankind

to take is in following his lead, opposition to which is " reaction " and a primary sin. It has been repeatedly observed that Communism in the U.S.S.R. has acquired the character of a powerfully emotive religion There is no need for wonder that it should have done so. We cannot here dwell on the curious disposition of the Russian mind, revealed long before the advent of its present Marxist creed, to identify itself with a messianic vocation;[1] but the notion of a "Holy Russia" and the quasi-deification of Lenin and Stalin are by no means discordant with some persistent notes of Marxist doctrine. The cult of the " leader " — provided always his dwelling is the Kremlin — is not to be considered " deviationism " even from the standpoint of the older orthodoxy. It is this messianic purpose which is made to safeguard the element of freedom, in that it signifies a cause to be promoted, a work to be accomplished, so that history is essentially something to be *made* and not merely contemplated as an unalterable datum. Marx himself declared, in criticism of the passive intellectualism of Hegel, that our aim must be not simply to understand the world but to transform it. The discharge of this messianic rôle demands, of course, political action, a political programme; politics being understood not in its to us familiar and traditional sense as involving a choice of ends or ultimate purposes — these on the contrary are already given — but a working-out on the practical level of the inherent requirements of the actual historical situation, whatever it may be. The proletariat, or those who act in its name, has to determine its action in accordance with circumstance; the appearance of contradiction, the sudden *volte-face,* the mental somersaults of propagandists — these matter not at all, save only that the great ends of history be furthered by them. Hence it is obvious that a Marxist régime must, for a quite undefined period, remain a dictatorship.

In this way the Marxist philosophy strives to give us, on the one hand, a determination of history, and, on the other, grounds for political action of the most far-ranging kind. It means that we are not free to choose our values, but must accept those which

[1] On this see the interesting essay, " Russia's Byzantine Heritage ", in A. J. Toynbee's *Civilization on Trial* (1948).

the course of history itself reveals and imposes; we have freedom, that is, only in respect of the *means*. But "means" implies a good deal more than technology. Since the "end" of history is not understood as a condition of things ultimately beyond the temporal process, it must in all respects be determined *by* history. But it may be hastened or it may be retarded. Only as man grasps the meaning of history and in the light of his knowledge applies himself to its service is the end to be realized.

But suppose we fail to grasp what, at any given moment, the course of history happens to demand? What if our politics misinterpret our philosophy? The possibility is always there, since action, with only even a modicum of freedom, entails a risk. Here, indeed, we perceive, in contrast with the neatness of the official theory, the practical difficulties and hazards encountered at every turn of events by a Communist régime or party, and so are in a position to appreciate to some extent the obsessive fear of deviationism which to the citizen of a free democracy seems at once bizarre and insincere. In truth, the needs of action — which after all cannot be foreknown with anything like certainty — reintroduce so large an element of contingence into human affairs, so much of doubt and danger, as to go far towards nullifying the advantages conferred by the basic philosophy itself. The uncertainties of the future loom large, whereas its long-heralded blessings recede. Moreover, practical action assumes an ever more decisive part in the determination of the "end" of history itself. History is not always quick. It may appear, on the contrary, slow and tortuous in its movements, its purpose at any particular moment, judged even by the illumination of an inerrant ideology, so likely to be obscure. Can the politician always afford to wait until the outcome of events justifies his decisions before making others? Is he not under continuous pressure to secure, in all his acts, a manifest anticipation of history's ultimate course? But, clearly enough, the underlying philosophy may be misconstrued or betrayed and some fresh ideology substituted for it. Such, unfortunately, is the dilemma of those who try to build their politics upon the foundation of a cut-and-dried philosophy: either dogma paralyzes action or else the action by degrees transforms the dogma.

Before leaving this subject we must observe one further aspect of it which is not without significance: its use of the *myth*. It employs ideas, that is to say, which are at once vital to its system and which yet are quite incapable of scientific demonstration. A philosophy which pronounces, for example, upon the nature of the final stage of history or the condition of mankind at that remove from now, or, again, upon the rôle which some person or social group has fulfilled and must fulfil in the course of time and in the working-out of the final disposition of the race, is doing nothing else than to employ notions, however rationally favoured, which are still a long way from scientifically proven. Such must be recognized, on account of the tendency in these philosophies — and Marxism, once more, provides a conspicuous instance of it — to promote their claims as though invested with all the force and assurance of an established conclusion in science. But although philosophies of history are thus prone to cry up their "scientific" character they are nevertheless inherently speculative and dogmatic; in the more precise meaning of the word they are *mythological,* and in the nature and function of their doctrine analogous to the teachings of religion. Yet for all that they essay to give intelligible meaning to the enigma of history it has to be said of them that they obfuscate every bit as much as they illumine.

II.

The question I particularly wish to consider here is whether a Christian, as such, may himself rightly adopt a philosophy of history in the meaning of the term just outlined. Or must we conclude that for him any such view is of its very nature inadmissible?

History, in Christian teaching, is an order of experience of indisputable reality and fundamental importance. Christianity is an historical religion; and an historical religion not merely in the sense that it has a past to which it is more or less bound by its traditions, but because certain of its foundation beliefs are themselves statements about allegedly historical events. Christianity may, indeed, be said to possess a *theology* of history. What exactly do we mean by this?

It is impossible to supply an answer without reference to a datum of which the non-Christian philosopher takes no account: Revelation. Christian theology entails speculative reasoning upon this datum and may properly go a good way beyond it in a number of matters; but it cannot dispense with the claim that at any rate its primary affirmations, embodied in the Scriptures, have been supernaturally disclosed. But, in accordance with that revelation, man knows himself to be a creature, a part and a part only of the divine creation, and that time and the historical process also belong to the order of created being; thus he cannot, so to say, stand outside time or look with the all-seeing eye of God. He cannot comprehend all history in one sweep, from its beginning to its final term, and theories which, with their accompanying myths, imply any such presumption on man's part he must consistently repudiate. For him an initial conviction will ever remain — that he is not his own maker, that he does not share the honours of creation, and that his vision, despite the powers of his God-given intellectual and imaginative faculties, is yet severely limited, a limitation which applies not only to "supernature" but to the terrestrial order as well. Prescience of the future course of history is therefore not allowed him. He may acquire an all but exhaustive knowledge of the facts of history to date, but history as a completed process is beyond his mental horizon. He may, of course, hazard guesses, but the supposition that he has a ground-plan of history *in toto* is to foster, according to Christian thinking, an illusion of a peculiarly dangerous sort. The scientist *qua* scientist is almost always more modest in the claims he advances for the state of his knowledge, and very commonly manifests a humility which political ideologists might profitably emulate. The Christian, for his part, like his spiritual ancestor the ancient Hebrew, knows that history has a meaning, but he cannot evolve the full content of that meaning either by empirical observation or by logical analysis. What he believes is that the essential *motif* of history has been declared by divine act, in the events to which the Scriptures bear witness. It is not that he has been endowed—as certain early heretics claimed for themselves — with some world-embracing speculative and

esoteric knowledge, nor that his subordinate status as a *creature* has in any way been lessened. He does not, moreover, profess any divinely communicated understanding of the course or ultimate significance of secular history, in past or future. What he has is a belief concerning a point within history itself as a *kairos* wherein God has manifested himself and his purposes as in no other way. The Christian, unlike the ancient Greek, does not in his theodicy attempt to by-pass history, because his saving knowledge is presented to him in historical terms, in the shape of a life lived on earth. "At the heart of the Christian creed stands something that happened *sub Pontio Pilato*"[2] That event was the crucifixion of the incarnate Lord, but "the significance of this happening, and the pattern to which it is the key, are not held to be discernible by any inspection that is not informed by faith".[3] It is in the light of it that Christianity sees both the beginning of history and its end, inasmuch as "all things were created by him and for him".[4]

The question of what the relationship of Christianity and human history basically is finds the answer therefore in the name of Jesus Christ. He is in a very special sense the centre of history, in that the times before his coming, like these after times in which we live and in which will live also the generations yet unborn, take their direction and meaning from him. His advent and work were, in the expressions adopted by Dr. Oscar Cullmann of Basel, the "decisive battle", though the "Victory Day" be yet far off. The matter has, I think, been particularly well put by Dr. Cullmann. With regard to the Christian hope for the future he writes, "what forms the centre (of the temporal process) is not now the object of hope but an historical event that has already taken place. This means that hope for the future can henceforth base itself on *faith* in the past — faith in the decisive battle that has now been fought. What has already happened provides some guaranty for what is still to happen. The hope of final victory is all the more intense, because the conviction stands fast unalterably that the

[2] John Baillie, *The Belief in Progress* (1950), p. 87.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] Col. i, 16.

battle which decides the victory has now been fought".[5] Thus Christianity does not seek some "timeless" idea with which to explain the courses of time, but, inasmuch as our lives are set in a temporal framework, points to an occurrence *within* time, so that that which must give them their profoundest significance is commensurate with them to the extent of belonging, in one of its aspects, to this perishable order of things below. One of the first errors which the Church was at pains to refute was that Christ's manhood was only an illusion.

At this point it is interesting to make a comparison with, and note an essential contrast between, Christianity and Marxism. The latter, in every way as much as the former, stresses the historical character of the link between events and that which imparts to events their overall meaning and importance. Further, it assigns — as by now we have been so well taught — to a particular historical situation, the dispossessed proletariat, a crucial function. It does so in view of its ideal of a classless society, since if class depends upon property the instrument for the abolition of class is that section, numerically the largest, which is without property. The question arises, of course: Why postulate a classless society as an ideal? Is it a necessary expression of belief in the brotherhood of man? Is it indeed feasible? There is in fact nothing inevitable in its evolution and when pronounced as a dogma of social faith is not less arbitrary than any other such assertion. On the other hand, Christian belief in the Kingdom of God is itself dependent upon him who, at a definite time and place, proclaimed its advent. It is not, that is to say, an ideal construction of the imagination, in the light of which claims are in turn made on behalf of Christ himself. Rather is it Christ who authenticates the Kingdom. For the Christian Church he is "the Gospel", above even that which he preached. Judaism of old committed the same error in this respect as does Marxism to-day, in that it judged its Messiah — and so misjudged him —

[5] *Christus und die Zeit* (Zurich, 1946), p. 74f. (Quoted Baillie, *op. cit.*, p.72). This work is, I think, one of the most important theological studies to have appeared in Europe since the war. It is now available in an English translation.

in accordance with its eschatological presuppositions. Both are distinctively "messianic" and put their trust in a New Age more or less incommensurate with that in which we yet live. Communism, in particular, is in the ironical position of proclaiming the emergence of a classless society from which strife will have disappeared and at the same time of acting as the greatest possible stimulus to class-struggle and a persistent threat to world peace. In contradistinction to both Christianity is not messianic; or rather it declares that the days of messianic expectation are long since over, and that there is no future event to look to whose meaning can transcend that which has already become the heart and soul of its message. Christian doctrine contains no promise of some yet distant Golden Age wherein life will be empowered to some higher degree of spiritual capacity than is at present possible and affords no encouragement to vain utopianism. Fullness of life is already available. To employ Professor Cullmann's terms once more, "Victory Day"—that consummation of things, with a final outpouring of God's grace, wherewith time for us will have its close — is not yet, and of that day "no man knoweth". But the "decisive battle" has been fought; the turning-point of history is not in the future but in the past, and the Church from age to age lives by virtue of it and so in witness to it. The consummation for which she waits will but confirm what she already holds in faith. Yet time is not merely to be abrogated, for it is a reflection of eternity; the things which are eternal have for us a vital manifestation in time. Between our Lord's Incarnation, his death and resurrection, and "the end of the world" there is this common measure, viz., the age in which we live and witness, and if God delays his ultimate gift of grace it is because the present age is unripe and the Church's work is unfinished.

If, however, the final consummation of things depends upon what God has already accomplished in Christ then plainly it does not depend upon the efficacy of human effort in the interval between the two. We cannot hasten it by our successes nor retard it by our failures, as also it is not for us "to know the times or seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power".

Christ's victory over death is the assurance — all the assurance we need — that his proclamation of the Kingdom is true. We have not to fear that the weakness of Christians, their temporizing witness, the alleged "failure" of the Church in this age or that, will jeopardize God's plan, as though he were powerless save through us his agents. Christians are under no constraint of doubting whether their actions are the "right" ones for this or that moment of crisis in human affairs — to the extent, at all events, that any misreading of circumstance on their part does not spell the frustration of God's purposes. The more regrettable is it therefore that Christians so often speak as if it must. To say this, of course, is assuredly not to plead on behalf of complacency, indifference or neglect of the Gospel: on the contrary, Christian action is of the highest significance not as a condition of or limit upon God's freedom but as a witness to the truth already revealed and declared, age after age, to men. A Christian's call is to witness to Christ, not to fret himself about "the shape of things to come". The Church in her historical aspect, as an institution, must be ever aware of what she is about, what her task is and what the opportunities of the moment demand. But she is not under obligation to work out some plan upon which the coming of the Kingdom of God must rely; for to suppose otherwise is to substitute for the free grace of God and the Gospel a perishable structure of human ingenuity and self-effort, a system of "works". The matter may be put thus: the Church's task is not messianic, an announcement of a deliverance promised but yet to be; it is *prophetic*, a proclamation of what was and is, the good news of the victory gained whose fruits have even now been made universally available and the consequences of which no future, however uncertain to our gaze, or menacing, can reverse.

What we have called the prophetic attitude to history surely leaves to the future an essential freedom; for the future is not simply the inescapable result of the unchangeable past. The past, truly enough, has made us what we are, but within the limitations of our present situation — and they are, in spite of appearances, ever exceedingly wide — we have choice before us. We know ourselves to be free by a primary intuition of our consciousness.

The future, therefore, is not the mere unfolding of a predetermined pattern but is always novel, challenging and fraught with opportunity. Thus seen it is the guaranty of our liberty and a call to human responsibility and action, investing them with an intrinsic meaning which, on the determinist theory, they cannot possess. Our freedom responds to the future's challenge and welcomes its chances, be they good or evil, grounds for anxiety or for hope. We have therefore to learn to look to the future with openness of mind, refusing the suggestion that it can be only a repetition of things past; scouting, also, the popular notion that it is something to be "built": built, that is, out of the materials left us by our previous experience, with its countless mistakes and disappointments. "Planning the future" — to use the current phrase — has risks of a kind too easily overlooked. It may inculcate a blindness to the vital elements of novelty in human situations which, after all, have not yet arisen and cannot, because of their novelty, be foreseen. There may be no new thing under the sun, but who can say what hitherto unknown conjunctures lie ahead of us?

So far as the Christian is concerned he cannot say with any great particularity what the Kingdom of God will demand in history. Accordingly the Church is unable to lay down a programme of action valid for all time and every circumstance. The faith does not change, but on the other hand its practical application is ever varying. Hence, indeed, the difficulty of formulating a Christian ethic. The basic principles may easily be indicated, but to state with exactitude what is *Christian* action in any given situation can seldom be done with complete assurance. The persistent danger lies in the tendency to reduce the idea of the Kingdom, in its rich potentiality of meaning, to certain purely human terms: ecclesiasticism, "social justice", a new international order, a classless society. It may be affirmed that Christian morality cannot rightly assume the character of a science, or a code of law good for all ages and situations; for it is typically an *Interimsethik*. It is our means of responding to the challenge of the Kingdom, not a universal norm of action.

III.

Has the Christian, therefore, no use whatever for a philosophical interpretation of history? His theology assures him that the future presents a field of free action, though unlike certain current forms of secular optimism it does not encourage him to believe that the world of the future will ever, in fact, become Utopia. But it would be a great error to conclude that the secular study of the historical process can teach him nothing. He has himself to live within that process, and his situation and circumstances are created by it. Secular history cannot, he believes, pronounce any final verdict upon itself; on the contrary, it is under judgement of God and subject for a true estimate of its value and meaning to the *Heilsgeschichte* of Christ — to his Incarnation and to his Kingdom, which both is and is to come. But the secular history which the Christian inescapably shares and to which he owes entirely the form of his own "situation" has a degree of independence and must needs first be understood in accordance with its own logic. Its end, in truth, is not yet. The Christian finds himself in an ambivalent position; or sees, rather, that his life is lived on two historical planes, though the highest — the "sacred" — is apprehended by faith and not vision. It is this lower, the worldly, plane which, however, provides him with the perplexities, the hazards and the opportunities wherein his witness to Christ and Christ's Kingdom takes shape. His testimony *qua* Christian, that is to say, will assume *this* form to-day, *that* to-morrow. The Church's own witness must change with changing occasions; which means that if her power of witness is to be supple and alert she herself must understand that history wherefrom her character and form as an *institution* are so largely derived. Only at damaging cost to her effectiveness is the Church ignorant of or indifferent to the course and nature of human history, and especially to the extraordinary complexity — the ever-increasing complexity — of every human situation. The Christian needs, therefore, a sufficient understanding of secular history, a perception of its laws or principles or patterns; in short, a grasp of its *shape,* such as is the endeavour of philosophy to secure. He must learn, indeed, that without the concrete historical situation

freedom can have no definition and no practical meaning. Hence the understanding of that situation is the first step towards the realization of freedom.

But before our question can be answered certain points must be made clear. In the first place it is obvious that the only type of philosophical approach to history which the Christian can for a moment entertain is one which allows room for theism; and philosophies of history as a rule tend in the opposite direction. Further, he will find slight use for theories which attempt at once too much and too little: such, I mean, as would offer us the multiformity of history reduced merely to one or two simple formulae. Thirdly, as has already been said, he must dismiss the pretention that the philosophy of history is a science properly so-called.

The fact that a Christian sees history upon a double plane must lead him to refuse any interpretation of a great event in secular affairs which would impose upon that event one intrinsic meaning and one only. Every such event has ultimately, for him, a double aspect. It is to be judged on the secular level and also on that of eternity, for he must read it in the light of that *Heilsgeschichte* which in all things affords him a reference that is final and absolute. History, he will increasingly perceive, is not univocal, and the kind of interpretation of events upon which, for example, the philosophy of Marxism insists will seem to him bald and arbitrary. Is, however, this ambivalence — for so the criticism might run — no better than an effort to avoid important practical decisions by the introduction of some notion of "mystery" into the historical process? To which the Christian replies that every significant event is the meeting-place of two orders, the divine and the human, and to present one half of the picture only is to convey not truth but at the best part-truth and at the worst dangerous error.

Yet since this world is the sphere of sin, events in that secular history which is under judgement are marked by sin and carry with them sin's consequences. To-day they appear ominous and tragic. But as the radical and the revolutionary are so apt to forget, good and bad are not just qualities predicable of different things, but inhere in the same things. Even good things —

reforms, projects and institutions devised with the best of intentions — contain within them, as time sooner or later reveals, the seeds of their perversion and corruption. "A civilization", it has been said, "may be wrecked without any spectacular crimes or criminals but by constant petty breaches of faith and minor complicities on the part of men generally considered very nice people".[6] Corruption, in truth, is not something accidental to, and so, given knowledge and a little goodwill, easily removable from, human history: it is an inseparable condition of it. Nothing is more difficult for those who do not understand the Christian doctrine of sin than to admit this to be the case. We are loath to abandon our belief in a condition of "normalcy" wherein all would be well but for the unfortunate presence of some assignable evil. In face of such evil we cast around for a scapegoat — the Germans, the Russians, capitalism, communism — finding it, indeed, anywhere but in our own cupidity and self-righteousness. If only, we think, this "last enemy" were annihilated the world would go forward, as is in the nature of things intended, upon the smooth track of perpetual progress. In other words, man bemuses himself with the notion that he can step outside history or by an effort bring its Juggernaut movement to a stop.

Yet though the logic of history lends no colour to facile optimisms the Christian has no need to shirk it. In the light of his faith the very worst trials and crises are not simply an embarrassing, or even a catastrophic, diversion of history from its normal courses, for he has no expectations of the sort which these things can destroy. On the contrary, he may confront each one as it comes as being yet another chance for grace to abound; which, again, is not to say that he has no interest in or responsibility towards the aims of secular progress. He has such interest and responsibility precisely because he believes in a real future, a

[6] H. Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (1949), p.37. As Prof. Butterfield observes, "against this curious toughness which seems to exist in the very texture of historical events, and against this admixture of earthiness which subjects the whole story to that serious gravitational pull, the more superficial kinds of idealism beat themselves into foam, and hang in the air as a sort of alien froth".

realm of freedom, in which the things that shall be are not *merely* an extension forward in time of those that have been. It is surely an error for the Christian to yield to the conclusion, by exaggeration of a legitimate pessimism, that history is but the mirror of human depravity; for in so far as he does so he commits himself to that "closed" view of it which, in a different context, he feels bound to oppose. To despair is a sin, and to despair of history is to abandon the conviction that our temporal state can ever effectively be a spur to faith or an opportunity of grace. The divine purpose, which overshadows all events and at moments invests them with such profound and startling meaning, makes even of catastrophe an occasion for good.

Christianity, then, can have nothing to do with an all-embracing or *total* philosophy of human history, for not only does it believe a global view to be impossible of attainment — since, as Troeltsch put it, humanity as a whole has no spiritual unity and therefore no unitary development — but it claims to have the proper key to the interpretation of history in its own revealed faith. Yet it has no reason for hostility towards the attempt to approach the enigma of history in a more modest way. If there is no law or principle available which will explain the whole of secular history we still may try — and with a very reasonable expectation of success — to understand its successive *epochs*. For in dealing with an historical epoch we have before us something which can usually be seen both in its totality and in due perspective. Only we have, of course, not merely to survey the eras which are past but that also in which we live — a more problematic task, and one in which the chances of self-deception are heavily increased. Our resultant "philosophy" of history will no doubt be less spectacular than the kind I have been criticizing, but, on the other hand, it will yield conclusions of a genuine utility.

In our determination of what constitutes an historical epoch Professor Arnold Toynbee has been able, on the basis of his unique erudition, to offer suggestions of outstanding value. History, he believes, reveals to our study a continuous oscillation of challenge and response; and it is this which provides us with the clue we need. "Have we not here", he asks, "the flint and steel by

whose mutual impact the creative spark is kindled?"[7] Using the language of religion he states his belief that "in response to the Devil's challenge God genuinely puts his created works in jeopardy, in order to win an opportunity of creating something new". Toynbee does not advance his view as a cut-and-dried theory, a new attempt, slightly disguised perhaps, to restore the dogmas of a speculative philosophy. But he does introduce a principle of intelligibility, which goes far towards explaining "the otherwise inexplicable and unpredictable geneses and growths of civilizations"; and hence also their breakdowns and disintegrations. When a particular society suffers a breakdown of its hitherto established equilibrium the interval required for the establishment of a new equilibrium — if such prove possible — is an historical epoch. It remains, of course, to adjudge accurately what, in fact, turned out to be a challenge and what was the response. But the idea is fruitful for its purposes and is as clear a "pattern" as may in the nature of things be devised. Again and again do we find in history situations which cannot be met, problems which cannot be solved, merely by recourse to accepted notions and methods. New methods and new insights into truth have, therefore, to be found if there is to be survival. It needs but little reflection to see how we, in our circumstances, are at the end, or the beginning, of an epoch. It may not — I do not know — be possible to interpret history along the whole of its courses in accordance with Toynbee's suggestions; but if they help us to perceive the design of even fragments of that vast tapestry, *A Study of History* will have won for itself the honour of permanently contributing to the sum of human wisdom.

The investigation of history in its several epochs is, I believe, the very best way of securing harmony and cooperation between the student of history and the philosopher. The former will reveal the characteristic features of some age past — its difficulties, its crises, the beliefs wherein it lived and strived, its standards of value. His task is primarily the elucidation of facts. The latter will employ the knowledge thus acquired in interpreting his own age and in anticipating the days ahead. His task is more

[7] *Civilization on Trial*, p. 12.

speculative; and it is also more practical: to cast light upon and to suggest solutions for our contemporary problems. It is, too, a corrective for that purely rectilinear conception of history favoured by those whose minds are dominated by specious notions of evolutionary progressivism. Epochs have their ebb and flow, and the passage of time is marked by events that are in some special sense crucial and decisive, by events that even on the secular level may be seen to involve judgement and condemnation, with the chance, however, of spiritual renewal and the hope of recovery. The perception of historical processes as moving from one critical moment to another brings, indeed, secular history into line with the sacred history and *its* critical moments whereunder, as we have seen, the affairs of men are all ultimately judged. There is room for difference of opinion as to which events, or limiting situations, are in the fullest sense " critical " and decisive. We cannot always be certain that our reading of secular history is the correct one. Thus it is disputable whether the class-struggle itself, upon which Marxism lays so much emphasis, is on the long view of things really crucial. On the other hand, it may be allowed by the non-Marxist that in certain respects the Marxian analysis is sound. Yet, even conceding the always present possibility of doubt and error, it still belongs to the Church's prophetical office to declare such times of crisis and to interpret them in the context of her belief.

Our conclusion, then, is that the philosophy of history, which to many minds is of such fascinating appeal, needs the correction which the religious and theological interpretation of history alone can, and must, provide: that, namely, of raising history to its proper level as a sphere of spirit and freedom. What the historian has to relate is not a record of uniform development or of reiterated patterns, like the patterns and processes of physical nature, but of crises and challenges such as demand men's constructive action if the future is to be saved. History is not merely unfolded about us, as a movement in which we can only but acquiesce. Rather is it a task to be accomplished, a call to hazards and to opportunities which for the Christian are also, on their diverse occasions and in their differing ways, instruments of Providence and means of grace.

THE CATHOLICITY OF THE PSALTER [1]

By G. LACEY MAY

I.

ACCORDING to a well-known dictionary the word "Catholic" has two common meanings: (when spelt with a small c) it means "*universal; of interest or use to all men; all-embracing, of wide sympathies, broad-minded*"; (when spelt with a capital C) it is used ecclesiastically to mean "*belonging to the whole body of Christians, or to the Church before separation between Eastern and Western, or to any body claiming continuity from the undivided Church*".

The first meaning is not ecclesiastical or necessarily religious, though sometimes applied to religious matters. As to the second meaning there are clearly many divergent views; but instructed Anglicans normally apply the word Catholic to a Christian body, belief or ceremony which pays deference to what has come down continuously from the primitive Church and has a universal rather than a local or personal connotation.

My aim in this article is to stress the fact that the Psalter contains both these kinds of catholicity.

II.

There is no need to dwell at length upon the catholicity of the Psalms in the first of these two senses. The Psalter as literature makes its appeal to all kinds of men by its diction, its charm of style, its sense of righteousness. It appeals to Jews as well as to Christians, and in a vaguer religious way to men of other religions or even to cultured pagans. Words like those of

[1] All quotations in this article, except one, are taken from the Prayer-book Version of the Psalms.

Psalm LXIII, "O God, thou art my God: early will I seek thee. My soul thirsteth for thee", may be spoken without any sense of inconsistency by devout Hindoos like Gandhi or Rabindranath Tagore. Often dealing with circumstances common to mankind in general — sorrow, joy, birth and death — the Psalter can touch a chord in hearts which know little of God and nothing of Christianity; *mentem mortalia tangunt.*

This universal appeal of the Psalms is further realized when we survey the amazing use made of them by Christians of every denomination in every Christian era in countless circumstances of tragedy, danger and prosperity. Christian controversialists (and doubtless Jews and Unitarians) meet on this ground when they can otherwise hardly meet at all. R. E. Prothero's *The Psalms in Human Life* gives an amazing catalogue of those who, differing vastly in their religion, have yet used the Psalms with the same comforting assurance of God's protecting and loving care.

We find monastic hermits, active soldiers, monarchs and martyrs, of boundless variation of circumstance and religious faith, falling within this category. St. Louis of France died with the words of a psalm upon his lips; the Scottish patriot, William Wallace, took his psalter with him to the scaffold, and bade the priest hold it before his eyes as long as he could see; Robert Southwell, Elizabethan poet and martyr, George Herbert, St. Francis de Sales, Sir Thomas More, many a Scottish covenanter, David Brainerd (missionary to American Red Indians), died repeating verses from the Psalms. Statesmen like Oliver Cromwell, William Wilberforce and W. E. Gladstone, in their hottest activities, drew comfort and inspiration from the Psalms. David Livingstone, threatened unceasingly by death from wild beasts, wild men, reptiles and fever, found daily strength in the words, "Commit thy way unto the Lord, and put thy trust in him; and he shall direct thy paths". Archbishop Laud, pining through four years of unjust imprisonment, and Charles Gordon in Khartoum waiting wistfully for the relief which never came, were alike sustained by psalms for their inevitable end.[2]

[2] These examples are culled from Prothero's book.

Such a consensus (and it might be mulitplied a hundredfold) plainly proves the catholicity of the Psalms as regards time and place. Their influence is universal because through all the ages two great realities persist — God, and the human soul. So long as man can stand awed before the majesty of Nature and naked before the holiness of God, so long will the Psalms appeal to thoughtful men of every age and race.

III.

On the catholicity of the Psalms considered from this point of view we shall all agree. But religious though that view may be, it is not at all what we mean when we talk of the faith so richly enjoyed by Catholic Christians. Common as it is to Jews, Unitarians and Christians alike, it may often revert rather to the Old Testament outlook than to the teaching of the Christian Church. When, for instance, we see Cromwell applying psalms to God's patronage and protection for whatever he chose to do — even the massacres of Drogheda and Wexford — or when we find Psalm CXLIX ("let the praises of God be in their mouth: and a two-edged sword in their hands") used alike by Romanist princes in the Thirty Years War, and by Thomas Müntzer to rouse the peasants in the great German revolt which followed the Reformation — we see the Psalter used in a sub-Christian and even a blasphemous way.

The individual use of the Psalms (dear to Puritans) ends in the very contradiction of Catholicism, which believes that "God so loved *the world* that he gave his only-begotten Son that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life". The Psalms have a Puritan tone in their strong national and individualistic appeal to God's protecting care. "I am trying", wrote a friend to me not long ago, "to appreciate the Psalms better, *in spite of their strong nationalism*". Exactly so! And in order to do that, we must not depreciate or ignore them, but appreciate and use them in their fullest — i.e. the Catholic — sense. And this is not hard to do, since behind the national glory desired by the Jew lay the desire for the glory of God when the earth should be filled with the knowledge of the glory of

God as the waters cover the sea. Behind the Psalter's appeals for the recognition of Jehovah by all men lies the unshaken belief that all men shall come under that certain judgement of God which Reinhold Niebuhr in his latest book[3] sets up as a standard for our self-deceiving world. The Psalmist (XCVI, 13) bids all creation rejoice, "for he cometh, for he cometh to judge the earth: and with righteousness to judge the world, and the people with his truth". The Jewish psalms, with their desire for a Redeemer with an everlasting Kingdom, are clearly the seed-bed of the Catholic Faith. Their "David's Son" issues into the only Son of David that matters to the world; their "chosen People" issues into St. Peter's "royal priesthood, holy nation, peculiar people"; whilst their "Jacob" (whether he be individual or nation) longing for a secure habitation issues into the Christian seeking, and finding, an abiding City. In all this we see the meaning of the Lord's saying that he came not to destroy the Jewish religion, but to fulfil it.

IV.

Catholic Christians, then, who believe the Church to be God's great gift to the world, have some right to read in the Hebrew psalms the purposes of God as revealed in the two thousand years and more since their writing. Did not our Lord bid us think thus? To the disciples walking on the Emmaus road on the first Easter Day, "beginning from Moses and all the prophets he interpreted to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself". They could not understand the Old Testament writings unless they linked them up with his mission to the world, his Passion and Resurrection. Nor, *vice-versa,* could they, or we, fully understand the Catholic faith without reference to the Old Testament. So we reckon Isaiah liii and many other Old Testament passages as prophetic of Christ's work; and among these passages we rightly include the Psalms.

In all Old Testament history and prophecy we must be prepared to meet the partially revealed purposes of God for the

[3] *Faith and History,* pp. 128, 143.

world; not his care only for the individual, but also the Incarnation, the Atonement, the sending of the Holy Ghost, and the founding of the Church and sacraments by which God's love has been showered upon man with a universal and catholic range.

The Psalter, in particular, is part of the divine preparation for Christ and a heritage passed on by the Jewish Church to the Catholic. If in war we Christians find it natural to take comfort from such psalms as XLVI, which express our deep faith in God's unchanging purposes for the nations, we shall find it equally natural to sing Messianic psalms with joy for the Incarnation, and psalms about Sion or Jerusalem with joy for the Catholic Church, that Holy City which is now indeed "the joy of the whole earth".

It is true that learned commentators (losing the forest for the trees) have lamentably failed to treat the Psalms in this living and significant way. Waxing eloquent on the uniqueness of the Psalter as a means of communion with God, they have failed to see that higher than the believer's individualistic approach to God is his approach to God in the communion of the Body redeemed by Christ, in which he has become member of a rejoicing, praying, worshipping community.

Biblical criticism of the last fifty years has greatly helped us to see this deeper meaning of the Psalms because criticism has taught us that the true significance of the Old Testament lies not so much in its being "part of the Bible" as in being part of God's preparation for the Incarnation and all that flows from it.

It is a little startling to find, however, that our fundamentalist forefathers, by a somewhat different approach, held much the same conception. We seldom glance at the sub-headings of the Psalms in the Authorized Version of the Bible; no doubt many Bible-readers are unconscious of their existence. At first sight, some of these headings are dogmatic enough as to seem fanciful. For instance, we find Psalm II headed "The Kingdom of Christ: kings are exhorted to accept it"; Psalm XLV ("My heart is inditing of a good matter") is entitled "The Majesty and grace of Christ's Kingdom"; Psalm LXXXVII, "The nature and glory of the Church. The increase, honour and comfort

of the members thereof ".

In reality, of course, there is nothing here which calls for surprise. Just because the Jewish Church and religion were God's preparation for the Catholic Church and Faith, there is a natural similarity in the language which both learned to use.

V.

May I here explain a little more definitely what I mean? What are the distinctive ideas which underlie Catholic Christianity as compared with Protestantism? I should, tentatively, describe them thus. Whereas Protestantism as a whole, and more certainly Protestants as individuals, greatly stress individualism in the approach to God for faith or worship, Catholicism (whilst accepting this individualism in its stride) lays far greater emphasis upon the power and love of God as manifesting itself *in the community of the Church as a redeeming Society.* God's love is conceived as eager to manifest itself through and in a Spirit-dwelling Society, used by the ascended Lord so closely that it can be called his Bride, his Body. Its works are his works, and manifest him; its sacraments, scriptures and teaching are vehicles of his grace.

Now the Jewish Church — more, I think, than Evangelicalism, and far more than American Protestantism — had these basic beliefs in the wonderful works of God, energizing, transforming, redeeming *through a saving Society or Church,* with its sacramental or quasi-sacramental manifestations such as the Pillar of Cloud and Fire, the flames of Sinai, the Brazen Serpent, the miraculous Manna, the water-giving Rock, the Passover feast, ordered sacrifices and an ordered ministry. Christ in his Church takes over, transforms and fulfils all these features of God's treatment and education of his people. It is therefore *natural* to expect in the Psalms (the highest and deepest expression of Jewish devotion and worship) an underlying language consonant with the Catholic Faith, with hints which in some measure foreshadow such great realities as the Blessed Trinity, the Incarnation, the Church, the sacraments. It is not only in human planning that " coming events cast their shadow before ".

The primitive Church recognized this Catholic element in the Psalter. Indeed, if she had enough breadth of vision to recognize Vergil as *naturaliter Christianus,* she could hardly think less highly of the Hebrew psalm-writers. Jeremy Taylor, in his *Sermon of the Whole Duty of the Clergy,* tells us that "the primitive Church would admit no men to the superior orders of the clergy unless, among other pre-required dispositions, they could say all David's Psalter by heart".[4] S. Morison, in his *English Prayer Books,* states that "Gregory the Great refused to consecrate a bishop who could not repeat the entire Psalter from memory". "Tertullian, in the second century, tells us that Christians sang psalms at their *agapae*". Augustine, and other writers, inform us that a psalm was sung, or partly said and partly sung, as a Gospel gradual at Mass;[4] whilst Cyril of Jerusalem and the Apostolical Constitutions and St. Augustine all describe Psalm XXXIV (or part of it, "O taste and see how gracious the Lord is") as sung during the reception of Communion.[5]

This acceptance of the Psalter as an aid to the teaching of the Faith persisted through the centuries. "When the Council of Toulouse in 1229 forbade the use of the Bible to the laity, a special exception was made in favour of the Psalter . . . and the Psalter was the first portion of the Hebrew Bible which ever issued from the Press".[4] John Donne says "the Psalms are the manna of the Church". So it has been a frequent custom to bind them up with the New Testament; and probably most of us would acknowledge that whilst we normally think of the rest of the Old Testament as Jewish, we think of the Psalter as a Christian rather than a Jewish manual. Even a Low Churchman like Bishop Perowne could write: "We cannot pray the Psalms without realizing in a very special manner the communion of saints, the oneness of the Church militant and the Church triumphant". "No use", says W. E. Barnes, "has a better

[4] Bp. Perowne, *The Psalms* (Vol. i, Introduction).
[5] J. H. Srawley, *The Early Liturgies.*

claim to be called a Catholic custom than the use of the Psalter in Christian worship ".[6]

It therefore, after all, is not astonishing to find those A.V. psalms with Christian or ecclesiastical headings. Why should not Psalm II be headed " The Kingdom of Christ ", when it cries " Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and so ye perish from the right way!"? And again, " I have set my King upon my holy hill of Sion; I will preach the law, whereof the Lord hath said unto me; Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee "? Is it wonder that St. Athanasius and his friends sang such psalms as battle-hymns against heretics and persecuting Arians?[7]

Of course this tendency of interpretation was carried to extremes by some patristic and medieval writers, who found direct allusion to our Lord or his life in every psalm. Tertullian finds allusion to Joseph of Arimathea in Psalm I! St. Chrysostom declares that " the heritage " given to those " that fear God's Name " is Christ himself;[7] and St. Augustine's constant teaching that " the sun coming forth as a bridegroom out of his chamber " is our Lord, may have led to Psalm XIX being chosen as a Christmas Day psalm. This flood of mystical interpretation — whether, as sometimes, wholly exaggerated, or extremely apposite — shows how wholeheartedly the Church accepted the Psalter as prophetic of the Church's Faith.

VI.

This is true, of course, not of the Incarnation only. One by one we can find most aspects of the Catholic Faith reflected in the Psalter. There are, for instance, frequent allusions to some Holy Spirit who teaches and guides:[8] " Let thy loving Spirit lead me forth into the land of righteousness " — " Take not thy Holy Spirit from me: O give me the comfort of thy help again; and stablish me with thy free Spirit ".

[6] *The Psalms* (Westminster Commentaries).

[7] C. L. Marson, *The Psalms at Work* (2nd ed., p. 5, p. 42).

[8] See H. Wheeler Robinson's *Inspiration and Revelation in the O.T.*, p. 76.

How intensely moving and arresting is the language in the Psalms of the Passion! — the XXIInd with its vivid details of Calvary — the isolation, the scornful taunts of the onlookers, the piercing of hands and feet, the fever, the parting of garments, the casting of dice, and the unshaken faith of the Sufferer, a trust envisaged as emphatically in Psalm XXXI also. Of whatever individual or national sufferer a Jew in reading these passages might think, the Christian can picture only him who was lifted up to win pardon for the world.

How wonderfully natural, again, it is to find the Catholic Church in the Psalms! St. Augustine, looking for a title for his great book on the Church, aptly chose a psalmist's name for Jerusalem, *The City of God*. What else does that amazing Psalm CVII mean than that toiling, suffering, bewildered men, beset by dangers on land and sea, can find their haven for peace and joy only in the Church of God — gathered from East and West, North and South, out of the wilderness unto a City where they *dwelt,* an abiding City which hath foundations?

From this certainty of a final abode of salvation the word *Jerusalem* or *Sion* comes into its use as a type of Jerusalem which is above, Heaven itself. The exultant Gradual Psalms (CXX-CXXXIV) sung by pious pilgrims approaching Jerusalem express the exultant expectancy of the Christian who travels to his true home. Had not Christina Rossetti caught the spirit of the Psalter when she sang of Heaven? —

O where is that country
And where can it be,
Not mine own country,
But dearer far to me?

Not mine own country,
If I one day may see
Its spices and cedars,
Its gold and ivory.

The pictures of Heaven in the Apocalypse have their roots in the Psalmist's fervour who cries to come into the Presence of God,

and would rather be a doorkeeper in the City of God than to dwell among the mighty ones of the earth. Such language is part of the Catholic heritage, and largely derives from the Psalms.

Drop now from Heaven, and find yourself in the earthly precincts of the Presence of the Lamb in the ordered worship of the Eucharist! As Hebrew psalms voiced the joy of Jews approaching God's Presence in the Holy of Holies or in the intensity of the Passover Feast, psalms still provide strains of penitence and joy for the Christian in preparation and thanksgiving for his approach to the Real Presence of the altar. As the priest does his work in the sanctuary, psalms like XLIII, LXXXIV and CL are worthy to take their place on his lips with the Gospel lections, the *Non sum dignus,* the *Benedictus qui venit* and the little Gospel of St. John.

The Psalter thus not only serves Christian worship, but also supplies refrains and incitements to Catholic practice and ways of life. The Penitential Psalms deepen the austerity of Catholic penitence with its acknowledgment of sin as well to the Church as to God. One of the greatest instances of Christian penitence was seen when the emperor Theodosius who, after massacring thousands of rebels in Thessalonica, was refused Holy Communion at Milan by St. Ambrose, and was not absolved until eight months later, at Christmas A.D. 390, lay prostrate on the church floor, divested of his royal robes, plucking his hair, and repeating—what but words of Psalm CXIX, 25?—*adhaesit pavimento anima mea.*

The high ideals of Christian monasticism as providing a way of *laus perennis* were justified by such passages from psalms as V. 3, CXIX, 148, 164. The use of incense in Christian worship was doubtless strengthened, as by Malachi i, 11, so also by the psalmist's words (CXLI, 2), "Let my prayer be set forth in thy sight as the incense"; whilst it is said that the beauty of voluntary poverty was expressed by the Duke of Gandia when, on handing over to the Society of Jesus his vast possessions, he broke exultantly into the cry of a psalm: "Our soul is escaped even as a

bird out of the snare of the fowler: the snare is broken, and we are delivered" (CXXIV, 6).[9]

There is no space here to dwell on the part played by the Psalter through all the centuries of the Church's public worship. Suffice it to notice that in the English Church room is found for psalms in the Commination, Marriage, Churching and Funeral services. There is no occasion of an approach to God, private as well as public, when the Catholic Christian does not find it seemly and uplifting to approach his Maker with words tender, grave, penitent, rejoicing, taken from the Psalter. And the sincerity of his worship will largely depend upon how far he has learned to use its language in the fullness and richness of its deepest significance.

[9] This, like other illustrations, is taken from C. L. Marson's invaluable book, *The Psalms at Work*. The duke of this name is said to have been a member of the Borgia family.

ARCHETYPES, IDOLS AND THE LIVING GOD

By A. GRAHAM IKIN

Some time ago I saw a film called *Her Jungle Love*. In it there is a very dramatic scene in a cavern deep in the heart of a mountain: a huge image of the crocodile god has been set up, and before it living victims are sacrificed to the sacred crocodiles. Just before the sacrifice the volcano erupts and in the midst of the chaos of boiling lava and falling boulders, the crocodiles break free and pursue the High Priest. He takes refuge by climbing up the image, when this, too, is overthrown, and in falling it pins him, so that he is devoured by the crocodiles to whom he had fed so many victims.

This seemed to me to express a profound truth. If we make images, either material or mental, of gods in the form of any level of created being, then sooner or later the reality of the forces on that level will destroy us. The early Hebrews, with their insistence that no image of God must be made and his name might not even be pronounced, were wiser than all those who have sought to confine the infinite source of our being within moulds made by the puny mind of man. To-day, in connexion with both psychology and religion, we have an interesting and timely attempt to free the religion of man from superstitions that have accompanied its infancy.

It is well to note that the movement is two-sided — both from the side of science and from that of religion. Early attempts from the side of psychology revealed so much childishness, even in the most developed religions of our day, that at first it seemed as if religion itself would be discredited as a childish superstition to be outgrown by thinking men and women. But if in this way

we set up the image of rational man as our God, then the reality of a cold, merciless logic, destroys the living flame of the spirit and psychological forces within us, which are not directly amenable to our reason, break out and destroy us, either through internecine warfare, or individually in the psycho-neuroses and psychoses so prevalent to-day, much as the living crocodiles devoured the priest imprisoned by the image of the God he had himself produced.

If a little psychology leads us to destroy traditional images of God, unless more psychology can lead us to the recognition of a controlling and directing though unseen power, before which the wisdom of man is foolishness, then we are in even a more parlous state than the primitives who worshipped and sought to serve natural forces transcending themselves, embodied in their primitive, even cruel, gods or totems. However crude their worship by our standards, it had within it the germ of the *humility essential to genuine religion,* which is lacking in those who pride themselves on having no need of God.

Freud has prepared a way for an overthrowing of our mental idols on a large scale and has thus done religion a real service, driving us out of our self-complacency. But he is still at the level of the ten commandments. With all his urge for freedom and self-expression, religiously he could only repeat "Thou shalt not . . .". He has not crossed the border between Judaism and Christianity, to the inner freedom of "This do and thou shalt live". Amongst leading psychologists Jung is foremost in asserting the primacy and importance of religious experience. He is bridging the gulf between the Old and the New Testament, pointing the way to a Kingdom of Heaven that is within us. Yet that is only within us because it is so infinitely beyond us that any names we may give it *mis-represent* it. He points out that in all his patients over 35 years of age, coming from all parts of the civilized world, their problem is ultimately religious and they cannot be cured without gaining or regaining a religious attitude to life.

From the side of religion, the work of Otto and Karl Barth brings us to a similar standpoint. Otto stresses a unique element

in our experience, continuous from grisly demonic horror in the presence of the felt unseen, to the awe in the Presence of the Unspeakably Holy, as running throughout our religious experience. Moreover, the theology of Karl Barth, with its emphasis on the transcendence of God, is another, much needed *corrective* to the modern humanism with an immanent God still striving to be born. Barth points out that when religion, the noblest of the labours of man, brings us face to face with the ultimate grounds of our being, then all we have so laboriously wrought out throughout the ages crumbles — shattered by a reality so transcendent we can make no image of it and give it no name.[1]

If we try to bring the totality of the God who is, into any image, mental or material, that we can make, our soul becomes the battleground on which the infinite within us destroys this limitation and, in so far as we have put our faith in it, shatters our faith. Only in so far as living images of the gods in primitive form are relevant to the cultural level of the people concerned can their worship provide a point of contact with that fundamental being before which our best and noblest is as dust and ashes.

If to-day we try to fix the immensity of the cosmos revealed by physics and astronomy, the abounding vitality of the creative life of the Universe, the transcendent wisdom expressed in the intricacy of the inter-relations between all levels of being, and the abiding purpose expressed in progressive evolution, within the symbols of a tradition framed when it was thought God had made the world in six days, four thousand years B.C.; when the

[1] It is interesting to note that modern physics has led to a similar realization that the fundamental reality is one that cannot actually be "pictured" or "imagined". All previous models have been progressively found to be inadequate to account for the actual phenomena. Jeans says: "although we can never devise a pictorial representation which shall be both true to nature and intelligible to our minds, we may still be able to make partial aspects of the truth comprehensible through pictorial representations or parables. As the whole truth does not admit of intelligible representation, every such pictorial representation or parable *must fail somewhere*". Jeans, *Physics and Philosophy*, 1, 16.

sun was thought to go round the earth and man was the climax and summit of creation, we are untrue to the Spirit which has broken through the bonds of the past and our traditional vessels will be destroyed by the life that needed to be expressed in new forms, relevant to the increased range of vision.

At every stage new wine must be poured into new wine skins. We may try to patch old ones for a time but, sooner or later, they burst and the wine runs out, and we have nothing left but torn skins with which to quench the thirst of the multitude.

In the psychology of Jung and the theology of Otto and Karl Barth we seem to have a meeting point between science and religion. Bertrand Russell could say that we must build only on the foundations of unyielding despair. I wonder if he ever realized how much was involved in the word "unyielding". If it is possible to face genuine despair in this way, man's roots must go very much deeper into reality than the despair of which he is conscious. So that he, too, gives useful weight to the recognition of a *deeper element in man than has yet been expressed adequately in any organized religion,* though it has broken through in the lives of those who have marked the *peaks* in the religious development of the race.

If the contributions of Jung, and Otto and Karl Barth could be brought together so that theology might be based on psychology instead of logic, we might see the beginning of a religious attitude that would counteract the materialism of our day. We have set up the image of the machine and of mechanical science as our God and the mechanical forces so set free are in danger of destroying the civilization that has worshipped force, as the crocodiles destroyed the priest who had sacrificed so many victims to them. We cannot boast of our superiority to primitive cults with their superstitions and cruelty, while we manufacture bombs, poison gases and atomic bombs: psychologically we are on a par. Our only hope lies in the possibility of recognizing it in time and turning from the God of Force to a God of Love, expressing in terms of the highest we know, a feeble image of the flame of creative energy *which holds all the destructive forces within the universe together so that it is still a "universe",*

with every existent in actual relation to every other as well as to the living whole of which it is a constituent part.

Jung would seem to have found a pointer to the direction in which we should move towards freedom as opposed to the Freudian "Thou shalt not". Barth has stressed the transcendent element which breaks through all tradition. But the bridge between psychology and religion can only be built in human personality. The Christian Church is faced with a very real crisis. Its theology and its traditions were framed before scientists had enlarged our conception of the universe — even eighteenth-century deism made its contribution to the machine age. Unless we can free ourselves from these fetters *to let the living spirit of God mould symbols that can really convey life effectually in the wider universe in which we live,* a Christian Church will once again crucify its God and, by making him static, sealing him in a tomb, will seal its own doom.

On the other hand, the real treasure that the Church (and by Church I mean the whole body of Christendom, not any particular branch) has to bring to the world which needs it so sorely, is just the personality of Christ. We have not yet envisaged a millionth part of all that is involved in the fact that Jesus of Nazareth really lived such a life, in the midst of conditions that in us lead to sin, disease, crime, war and all hatred and uncharitableness that we do not ask "Was God in Christ?" but "Is God like Christ?" There, in a real personality, we have the fulfilment of the ideal of the humanists, who will not imprison God in less than man, and of those who will not imprison him in man as he is.

If the psychology of Jung, with its deep spirituality and moral courage, could not only show us a practical way of getting into touch with our deep inner forces, but could also bring us to a deeper realization of the *inner life of Christ*, indicating the nature of the goal towards which mankind is so feebly striving, the Christian Church might renew its depleted inner reserves and bring a renewed harmony to thousands for whom the way of analysis itself is not possible, nor necessarily desirable. The prevalence of mental and nervous disorders to-day, disorders

which are becoming more serious and more resistant to treatment in type, as well as the political situation in many parts of the world, indicates that our spiritual reserves are running low. If we were actually *appropriating* a thousandth part of the spiritual resources the churches claim as available for man we should be able to bring a new order of human fellowship into being, within which the diversity of gifts of the nations could find full scope. This reveals the enormous gap between the ideal to which we give lip service and our actual faith in it. *Faith is belief we translate into action,* not a hope but a reality. The absence of such dynamic faith in daily life is obvious.

Our scientific resources are adequate to this if our spiritual attitude enabled us to utilize them for the common good. As it is totalitarian States set up an idol and sacrifice to it with great fervour, much of what is finest in their heritage and culture, and sooner or later, as was illustrated by the defeat of Hitler and Mussolini, reality shatters their idol and the forms of the chaos out of which a new birth can come, no man can predict. But the deeper spiritual forces within man that cannot be confined in any system, must sooner or later break through into consciousness, and the balance of power set up on a basis of repression will be upset.

Some, though not all, cases of psycho-neuroses occur not because the individual has not reached the average level of culture, but because he has risen beyond it by inner forces, which, in conflict with his psychological environment, may be beyond his power to resolve constructively unaided. If we could help such we might get glimpses of the way out of collective troubles, hints of how to guide social policy, that would be in harmony with deep inner realities which could transform and raise the general psychological level of the age.

Idols have no power of themselves. Humanity gives them a terrific power at times by the libido or energy with which it invests them, which then recoils upon their creators. This is as true for mental gods as for those of wood and stone, as we are realizing with our "ideological wars", wars not fought for material gain only, but for different "ways of life".

The prevalence of fear in the world to-day is an expression of our lack of knowledge of and faith in God. The consequences of this fear create conditions ever more terrifying, and for many an anxiety state becomes almost inevitable, unless the vicious circle can be broken by an *understanding acceptance* of the hazards of life.

One war was fought to "end war"; and a still worse one followed. The proof of the reality of what had been said about being destroyed by the mechanical forces we worship, was given by the overthrow of the Nazis by the very weapons and methods which they had trusted to win a supremacy over the rest of the world, and which cannot be achieved except in terms of genuine "human quality".

Yet now, again, victors and vanquished alike, are wondering whether yet another, still more devastating, war can be averted or not: and this time with atomic bombs that *can* wipe out whole cities with all their cultural as well as physical life in a flash, the risk of destroying not just the culture of one city or one nation, but that of mankind itself, is *real.*

How can we try to win a peace that we are finding is more difficult than winning a war? What can we do to foster the forces making for cooperation instead of conflict? How can we *unite* mankind to fight against the suicidal use of atomic energy in "civil war" between members of the human family? The danger is not that of being vanquished, of losing a war, but to the whole human race. *If danger on this scale cannot enable us to rise above the conflicts and petty rivalries of the past,* if it cannot encourage us to settle conflicts on a higher level than brute force, then like the priest pinned under the image of the crocodile god, devoured by the living crocodiles, we shall be destroyed by the diversion of energy into destructive forces instead of their utilization for the common good.

The urgency is greater than in 1938. We have *not* yet learned our lesson, not even through all the horrors of the last war. *Can* we learn it in time to avert this still more terrible danger? What can we do, as individuals, as guilds, federations, welfare associations, nations, Churches or other forms of community life?

The whole world is so closely interconnected that our attitude may help to win through the uneasy "peace" that we call a "cold war" or stir it until it becomes a great conflagration, another "world war". Here each of us has a limited but real measure of responsibility. The tendency to condemn without understanding, to try to find a "scapegoat" somewhere, to ease our own consciences: the tendency to judge as if all the right must be on one side or the other, and not that there is an inevitable mixture which needs to be dealt with with discrimination: the tendency to talk a lot and form a lot of "committees" to save ourselves from the *real effort of responsible thinking and the relevant action that can result from insight that is genuinely in touch with the actual situation* — all this is simply giving power into the hands of the distorted, spiritually insecure and immature, who *cannot* use power creatively, but can only unleash the forces of destruction, until, like a boomerang, they recoil on themselves, as happened in Germany, Italy and Japan.

But if the distorted, spiritually immature and insecure men again for a time wrest the power from those who, while not positively seeking to use it against the rest of the world, are letting go their hold on "power for service" and shirking their own responsibility for the right use of such power as they have, then this time the boomerang will not only crush the wielders of brute force, but all those of us who have been too contented with "things as they are", too lazy to pull our weight in the development of a world fellowship, too much like the ostrich, with our heads in the sand, not seeing the storm about to overwhelm us until it "hits us" and it is too late.

In the epilogue to a recent edition of *Religion and Psychotherapy* by the present writer, this note of urgency is stressed by many writers from a wide range of experience. The "tempo" of change is accelerating: which way will the balance of power go? Will it tend to the gradual taming of the "primitive" elements in man until we grow mature enough to use power constructively: will it tend towards uniting mankind against the misuse of power, against the threat to *all* from atomic warfare? Or will hasty, ill-considered judgements on the part of those who do not

realize the nature of the peril with which mankind is now faced, the *danger from our own activities* and not just from storms, floods and the forces of nature, precipitate the conflict and engulf mankind in the *most senseless activity it has ever committed itself to in a long history of follies*?

Atomic bombs do not drop down from heaven as natural forces. An enormous amount of *human* skill and ingenuity has first to go into making the atom release the terrific power "crystallized", so to speak, within it, before it can destroy and wipe out the lives and the results of the labours of so many *other* human beings in the city on which it is dropped—again by *human* agency. An equally great cooperative effort to release the forces *within* mankind for fellowship and cooperation and the fighting the common enemies of mankind, *could* bring in an era of peace in which the specifically human qualities could ripen and develop and children would once again have a secure heritage into which to be born, instead of a world torn by rivalries.

Our real treasure is in the living reality of the actual human being, who even in the split second before being wiped out by an atomic bomb can be *aware* that he is being destroyed, though the bomb, with all its destructiveness, does not *know* what it is doing, and is just the blind "slave" of the human minds who brought it into existence.

We must either put our faith in brute force and ever bigger armaments, and mutually destroy ourselves: or we must put our faith in *human quality,* on the value of human lives: human persons that can only come to the fullness of their humanity in relation with the God who controls and directs force so intelligently and precisely for the *fulfilment of its true purpose* that if the tiny speck from the embryo of a chick that is destined to become the thigh bone is dissected out and grown in a suitable medium, it produces the thigh bone — without the rest of the chick.

Everyone here has a part to play, and the issue depends in the long run upon our inner resources — the quality of our communion with God, the sincerity of our communal life, our dependence upon the reality of the unseen, invisible yet fundamental ground of all existence which we call God. If we worship

power, then by power we are destroyed, interiorly as well as exteriorly. If we worship "love", trusting the *inner reality of life,* then out of disaster and apparent defeat, life wrests a victory, as it did on Calvary.

Suffering in life in some form is inevitable. Our attitude to it makes of it a terrifying, disintegrating experience, or a constructive creative one, through which, or out of which, fresh life is brought into being.

Only when we are ready to accept, if necessary, the worst that *can* happen to us, can we face life as it comes, undisturbed by rumours of dangers not yet actual. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof", expresses a deep secret of One who knew the worst life could inflict, and was prepared to face it *when it came,* but who yet realized the futility of wasting our energies to-day in worrying about what *might* happen to-morrow.

When we seek first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, when we respond to the eternal, transcendent element in experience, then and then only, losing our narrowly self-centred lives, we find our real selves with a function, a vocation, a destiny, whatever you wish to call it, within a purpose which transcends all that we *can* lose on earth. On that level fear is transmuted into awe and men realize that our life is hid with Christ in God.

Everyone in whom the divine spark within has emerged into a conscious acceptance of the reality of an inner life beyond the power of any external foe, becomes a focus through which some glimpse of the eternal can be caught by others. The kingdom of God is within us, and only from that centre can we help to quicken it in those as yet blind to their heritage, opening their eyes to the reality of God in themselves, through which they may glimpse something of the Eternal Reality of God, the Father of all.

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THE SUPREMACY OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

By NORMAN ADCOCK,

WHILE Christianity has often been defined as a religion seeking a philosophy, and almost as often Platonism has been cited as that philosophy already provided, it is the purpose of this article to repudiate such a definition, and on the contrary to demonstrate that with far more justice Christianity is to be defined as a religion from which there needs to, and can be produced a *Christian* philosophy, which, while still circumscribed by the natural limitations of man's finite intellect, and to that extent liable to some errors of a purely intellectual character, yet, for reasons presently to be given, being largely freed from the primary source of error inherent in all the rational processes, which will be discussed in all its aspects, would be the philosophy *par excellence*: not completely free from, but the least contaminated by, error.

An exposition *of* the Christian philosophy, though of paramount interest and importance, lies outside the scope of this present study, though it is hoped that an opportunity will be found for it on another occasion. Here the inquiry must be limited to establishing as far as possible, beyond doubt, the irrefutable character of the claim made above for Christianity to be *alone* capable of producing, not *the* perfect, because perfection here is impossible, but the *most* perfect philosophy capable of being formulated on this earth, during which examination we shall see the astonishing verdict which Christianity has to pass on all other philosophies.

Now, there are two ways of conducting the search after truth. The one is through science and philosophy, and this can be termed the approach from the outside, and with that method we shall begin our study of the present problem.

The two popular contemporary contrary extremes of the doctrine of man's rationality serve to stress both their total inadequacy separately (as held to-day) to account for *all* the *factual* circumstances about man, and also their adequacy, properly united, to so account for them: in short, establishing as an unshakeable eminence between two contrary errors, the Aristotelian view which, distinguishing between the *speculative judgement* (proceeding from the understanding alone) and the *practical* judgement (proceeding conjointly from the will), differentiates will from reason.

For, on the one hand, a majority of contemporary educationists, by asserting that a sound education for all — apparently defining education wholly in terms of academic learning with an emphasis perhaps on the "sciences" — is the solution for all the world's many troubles, seemingly subscribe to the views of Socrates and Plato that virtue is identical with knowledge, the sinner being thus only an ignorant man, and hence no sinner at all in the real sense, and dissociate themselves from the Aristotelian view, although some contemporary "educationists" may never have heard of either view, and may sincerely believe that they are propounding a theory really novel, and, what is more, despite the weight of experience against it, really valid.

On the other hand, there is that school of psychologists which wholly discounts reason, asserting it to be but the product of the individual's blind impulses in the unconscious, and thus wholly irrational at its basis, despite the oft-urged fatal objection that if this assumption be true, then it too, being a product of reasoning power, together with every other rational erection, must collapse, since, on its own showing, reason is a completely false and powerless guide.

Before going further, then, in a rational argument, it is expedient to proffer some concrete evidence for the validity of that reason to which we are appealing to establish our case.

When, during the nineteenth century, it was observed that the orbital movement of the planet Uranus showed an irregularity in the path rationally predicted for it, it was deduced *by reason* that there must be beyond it another heavenly body causing this

deviation: and, further, *by reason* it was calculated in what portion of the sky and at what period of time this as yet unknown body should appear: and when at the given time the stated place was observed by telescope, the planet to which the name of Neptune was later given, was discovered: just as in 1930, by exactly the same reasoning based on a similar irregularity noted in the path of Neptune itself, a further planet still was deduced and found and named Pluto. Here, surely, is an *objective* vindication of the validity of reason, by no means rendered nugatory by the fact that the same conclusion has been shown capable of attainment along different lines by Einstein's theory of the Universe, because Einstein's theories are themselves the product of reason, and, as in simultaneous quadratics, while at least two methods are possible for their solution, yet *both* are mathematical, so *both* these methods applied to the discovery of the planets Neptune and Pluto are *rational.*

But, although invalidating the sweeping claims of the "irrationalist" school, this vindication by no means denies that the irrational impulses surging up from the unconscious influence the workings and conclusions of reason.

With the Rationalist we can agree that an increase in the individual's reasoning powers would render him intellectually fitter to decide matters of great import to conduct, but with him we shall disagree that mere knowledge of what *should* be done will carry with it the power to do it.

For psychology tells us that consciousness is the progressive manifestation of an unceasing activity, an activity only partially revealed to us as consciousness: and that a mental act presents three aspects, being at once a knowing (a cognition), a being affected (an affection) and a striving (a conation): and psychoanalysis (a branch of study separate from psychology) informs us that a far greater proportion of our dispositions or impulses are in the unconscious part of the mind than are in the conscious part (repeating the first assertion of psychology cited above), and that these impulses in the unconscious are in a corrupted state, and are constantly reacting upon the conscious part of the mind.

It is the conative, and not the cognitive, aspect that enables

us to carry out what we will to do, if our will be strong enough: the moral power is operative in the conative, not the cognitive. Evidence for this conclusion on a universal, one might almost say on a cosmic, scale, is found in Professor Toynbee's recent study of twenty-one civilizations, the vast majority now past and fallen: and in each case the civilization collapsed when at the height of its *intellectual and technical* (cognitive) but at the *depths of its moral* (conative) power.

And the important thing to remember is that the psychologists have established that the unconscious of every *normal* person is in a corrupted state: that the chaotic, subliminal region of the self is a region of suppressed, ugly, distorted, corrupting desires.

When a child at its early lessons in adding up two and three makes the answer six, that is a mistake owing to its as yet undeveloped reasoning power: a mere imperfection rectifiable by more study and practice. But if the child has been deliberately careless, or even, knowing the right answer, has deliberately from a desire, say, to spite its teacher, put the wrong answer, then here will has intruded upon reason to falsify it, and no mere pursuance of further intellectual study and practice will rectify that until that particular trait, causing the will deliberately to falsify the reason, is overcome.

Or in the case of a person following a mode of life which reason tells him, and he fully realizes it himself, will, if persisted in, lead to personal disaster and misery, and eventually, maybe, to a premature and most painful physical death, reason can in no way prevent him continuing in that course if he so wills, because reason can manifestly only *advise* and not *compel*. And further, its advice is more often than not rendered unreliable, by its invasion by the irrational upsurgings from the unconscious, mingling with and vitiating the reason.

Instances of this are seen in all walks of life. For, if we desire a thing strongly, we deliberately begin to "rationalize" about it, which term is misleading, for it does not mean to be rational in our argument, but to adduce all evidence in favour of, while conveniently ignoring, or deliberately manipulating to our

advantage all evidence against our project: in other words, do all in our power to *emotionally* reject any unfavourable evidence: so that rationalizing is really irrationalizing. The will, which desires the project, invades our purely discursive reason, causing it to behave *irrationally,* suppressing evidence in a most unrational way. And, furthermore, it is the invasion of the discursive reason by a will that, as we have already seen, is shown by ample empirical evidence to be itself corrupted: warped. So this invasion poisons (vitiates) the process of our discursive reason, and it is that poisoning by the *irrational,* corrupted element in the will that irrationalizes the reason itself.

Now, there are some points meriting special attention to be noted at this stage of the argument.

First, it is not the will *alone* that is corrupted. The corruption lies in the *whole* unconscious of man: in his subliminal state, the *whole* man is corrupted, but this corruption is most clearly manifested through the working of the will.

Secondly, while the whole man is corrupted, he is not wholly corrupt. To maintain a doctrine of total depravity of man is, on the face of it, inconsistent with the facts. For, despite the apparent utter depravity of certain numbers of individuals in every nation of the world, it is a *fact* that the general run of mankind is not of this nature, when we see the vast amount of good in many men and the varying amount of good in most men, and this often irrespective of any particular ethical standards or religious convictions. Nor is this a false, facile optimistic estimate of the facts, such as appears in the popular estimation that there is good in all men, look for it, find it, and then rejoice that your fellow-creatures are really so fine deep down at heart (it must be deep down, because it is often necessary to burrow down so far to find it, and burrow through some pretty dirty soil, too, at times), so everything is really all right after all.

For, to correct any possible misunderstanding, leading to over-optimism, of man's nature, we are at once faced with the fact that *every* well-intentioned act of men, however good they may be, entered upon in their own strength on a purely human basis, always brings results far from those intended by the doers.

However pure the aim and disinterested the motive, the resultant object, when attained, is not the object as we envisaged it when in the process of attaining it. It is never the unmixed good we intended it to be.

Into the very achieved object itself we introduce an element we never intended, and our aim achieved is seen to be, after all, only a mixed blessing, being accompanied by some consequences, to be termed at the very best unfortunate, in that the attained good goal has only raised a larger and worse problem for solution than the original one it had been confidently hoped the attained goal would have solved, and at the very worst downright evil in the further undreamed of consequences accompanying our achieved aim.

With all the good the very best men would do, and actually do do, when confident in their own strength and manhood alone, goes a certain amount of its very opposite nature; a certain amount of deadly poison with the medicine of a *purely human* good endeavour that vitiates the best intentions and makes them what we really never intended.

Historical examples on the grand scale leap to the mind. The early humanistic movement, as Professor Cammaerts has shown in more than one work of his; the invention of the aeroplane and its development on lines vastly different as to its usage from what was intended by its inventor, who was filled with the idea of its assisting the progress of the human race (and certainly many others shared this view, as witness the extravagant panegyric of the great *humanist* Victor Hugo upon it at its inception); the invention of wireless; the appearance of every new economic system ever conceived; while, as for the similar frustrations of good intentions on the part of ordinary individuals, these are limited only by the number of such persons as have been on the earth since man's creation.

And all this, not for the lack of trying, but, because, in the very doing of the good act a result far different from what was aimed at is brought about: so that it can be said definitely and without fear of contradiction that man, on his own, cannot bring

about a situation of unmixed good: and this fully supports the psycho-analysts' claim that man's very nature is warped.

Thirdly, it must be remembered that the psycho-analyst himself, in common with all normal men, is subject to the same process of unconscious, irrational impulses in his own "ego". All the psycho-analyst claims to be able to do is to restore the abnormal[1] to normality, which, on his own admittance, is still a very imperfect state.

The psycho-analyst lays no claims whatever to be able to improve "normality": indeed, by the very nature of the case, he cannot, and never will be able to. For his own normal conclusions are adversely influenced by his own psychical imperfections, in common with all mankind, and, in so far, contain errors: and this applies to *all* psycho-analysts now and for ever.

Fourthly, it must be remembered that psychology, being primarily a study of man's mind and personality, can never hope to succeed fully in its task. All science is a method of investigation invented by the mind of man. Now, this latest science is turning its probing beams on to the mind that invented it, and since that mind is greater than its invented instrument, that science will never succeed in completely illuminating and understanding the secrets of that mind. Therefore there must always remain about man something for ever mysterious, and, by unaided reason, unknowable.

The position we have arrived at now is this. *All* our reasoning (with one possible sphere excepted, which will be discussed presently) is the product of the discursive reason mingled with an invading will that itself is corrupted by intruding elements from the subliminal, rendering the total will a mingling of good and evil: or, more correctly, making that will the instrument through which the corrupted state of the whole man is most clearly visible.

What issues from the product of the discursive reason and

[1] That is, abnormal in an *unfavourable* sense. It would be very interesting and instructive to psycho-analyse one who was abnormal in a *favourable* sense (that is, in a super, as opposed to a subnormal state), a Christian saint, for instance.

this tainted will is not so-called Rationalism — there exists no such pure quality — but the reason unbalanced by emotional bias, which is irrationalism. The trouble arises because there is no such thing as a simple fact. Every fact must be interpreted, and it is in the interpretation that the emotional bias, the irrational element, invades and vitiates the reason.

Now a person of weak character is one who, as the urges from the unconscious well up and infect his conscious will, accepts whatever continual changes they make in that conscious will, with no attempt to resist their influence in any way. The unconscious impulses thus become wholly dominant over his slavish will, which becomes progressively weaker from its passive subjection.

The person of strong character is of two main types. In the first, the *conscious* attributes of the will can be so coordinated that the resultant strong will (because not disintegrated) is sympathetic to the upsurging warped impulses from the unconscious as they enter the conscious. These unconscious urges, then, by their influence integrate with the conscious will, because it is sympathetically disposed towards them, so that thus coordinated may be achieved a degree of corruption unattainable by the uncoordinated, frequently mutually-conflicting impulses, observable in the weak character, despite the individual craving after corruption of each impulse.

This first type of strong character, deliberately striving after ends conformable with the gratification of its impulses upsurging from the subliminal, thus integrating them into the conscious will, and rendering that will more strongly corrupt, is, of course, the type of man who is powerful for evil. But since their aim, despite the spectacular accomplishments many of their number have wrought as recorded by history down the long ages, bringing civilizations into the dust, and untold misery to myriads, is a corrupted aim directed to *total* corruption, it will, as contemporary history is plainly warning the world, end in that total corruption of all participating in it, which is synonymous with *extinction*.

The second type of strong character is the ordinary, decent

good man of humanistic principles, generally an idealist. His conscious will is quite well organized, but because the resultant high ideals from such a coordinated will in harmony with a reasonable mind are in direct conflict with the upsurging impulses from the unconscious, about whose corrupt nature and constant invasion of his will he can do nothing, his strong will is sufficiently poisoned by the antagonistic impulses from the subliminal, against which he struggles, but can do nothing to cancel them out, as to bring to frustration all the grandiose, well-meaning plans he has. All the good he plans and does carries with it an opposite poisoning influence, which, if not the equal of the good, is quite sufficient to bring about results quite different from those theoretically planned and practically aimed at, illustrated by the saying, " The road to Hell is paved with good intentions ". Of course they are good intentions, but they are twisted out of their aim by the corroding influence of the upsurging passions from the unconscious.

Then there is the ordinary average man. His *conscious* will is not very well coordinated, though in a general way amiably inclined. But since this very mediocre will is subject to the violent upsurging of impulses from the unconscious, despite the warnings of a moderately developed reason, the resultant character is fairly colourless and ineffectual in the daily trials to which it is subjected. Hence, much to his indignant surprise, is the explanation of the inability of the " average " man to stand up to the first type of man of strong character already discussed, however much the " average " man may feel opposed to this man's methods. It is the very partly integrated, and as such, weaker, character (however benevolent its intentions) inevitably going down before the impact of a much more highly integrated character (however malevolent its intentions).

There is yet another type of strong character: but discussion on this must be held over until later.

Reviewing the situation so far, we see that man is indeed imperfect. He has no control over the unconscious in his subliminal self from whence these corroding elements proceed. Therefore, he can never cure

himself, and indeed, on the face of it, the imperfect can never make itself perfect. The whole human race is in this sad plight, and, it is obvious, must ever remain so, *unless help is brought to it from outside.*

Although, strictly speaking, it is no part of this present inquiry to investigate evidence for such a sphere outside and above the ordinary physical universe, yet two suggestions may be made which certainly point in that direction.

Ignoring for the moment the question whether the theory of evolution is valid or invalid, although a growing number of scientists are questioning it, the fact remains that, if the universe is evolving, it is evolving *into* something. The most ardent evolutionist will talk of this age being *better* than the preceding ones. But the word " better " is a measuring term. A measuring term implies some *external, fixed* standard against which to measure. You can no more measure without such a fixed, external standard than you can lift yourself by your own braces.

Such a standard for the universe would imply an eternal, changeless order against which to measure our changes. Let the evolutionist deny this, then he must change his language completely. He cannot speak of this age being " better than ", but only " different from ", preceding ones: for if everything changes and there is no constant to measure this change against, then we can only simply record this change, and such measuring and valuing terms as " better " and " worse " must be dropped from our vocabulary as meaningless.

A far more cogent argument is available from the new light that is being thrown on the nature of man himself: for that telepathy and precognition are both faculties of man is attested to by such a body of empirical evidence as would command immediate acceptance by all scientists were that evidence of a nature other than it is. But although the *facts* seem so opposed to all orthodox scientific theories, they are, nevertheless, facts, and those theories must be conformed to fit in with any new evidence. The significance of this hostile attitude of many scientists to such evidence will be examined at a later stage in our argument.

Possession of these faculties of telepathy and precognition show that there is in man's nature an element transcending time and space: that is, transcending even the four-dimensional space-time continuum universe of modern physicists. Hence there is a sphere outside and above this present one, though of its nature we know, from scientific and philosophical sources, practically nothing.

Reasonable grounds for an extra- and supra- sphere to our own universe-system having been given, and having seen that there is an absolute necessity for assistance for imperfect mankind from such a sphere, we shall still not stray from strictly philosophical speculation if we ask, What form would it be most desirable for this aid to take?

In this connexion it should first be noted that influence in human relationships, whether it be of persuasion or dissuasion, relies for its effect not solely upon reason, but is rather exerted by the total personality of the persuader or dissuader upon the total personality of the other. This being so, it would seem logical to suggest that the form most desirable to be taken by this aid from without would be an influence of a personal nature extraneous to all mankind, exerted upon those warped impulses invading from the subliminal man's conscious self.

Having established the fact of such an invasion, it now behoves us to observe the significance of *how* this invasion works. The first thing we notice is that the farther removed from direct bearing on human matters a problem is, the less is reason polluted by invasion of the tainted will. That is, the remoter our study is from directly bearing upon human issues, the more dispassionate we become. This is undoubtedly the cause of our (up to a point rightly) regarding scientists as dispassionate seekers after truth. And so they are, more or less, until, as is finally bound to happen, their inquiries approach some aspect of the problem of the being and nature of man himself. Then, as we shall presently see, though far from being unbiased they are not far from being unbalanced.

Thus in pure mathematics (always allowing for any possible personal clash between two mathematical exponents of two rival

theories in this very abstract sphere: or for the remote possibility of the presence in this rarified realm of a Pythagorean, who would undoubtedly introduce a goodly portion of emotional bias), we see discursive reasoning at work in its purest, most unalloyed form. The same would hold true, to an almost equal degree, in the case of astronomy and astrophysics, although because here we enter a sphere, as it were, on the very outer edge, and slightly under the influence of direct human interests, in that the structure, origin and destiny of the physical universe is rightly felt to have some bearing on man and his nature and destiny, we must allow for a certain ingredient of emotional bias in the various theories propounded concerning the physical universe conditioned by the personal beliefs of the theorists concerned. We have, however, seen an instance in this sphere where the findings of reason were minimally uncorrupted by emotional bias in the discovery of the planet Neptune, and later, of Pluto also. Here was reason minimally influenced by corrupted will, and hence maximally effective.

In the study of chemistry and physics the emotional bias of the searcher after truth in these two departments of knowledge is on the increase, because these two branches of science are rather more closely connected with the being of man, and this bias obviously grows rapidly as we pass through zoology, biology and bio-chemistry, whose exponents, not satisfied with the legitimate application of their methods to a study of man's physical body, illogically and in plain language really stupidly try to apply these methods of a purely physical science equipped only for dealing with the ponderables to a study of man *in toto*, which, of course, includes his personality, which is demonstrably an imponderable attribute: a proceeding which called forth the most scathing denunciations from that great French doctor and scientist, the late Dr. Alexis Carrel, in his book, *Man, The Unknown.*

In this respect, Mr. G. N. M. Tyrrell, in his *Personality of Man* has some very interesting and illuminating observations. He refers, for instance, to the "intense *emotional* hostility aroused in many scientists by any evidence for the paranormal",

and, in the case of hypnosis, tells how the *Lancet* in the early days of mesmerism thundered that any medical man who subscribed to such quackery deserved to be hooted out of the profession: and when operations began to be performed successfully on patients in a state of hypnosis, opponents present declared that these patients must have been bribed, and so lay quite still betraying no sign of agony when their tumors were being cut or their limbs amputated.

Against all concrete evidence could such wholly *irrational* explanations be advanced: explanations in truth fit for the madhouse because they *were* the product of the irrational upsurge from the subliminal depths of the "*ego*", completely corrupting the reason of their originators. Finally, of course, the efficacy of hypnosis in such cases was, and is, generally admitted.

Psychology in its initial stages seeming, even while in danger of overthrowing the edifice of science (including itself) by its apparent disproof of reason as a guide, as we saw in our opening paragraphs, yet to support physical science by showing that man could be eventually fully explained by scientific methods, and therefore must be *wholly* material, still, as its several branches proceeded in their investigation in some of them began, and is continuing, to lay bare facts concerning man's personality thoroughly unpalatable to and untenable by any theory holding a purely materialistic view of the Universe, and is raising the same sort of frantic hostile emotional bias among "orthodox" scientists as the use of hypnosis evoked at its inception, as Mr. Tyrrell also observes in the same book.

Thus those branches of psychology that are beginning to reveal that there is that about man's personality that cannot at all be reconciled with the normal laws of purely physical nature, that does, indeed, on the contrary, reveal a complete "otherness" from the physical universe, arouse intense irrational, emotional opposition from a vast majority of "scientific thinkers", well illustrated by the remark concerning telepathy made to the late William James by a then leading biologist: "Even if such a thing (as telepathy) were true, scientists ought to band together to keep it suppressed and concealed. It would undo the uniformity of

nature and all sorts of other things without which scientists cannot carry on their pursuits".

Undoubtedly, much the same pious horror (and rubbish) was felt by many savants at the British Association Meeting in 1949 who heard Professor A. C. Hardy, Professor of Zoology at Oxford, voice his belief in the reality of telepathy. Scientists who "think" thus emotionally completely forget that science itself is but a method of observation of happenings in the physical world devised by men themselves: and that when any new *fact*, however strange, is demonstrably established as occurring in that world, it must be taken into account, and previously held theories modified to accommodate it: and *not* the fact either wildly ignored or flatly denied, or, just as bad, twisted to try and fit in with previously constructed theories.

But the whole situation is charged with significance and interest. For, as already seen, the nearer any science approaches to dealing with matters of human interest, the more fiercely does the corrupted will invade the discursive reason, so now we see that the deeper the science of psychology delves into the secret depths of the self-hood of man, the even fiercer yet becomes the invasion of the discursive reason by the warped will.

All the modern marvels discovered about the size, structure, age and composition of the Universe, far from dwarfing man (other, of course, than in a purely *metrical* sense), as many thinkers would lead us to believe, really proclaim him to surpass that which he so far understands. In other words, in so far as man comprehends the physical universe, so he surpasses it *in esse*: and in so far as all that at present lies beyond his understanding (even as, 100 years ago, much of what he understands of it *now* was beyond his *then* comprehension) will yet be capable of ultimate comprehension by him, he transcends the *whole* physical universe *in posse*.

So man is demonstrably more fundamental, more approximating to ultimate reality than is the physical universe.

But we have seen that the study of that Universe, either of the macrocosm or the microcosm, engenders little invasion of the discursive reason by the warped will, except in so far as that study

should inadvertently touch upon any aspect of direct human interest.

Then we have established that the nearer our studies approach to ultimate reality, the more fiercely does the warped will invade the reason: the more irrational and passionate and illogical our arguments become. This means again that the personality of man, as has long been considered by many though denied by some as merely epiphenomenal, is very clearly shown to be indeed the most fundamental and real aspect of his whole nature.

When we turn to those spheres of studies most intimately related to human activities, we find the emotional bias increasing rapidly until, reaching economics and politics, the increase is in geometrical progression, and in the latter sphere, without any fear of contradiction, the emotional bias can be said to hold nearly the whole field to the almost total exclusion of discursive reason.

Concerning religion it is often remarked that "You can never argue a man into religion". Without subscribing to this in its entirety, yet admitting its general validity, it is very important to observe that, on the other hand, it is a well established fact that you can very often argue a man *out* of religion.

Now, since there must be some guide to human existence, those argued out of religion are generally argued into some social and political activity.

But we have seen that the nearer to ultimate reality our studies take us, the greater is the intrusion of the warped will into our reasoning: and that the resultant product of the tainted will and the discursive reason always expresses the utmost hostility to and argues *away* from that which is more fundamental and real to that which is less.

That is, any doctrine into which one is argued with less opposition from the twisted will is not so fundamental as, and hence is more remote from, ultimate truth than is the doctrine *from* which one has been argued, and which was emotionally opposed by a far greater resistance of the warped will.

Thus politics are clearly seen to be *less* fundamental than

religion: and since it is observable from a study of history that religion, even more than politics, has been torn by emotional strife, then we can state that religion does deal with the absolute fundamentals of man's being.

On the same hypothesis the religion which arouses the greatest opposition — the religion which most *offends* — is the religion of all the many in the world that is the most true: is, indeed, *the* religion.

Now the religion which, *par excellence,* does that is true Christianity (advisedly and deliberately *true* Christianity to distinguish it from the misunderstood, anaemic, grotesquely-distorted "popular" doctrines that go by the name of "Christianity" among such multitudes of the people): even as, in the first days of its preaching, "Many were offended . . . and followed him no longer".

It is interesting to note that there is quite a cult in favour of Buddhism among certain intellectual Western circles to-day: of which Jacques Maritain, in his *Introduction to Philosophy,* remarks: "If at the present day it (i.e. Buddhism) has found a warm welcome among certain circles in Europe, it is because all who hope to derive from *humanitarianism* [italics mine] a moral code of human kindness for the acceptance of an atheistic society are already implicitly Buddhists".

Precisely. Buddhism (which, admittedly, Jacques Maritain classes among the products of pre-philosophical thought, but which I ask leave to class here as a religion, as I think most, if not all, its exponents would, though personally I regard it as certainly approximating more to a philosophy of sorts than to religion as such) offers a philosophy for *humanitarianism,* which is one of the secular doctrines directed towards the guidance and welfare of mankind: which, together with politics and economics, seemingly offers a much less bothersome and really easier way out of all our difficulties than any religious solution. And since its adherents are indistinguishable in doctrine from Buddhists, then that religion is more easily accepted by the twisted will than is Christianity.

Our position now is as follows:—

(1) Reason, by virtue of its functioning through a finite organ, the brain, is capable of accidental errors. These can be corrected by further application to study and an increase in knowledge, though there are no grounds for supposing that reason, even if pure and unalloyed, could ever arrive at *complete* knowledge of everything, since all available evidence points to complete knowledge even of the four-dimensional space-time continuum being beyond the powers of the three-dimensional brain, the only medium through which reason, in this sphere, can function.

(2) By virtue of its invasion by the corrupted and irrationalized upsurges from the subliminal self, chiefly manifested in and through the will, reason is capable of *deliberate* error, irrational in basis, and capable only of correction in so far as the will itself is purged of these corrupted elements.

(3) The nearer we approach in our investigations to ultimate reality, the more pronounced is this invasion of the discursive reason by the tainted will, striving directly to discourage such investigations, or, failing that, to discredit their results.

(4) Man is more fundamental: that is, approximates more to reality than the physical universe, both macro- and microcosmic.

(5) Man's personality is the most fundamental aspect of his whole nature.

(6) Religion is the most fundamental of all man's activities.

(7) Of all religions, Christianity is the most real: in other words, it is the only *true* religion.

To complete our investigation by the first method, namely, from the *outside, via* science and philosophy, it needs now but to note the peculiar *form* adopted in its actions by the combined reason-tainted-will.

It is an observable fact that in men about to embark upon some evil course, the efforts of their warped will-invaded reason issue in an attempt to justify their act by saying either that, if only properly viewed and understood, it would be seen to be good, as they themselves (so they aver) so see it, or that it will be instrumental in achieving good.

This attempt of evil to justify itself at the bar of good, this

involuntary homage paid by vice to virtue, is surely evidence that evil, manifesting through the corrupted will, though dynamic and positive, is *not* primary and original, but secondary and derivative: is *not* the equal and opposite of good, but the inferior and opposite, for the equal would experience no obligation to justify its actions before its peer: is evidence, in other words, that the surging uprushes from man's subliminal self invading and corrupting the will are, and convert that will itself into being, in a state of rebellion.

Thus, to the seven points just quoted we can add this: that all the evidence points to the whole man being in a state of rebellion. That state of rebellion grows in intensity and fury in direct proportion as man's discursive reason seeks after and approaches nearer to fundamental truth and ultimate reality. So it seems not illogical to conclude that man is in rebellion against truth: against ultimate reality. That is as far as we may legitimately go by the first — the *from outside* — method we have been following. So we now pass on to the second method of pursuing our search after truth.

II.

This second method of searching for truth is through religion, and this can be termed the approach from the *inside*.

We have seen by our so far empirical approach that religion deals with the most fundamental aspects of man's life; and that, by the criterion we have been logically led to adopt, Christianity is *the* religion *par excellence*: is, in fact, unique.

Christianity tells us that Christ, while on earth, was never separated from complete union with the Godhead: his earthly life, as his heavenly existence, was lived in the fellowship of the Holy Trinity: he and his Father, bound by their mutual love, issuing in the personal Holy Spirit.

It furthermore tells us that we are "adopted sons" of God: adopted through Christ: and therefore sharing with him this being "gathered up" into the Godhead, and so in this truly

"Trinitarian life", as Professor Hodgson puts it, we "see out" from within.

That is why I have called the approach *via* religion the approach from "*inside*". It is this approach made by the true believer that illuminates the problems and mysteries of existence with glaring clarity as we see them, not, indeed, as God sees them, because the best Christian is still far from perfect, but at least from a God-influenced angle from *within* the Godhead, a position not enjoyed by the non-Christian.

The ordinary Christian may object that he has no knowledge of leading such a "gathered-up" life within the Godhead; that he has no experience of it at all. That may be so. But then the ordinary man would, with equal certainty aver that he has no knowledge, and has never undergone the experience of, being at once an immanent and transcendent creature. Yet, in the face of all the evidence accruing from recent study of man's personality, it is clear that in our subliminal selves there is a "locus" of "happening" or "being" which is neither temporal nor spatial, at least in our meaning of those terms; demonstrating that there are faculties in man belonging to an order of existence which is independent of space and time; so that the living human is, as a psycho-physical being, in fact the nexus for interaction between the purely *physical* order and this other order, which may be conveniently termed "the elsewhere"; and therefore every human being is both immanent and transcendent, despite the certain fact that no one is aware of this.

So that the objection of the ordinary Christian to the possibility of his being, as an adopted son of God, within the Godhead, on the grounds that he never feels aware of it, is completely negatived.

The Christian doctrine of man proclaims the corruption of all men's wills, and their consequent fallen state, being turned from an utter theocentric attitude, when, in unbroken harmony with the perfect will of God they were themselves in a state of perfection, to an anthropocentric attitude, and hence, out of harmony with the perfect will of God. They are imperfect, not in any

intellectual sense, which can be remedied by an increase of knowledge, but in a *moral* sense, because increasing knowledge, while it could affirm ever more clearly (as ordinary commonsense does to those who give any thought to the matter at all) that what was necessary for restoration to wholeness was again to become completely theocentric, could yet give no power to implement this advice. The initiative for that lies, not in the discursive reason, but in the will being *willing* to surrender its new-found, and, from the purely self-gratification viewpoint, attractive self-contemplation. The initiative, in other words, must take the form of active *self-surrender,* most wounding to a self that has lost its true centre and become wrapped in a *false* love of self; false, because eventually such an attitude is not beneficial, but mortally detrimental, to self-hood.

This aspect of the Christian doctrine has always aroused the utmost hostility, not only among non-Christians, but frequently among Christians likewise (as, if this particular doctrine be true, *we should expect it to do*).

This violent antagonism is caused by pride: a pride that revolts against any idea that man can possibly be a sinner in need of redemption; a pride most plainly, and, because of its hypocritical disguise, most loathsomely, to be seen in modern man. For modern man is loud in his denial of his own self-importance before the staggering size of the Universe: if the whole earth is less than a grain of sand, then what crawling, infinitesimal speck must he himself be? (We have already seen that this line of argument from mere size is wholly irrelevant: but modern man, despite this so-called "Age of Education", does not seem very sound in many of his arguments.)

That is, having largely denied the existence of a God to whom he is accountable for his actions, and than whom he is both in degree and kind infinitely less, he now confounds greatness with mere *size* and glories in showing (by his admission of utter inferiority to the whole Universe in this respect) his humility, which, he declares, was a false humility when he believed in a God who had made man the crown of creation.

But he overlooks or quietly ignores the fact that in his aboli-

tion of God he has usurped the vacant place himself. Man now feels he is accountable to no one. What, such a one as he in need of redemption? Nonsense! He is not perfect, of course, but he will put that right on his own through the succeeding ages. And in it all, in the miserable, tawdry hypocritical appeals to his humility, modern man, as the first man, proclaims his *pride*: the pride of that will, which in ancient man and modern man is just as warped with pride as ever.

The evil of pride is bound to show forth with or without man's belief in God, still urging him to be *as* God, even as it did at the Fall, since, as we have just seen, having more or less to his own satisfaction abolished God, he now tacitly elevates himself to what he now confidently thinks is the vacant place.

"If ye then, being *evil*," said Jesus — here announcing man's fallen and sinful state — "know how to give *good* gifts unto your children," — here he announced man's depravity to be *not* total. And, in those words of Christ, we have the Christian doctrine of man. But we have already seen that scientific investigation of man's personality shows him to be in a corrupted — warped — fallen — depraved state; while a dispassionate survey of all the evidence shows that this state of depravity cannot be a total one.

The Christian doctrine likewise asserts that man's fall was occasioned by a rebellion against God, and that man is still in that state of rebellion. But we have already seen that this is exactly the conclusion that a study of the *form* taken in its actions by man's reason plus warped will, forces upon us.

We know that frequently when Jesus was about to cast out devils from those possessed, the possessed cried out, "What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God?" In so acting, they were conforming to the attitude to be expected of wills in rebellion against God when brought into immediate contact with him; namely, the closer they approached to him against whom they were in a state of wild rebellion, the more rebellious would they become, and strive by all in their power to draw away from him. But we have already seen that the nearer man's study approaches to ultimate reality, the more frenziedly does the warped will invade the discursive reason that is doing its best to make that

approach to ultimate reality, and strive to draw it away by vitiating its working with its poison. Thus, so far, all the Christian doctrine mentioned is supported up to the hilt by scientific discoveries in the field of man's nature, and philosophical consideration of them.

What was proclaimed by Revelation as the truth about man some 2,000 years ago, is now borne out by recent discoveries in the psychological sphere; not only a striking piece of evidence in that doctrine's favour, but equally evidence for the superiority of the revelationary over the empirical, the latter having taken some 2,000 years to catch up with and verify the former.

One very formidable difficulty intrudes at this point threatening, despite all the evidence up to date in its favour, very seriously to challenge our whole theory. For, granting the theory that the warped will has always, by poisoning the discursive reason, sought to draw man away from all knowledge of, and belief in, God, against whom all mortal wills are in rebellion, how has man ever arrived at any knowledge about God at all, let alone held any belief in him, as the many religions of the ancient and almost as many religions of the modern world show that he has?

On closer examination the difficulty is not so insuperable as at first sight it might appear to be.

(1) It must be remembered that man is not *totally* corrupt; thus the will is not *wholly* inclined away from God: therefore there will result not a completely undifferentiated straining away from God, but an amply sufficient resultant force none the less to ensure constant rebellion.

(2) The will can so mislead reason in its interpretation of the data that it presents the seekers with a totally erroneous idea of God; and in this way achieves its aim of revolting and turning man away from the one only God.

(3) Or the will can so cause the data to be interpreted that the seekers are led to deny God altogether. This is really only a variant of (2), that is, it is an extremely erroneous idea about God, representing supreme being as non-being.

It must also be remembered that any idea we create of God *in our own image,* is wholly false and far removed from any

approach to truth, for, although we were made in the image of God, we have, by the Fall, broken and marred that image, so that any conception of God created in its likeness must be but a blasphemous travesty of God. St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, had very good reason, therefore, after having initially said a little in favour of "natural religion", to show that even the most abandoned of the Gentiles were really without excuse for not knowing anything about God, very much to discountenance its value later.

In the light of (1), (2) and (3) above we are in the position to make the following observation.

In proportion as the *uncorrupted* element in the not *totally* depraved man is respectively stronger, equal to, or weaker than the intruding corrupted subliminal uprushes, synthesizing in the *corrupted* whole, we may expect to find men divided into the following rough categories in respect of religion and philosophy, for philosophy in speculating about the nature of man and the Universe *must* raise and try to answer questions as to the possibility or impossibility of a Creator's existence: his nature — if the possibility of him be admitted — and so on, thus involving philosophy (or, more correctly, philosophers) in this same everlasting struggle beween the reason and the invading will.

(a) Those who accept God, but give a very faulty interpretation of him.

(b) Those who accept God, but have a very erroneous conception of him.

(c) Those who accept God, but hold a wholly distorted conception of him.

(d) Those who reject the idea of God altogether.

In the highest philosophers of ancient times, whose state of character we may not unreasonably suppose to have been such that the uncorrupt element in their nature was rather stronger than the intruding, corrupt subliminal uprushes, the synthesizing of which two elements would issue in a resultant attitude of thought and action qualifying them for category (a) above, we might expect to find lofty doctrines concerning deity, approaching at times some of the points of Christian doctrine, yet with

an overall content that largely appears as a travesty of Christianity. And this is exactly what we *do* find.

Into category (b) above would fall most of the ancient pagan religions. For, however unpalatable for the warped will to turn to any deity at all, yet since it is always easier to turn to *false* deities, because, being false, they are still remote from the truth, advance towards which we have seen the warped will in rebellion resists with all its might, we therefore meet with a succession of these very erroneous ideas about God in the ancient world. In these *religions* the idea of God was *not* the work of philosophical speculations, but was rather the product of a revelation so seriously conditioned by the state of the recipients that they held these very erroneous conceptions of the deity.

Into category (c) can be placed those orgiastic religions of the ancient world, acknowledgement of such a deity or deities as these required in their wild rites, with no moral demand made upon their devotees, being no defeat for the rebellious will but rather a triumph. It is to be noted that these orgiastic cults displayed a wholly *distorted* — as distinct from category (b's) merely erroneous — conception of deity.

So, in succeeding ages it has always been easier to turn to the idea of an evolving deity (though this conception can be shown to be wholly untenable from our present knowledge of the nature of the physical universe alone), or to an impersonal deity, neither of which demands obedience from their worshippers, and, what is more, as far as pre-eminence goes, is pretty much on a par with human beings, and in the case of the impersonal deity not even possessing personality, and so really a little below them, thus not offending the *pride* of the warped will: that *pride* which is the very essence of its corruption and rebellion.

There is one more category which, because only one small and, judged by world standards, insignificant race of people belonged to it, has not been listed among the others, so that it may be dealt with quite separately on account of its uniqueness.

That category is the one wherein a true revelation of the true God has been given and received (for remember that, since not *totally* corrupt, but only *corrupted,* the Will is not *wholly* turned

away from the true God), and then the rebellious will has still gained its own end by ensuring that, high as the revelation and knowledge of God's will consequently is, God's revealed will is *not* obeyed. This results in just as successful a rebellion as in the previously quoted instances. The people in question were, of course, the ancient Hebrews, and the religion Hebraism, developing later into Judaism.

Thus, in the best of ancient philosophies, high-minded savants drew very faulty interpretations of deity, and in ancient religions the true God was never known, and so never followed and obeyed; and in the one instance (the Hebraic) when he *was* truly known, was continually disobeyed, and his *known* revealed will flouted by the rebellious wills of those that paid him largely lip-service only.

So our theory is *not* contradicted by the existence of high philosophies admitting the idea of deity and religions in the ancient world, for, as we have seen, they were not, in their several natures, inconsistent with our evidence of the rebellious state of man's will.

Now these methods of the Devil just detailed for seeing that fallen man did *not* follow and obey the one true God were all very well as far as they went. This sudden introduction of the Devil into the argument may seem startling, if not unnecessary, and call for some explanation. All that can be said on this subject here is this.

We have already seen that in human relationships influence is always exerted upon the conduct of others, persuasive, dissuasive, exhortatory or otherwise, by the exertion of the *total* personality of the one upon the *total* personality of the other.

Following along these lines we have also shown that the absolutely necessary outside help to make imperfect man perfect should be of a *personal* nature.

It does not, therefore, seem wholly illogical to assume that the influence exerted upon the rebellious nature of man to keep him continually in that state of rebellion, since manifestly it is not primarily the work of any *human* agency (because mankind

has been in this state from the appearance of the first man upon earth, before any fellow existed in his neighbourhood to influence him one way or the other), although human agents may often be used in the process, yet comes from *outside* the physical sphere, and is of a personal nature, and therefore exerted *by at least a person*: and that person is termed the Devil.

Further, we have seen from the very nature of the case that evil is in rebellion against good. That is, it is *not* the equal and opposite, but the inferior and opposite of good. Thus, although this in no way explains, but only pushes back a stage further, the problem of evil, the Devil is *not* the equal and opposite, but the inferior and opposite to God, himself a rebellious spirit, as the Christian Scriptures teach, and therefore there is *no* dualism involved in Christianity, as is often urged, and as is palpably present in such a religion as Zoroastrianism, with its *equal* and opposite personifications of the powers of good and evil, Ahura-Mazda and Ormuzd.

But, reverting to our main subject, how much better for the Devil if he could bring man to deny God altogether! Admittedly, such an accomplishment would include the Devil's *own* banishment to the limbo of unbelief. But that would not disturb him. He would be just as real, believed in or not; and he would be achieving his own end, and, though unconsciously to human beings, would be proclaiming his own continued existence by the very fact of *their* continual denial of God.

In the comparatively early age of the world, when reason had not laid bare so many wonders of the physical universe, this was impossible, and the methods already detailed had to be adopted.

But, as reason rose to such heights, and gathered within its confines such a mass of knowledge about the nature of the physical universe, both macrocosm and microcosm, reason's *content* being now so much greater, there was, in direct proportion to this greatly increased mental material, a much greater opportunity for the *distortion* and *misinterpretation* of all these facts by the invading corrupt will because it had so much more material to work upon.

That is, as the ever-spreading boundaries of reason collected more and more material within them, so was reason, *ipso facto,* capable of far greater prostitution by the will than when its confines were narrower and its contents less, just as the greater an Empire the more resounding, complete and disastrous its fall on defeat in war.

The realm of reason has made such strides during the past few centuries. The same warped will has had, therefore, a much bigger field for action; much more material to corrupt. The results achieved were much more spectacular.

What better and easier than to persuade the modern multitudes to worship at the shrine of science? The Devil can well afford to congratulate himself most highly on his undoubted success, for he has got modern, stream-lined, mass-educated man, so confident in his intellectual powers, back again into the stage of grovelling idol worshippers.

For science, personified in the popular mind to the status of some indispensable saviour-goddess (science is generally referred to by the feminine personal pronoun) is, in actual fact, merely a method of observing natural phenomena, and constructing theories based on these observations; a process wholly devised by man: abstract, impersonal, and certainly *less* than the mind of man which produced it. Therefore, in worshipping science, and denying or ignoring God, modern man is worshipping something *less than* man, and, as previously remarked, is back again at the fairly early idol-worshipping stage, where things made by men's hand and first of all conceived in men's minds, were revered.

Thus into our category (d) we see that, by and large, either through his ignoring or denying God, modern man falls, and provides by his attitude yet further vindication of our theory. Further, Christianity proclaims that man, having no power of himself to help himself, needs to be saved; and that he can only be saved by a final act of redemption on God's part, which has already been made by the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, Jesus Christ.

This conclusion as to the utter necessity of outside help, we

had already arrived at by our first method of approach, when we saw that, because of their subliminal origin, the invading corrupt impulses cannot be controlled by conscious act of will, and are therefore ineradicable by any effort on man's part, fully vindicating the whole Christian teaching on this point.

Furthermore, in the Old Testament we learn that God has always been sending forth his mercy — his love — to put fallen man in the right; to put him in such a state that he is capable of salvation. Hence we can see that there can never be any such thing as *self*-righteousness. The self is corrupt; it can only be put into a state of righteousness by God.

And in the New Testament we learn that God's Love Incarnate dwelt visibly on this earth in Palestine in the Person of Jesus Christ.

Now God, in the light of the Christian revelation, is both absolute reason and perfect love (and neither of these qualities can ever be observable *apart from a person*). Our finite reason, even unfettered from the intrusion of the corrupt will, could never attain to full knowledge of him.

Similarly, it is apparent that those animals in close contact with human beings cannot hope and hardly attempt to understand us and our methods by a reasoning power which, in them (and it is generally recognized now that animals do have *some* elementary reasoning faculty, and, possibly, even a dawning personality), is in a most primitive, rudimentary state; but learn eventually to rely upon our behaviour towards them, not to understand it, in the light of a reciprocal affection, which eventually can and generally does, develop into love. That is what they rely upon, without at all being able to reason about it. But be it noted: that love which they come eventually to exhibit (instanced again and again in such cases as dogs or horses dying from broken hearts, sometimes, as, for example, in the case of the late King of Denmark, on the very graves of their masters or mistresses), is evoked from them by *our* love: animals, left to themselves, would not thus develop it; we in a very true sense, complete the animalhood in animals; in us they find, or should be able to find, their completion; even so, we, in God, find our completion; his

love evokes from us corresponding love; and, in the final count, it is this love which bridges the gap between us and God, where reason itself cannot take us. It is not for nothing that, whereas philosophy stresses the separating power between ourselves and the absolute in terms of the finite's constant inability to comprehend the infinite, true religion shows the great divider between God and man to be, not reason's lack of comprehending power, but sin.

Therefore we see that love is above reason; God is perfect love and absolute reason: that is the Christian order. And Holy Church teaches us that in the great Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist Christ is again present, and is, in the outward symbols of the bread and the wine, received into ourselves — for the very purpose of doing what no other power in earth or heaven can — *unwarping our warped and corrupted natures.* Here is that power from outside, whose presence we have seen is vital for restoring our fallen selves.

Now we receive first the Holy Ghost, who illuminates our hearts and minds to receive Christ. "No man by the Holy Ghost calleth Jesus accursed". And here a thought of tremendous significance arises. God the Holy Ghost has through all time been at work striving to reveal the Godhead to men. Wherever in any religion there is any element of any good; in fact, where there is any sign of religion at all, however gross, simply in the fact that there man is seeking God, there we can see God the Holy Ghost at work, though his work is hindered and marred by the corrupt will of man striving to misinterpret all his revelation of the Godhead as we have seen.

Supremely is God the Holy Ghost seen at work among the ancient Hebrews, and among them, supremely among their line of unique prophets. And yet Christianity asserts that only *after* the redemptive act of Christ, could the Holy Ghost be most fully operative in the Universe and in man, and supremely only in those who accept Jesus Christ. "Nevertheless I tell you the truth. It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you".

Perhaps we may venture the following possible explanation. The Holy Ghost *must* work through man; and man is imperfect. Therefore his instrument is imperfect. It is this human element intruding that causes errors of understanding and interpretation even in such great Holy-Spirit-inspired figures as the Hebrew prophets. But Jesus is true God and perfect man; and that perfect manhood he took with him in his Ascension into heaven: and the cause of fallen manhood is being eternally pleaded by that perfect manhood of God the Son before the throne of the Father.

And that *perfect manhood we receive in the Holy Eucharist.* So the *true* Christian, in whom dwells Christ, contains his perfect manhood, through which *perfect* manhood the Holy Ghost can now work, and thus work, in all reverence, to *full* capacity, as he could *not* before the great redemptive act of God in Christ.

We have travelled far from our opening paragraph, through much evidence and many arguments, but at last we have arrived at a position where we can see quite clearly the truth of the claim to supremacy of a Christian philosophy.

Christianity's ability to produce the most perfect philosophy possible in this finite sphere is now perfectly apparent. It rests upon the power of Christ to redeem souls; that is, to unwarp our warped and corrupted souls, a process which we have already seen cannot be achieved by any efforts of our own. Thus Christianity gets down to the very roots of the matter. It is in our subliminal selves that the corruption of man lies: those corrupt, subliminal selves Jesus Christ is ever un-corrupting. And as these souls become less and less corrupted, so the will invading reason will be less and less corrupted. So the outcome of our reasoning powers, by which we formulate our philosophy, will more and more approximate to the truth, though will never be entirely without error. The terms, that is, in which we clothe our knowledge of God here will always be but imperfect ones for the purpose.

And the verdict that Christianity has to pass on *every* other philosophy formulated by non-Christians, or, for that matter, by Christians who are Christians in name only, is that, *because*

the warped souls of their respective formulators are not being unwarped by the indwelling Christ, their respective reasons, being invaded by the maximally corrupt will, their works, the *product* of those vitiated reasoning powers, will share, and suffer from, all the deep errors of those vitiated reasons, and so will decline maximally from the truth, in a way that a true Christian philosophy will not.

Here we may profitably discuss that other type of strong character, mentioned earlier in passing, and held over until its proper place for fuller examination — the Christian man.

The impulses governing the conscious will can be co-ordinated into a resultant strong will that desires to refine those passions surging up from the *unconscious,* to draw them away from their corroded desires. Thus sublimated as they emerge from the unconscious into the conscious, the poison sting of their corrupting influence is drawn (not without great effort and struggle on the part of the individual, as any Christian soul will testify), and they enter a conscious will, already integrated in a manner diametrically opposed to their former corrupt state in the unconscious, and, in sublimation, themselves turn away from their original corrupt state and become an integrate part of that will directed against the other still unconscious urges, and thus strengthen it in its twofold task of first stedfastly opposing and then sublimating these. But the distinctive feature of such a man is that he confesses to doing all this, not in his own strength (for how can a nature corrupt at its roots *un*corrupt *itself*?) but by an appeal to, and a joining forces with a perfect (that is, utterly *un*corrupt will); the will of God; by the Power and through the Grace of the indwelling Christ who is doing for him what he cannot do for himself: progressively unwarping his warped nature.

Of course, the whole idea of a special selection, such as this implies of a Christian community *apart from* the rest of mankind, as an " elect people ", is abhorrent in an age that still clings to a false egalitarian conception of humanity.

But the Christian's privilege, any more than the Hebrew's of old, does not mean that he is placed on a pinnacle, especially

chosen and favoured by God to enjoy privileges and rewards above all others: the privilege carries with it tremendous responsibility. It is the inestimable privilege of being called upon to shew forth God, and being endowed with grace from on high for this purpose, with the knowledge that, with all these advantages, if he fail to do so, the responsibility, because of the greatness of the revelation and the consequent privilege, will be a vaster and more terrible responsibility than any borne by those not so privileged.

One more problem yet remains, somewhat akin to the one earlier raised for this theory by the presence of any idea at all about God among man, ancient or modern: namely, how, if anyone has been attracted to, and led to adopt, Christianity, Christianity can then possibly represent the truth about God, which should *repel* all men owing to their warped *selves* being in rebellion against God?

And, as with the former problem, the answer is on similar lines.

(1) Again it must be remembered that man's self is not *totally* depraved, and so there is not a complete, undifferentiated straining away of the corrupted will from all ideas of God.

(2) But, far more important, is this. Are we Christians really sure that we want to find Christ, or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, are we Christians really sure that we want Christ to find us? "Popular" Christianity is nearly always a watered-down, half-hearted Christianity. When we are faced, as we are on occasions, with the stark demands of Jesus Christ upon us, we are partly stupefied, partly horrified, and say, "But, of course, he didn't really mean that when he said that". But he did. *Real* Christianity very often offends the vast majority of respectable Christians, in so far as they have not been growing into the fullness of the stature of Jesus: that is, in so far as their lives have not been surrendered to him and their warped wills, in consequence, not unwarped.

So many Christians are only "nominally" Christian. The Devil using his old methods persuades so many of us to act as

the Hebrews did of old: knowing God's Will, yet not doing it; refusing entry to the Christ who stands outside our hearts, knocking; making a mockery of, and blaspheming, the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist.

The more Christianity offends men *as they are,* that is, in the natural state; the more Christianity offends "nominal" Christians; the more certain we may be that it is true Christianity that is being preached.

That is the answer. Christ often offends those from whom he has the utmost right to expect full allegiance. But, in the *true* Christian, as the corrupted will is made less corrupt; as the man is becoming a new man (for it cannot be stressed too often that a Christian in this life is one who is always *in the process* of being saved), so the drawing power of Jesus in his greatest demands is increased, because now being made nearer and nearer to the image broken in the fall, the true God is becoming less and less the object of aversion to a will that is becoming less and less rebellious.

It is the "nominal" Christians who can be, and often are, argued "out of" their "Christianity", for they have simply held their religious views through habit of upbringing, without for themselves ever having attempted to explore the depths of true religion: in theological language, they have never sought the experience of God for themselves at first hand, but have just a second-hand knowledge of him derived from the teaching and training of their parents and teachers; and to have a second-hand knowledge of God means that the Living Christ is not dwelling within us. With these people, when arguments against Christianity are brought to bear on them, because, owing to their not really having been converted to Christianity at all, their wills are still as twisted and corrupted as ever, those warped wills at once start surging up into their irrational, emotional invasion of reason, and these wills, being of such a nature to prefer the arguments against rather than the arguments for Christianity, they influence their owners strongly away from the Christianity they have nominally held, so that the arguments for the other side become more and more compelling because all reasons arguing

against that side are suppressed and ignored by the corrupt will's invasion of reason.

But the *true* Christian, although not perfect, for perfection belongs not here, but progressively on the way to perfection, can see all the arguments against Christianity for what they really are. And like the two travellers who, during the blowing of the wind in an effort to make them remove their cloaks, did but hug them the more closely to their bodies, but who, with the advent of the sun, also bent upon making them discard their cloaks, cast them off in his warm rays, he is only the more confirmed in the utter truth of the Christian revelation.

And any Christian philosophy emanating from such a one is indeed the *Philosophia Perennis*: the *truest* philosophy in this world.

THE EVANGELICAL TRADITION

By L. E. ELLIOTT-BINNS

It has not infrequently happened in the course of history that individuals or groups have made a definite contribution to the body to which they belonged, but, this having been assimilated, their part in the matter has been forgotten. This is true, on an even wider scale, of the Church itself. Many Christians of an individualistic type have in the past denounced the Church as decadent and as cumbering the ground; but in doing so they have failed to realize that, humanly speaking, apart from the Church they would never have heard of Christianity at all. Such an attitude shews ingratitude and is the child of ignorance.

So in the present day there is a failure to realize what the Evangelical contribution has meant to the life of the Church as a whole; and the same spirit of ingratitude, based on ignorance, is engendered. Moreover to ignore this tradition involves definite loss and deprivation, for though much in it has been outmoded, there are still lessons to be learned from the early Evangelicals, even in these enlightened days. In them we have a body of men who, beyond all question, achieved great things in the way of personal holiness, and rendered devoted service to the cause of Christianity. The example of their lives is among the most precious possessions of the Church to which they were proud to belong. To study them afresh can hardly fail to provide encouragement and stimulating power to every school of thought within the Church.

Quite recently two volumes have been published[1] containing

[1] *Oxford and the Evangelical Succession*, by M. L. Loane (Lutterworth Press, 15s.) and *The Polished Shaft*, by W. E. M. Brown (S.P.C.K. 7s. 6d.).

much excellent material for such a study, and in a most attractive form. As they deal with different aspects of the movement they pleasantly supplement and reinforce one another.

Canon Loane's volume recalls what was once a very popular work, Bishop J. C. Ryle's *Christian Leaders of the Last Century*; but he deals with five only of these pioneers and his treatment is more modern. The lives he has selected are those of George Whitefield, who as a small boy longed to go on the stage, but was to find a very different outlet for his amazing histrionic genius; of John Newton, the converted slave-trader, who was to become one of the wisest and most successful directors of souls that the Church has ever known; of Thomas Scott the commentator, to whom Cardinal Newman confessed that he almost owed his soul; of Richard Cecil, the most attractive of the Evangelical fathers, with his cultivated mind and tolerant outlook; and, finally, of Daniel Wilson, great as parish priest and as an administrator in the Church overseas. It will be seen from this catalogue that the subjects have been well chosen, and together they form a gallery of very diverse characters; yet in spite of this diversity they were linked one to another by a definite spiritual succession. They thus illustrate the manifold ways in which the Spirit of God fulfils his divine purposes and makes choice of most unlikely instruments. It is not perhaps without significance that Newton, Scott and Cecil had all at one time been opponents of the faith that later they would commend with such force and ability — Newton and Cecil, indeed, had actively promoted scepticism.

Although the book is stimulating and helpful the title is surely misleading and inexact; for Oxford had as little to do with the Evangelical succession as with the so-called Oxford Groups. In any case neither Newton nor Scott were Oxford men, and only Wilson was in residence, and that for no long period, as a don. Oxford, indeed, in spite of the common notion, for which Wesley himself is partly to blame, had nothing to do with the Methodist Movement, and the Methodists themselves date its start, not from the meetings of the "Holy Club" in 1729, but from the beginnings of field preaching ten years later. It is true that the

members of the "Holy Club" were nicknamed "Methodists", but neither in their views nor very much in their personnel were they to be identified with the later movement. The Oxford "Methodists" were a group of High Churchmen, and their successors, if any, are to be found in Newman and his friends a century later. Apart from the Wesleys and Whitefield, few of them took any part in the Revival; some became Moravians; others, like Clayton of Manchester, with greater consistency became advanced High Churchmen; Hervey alone can be called an Evangelical.

This is my main criticism. I think, however, that Canon Loane has also been misled by another popular notion. On p. 57 he speaks of England as having been saved from horrors similar to those of the French Revolution by the movement. Although this idea has had weighty support in the past I find it unconvincing. The whole condition of affairs in England was so different from that in France that it is difficult to imagine similar outbreaks in this island on any large scale. There were, moreover, other and more potent causes at work to prevent them—such as a common interest and participation in sport;[2] and though the revival may have had a sobering effect on the minds of some Englishmen, too much stress ought not to be placed on it as a prophylactic against revolution.

On pp. 72-77 there is a long extract from Hugh Walpole's *Rogue Herries* describing the effects of Whitefield's preaching. This is a striking and imaginative piece of writing; but one is tempted to ask why recourse should be had to fiction in what is after all an historical study. There are not lacking actual accounts to which appeal could have been made.

In one instance Canon Loane has allowed himself to fall into a small error through a careless reading of his authority. On p. 248 he says that John Eyre was Cecil's curate at Lewes in 1778.

[2] Cf. G. M. Trevelyan *English Social History* p.408: "If the French *noblesse* had been capable of playing cricket with their peasants, their chateaux would never have been burnt".

But Bateman in his *Life of Daniel Wilson* I. p. 3 says "*about* 1778". The correct date is 1780.

The volume is unfortunately marred by many slips and trifling errors; and, as a second edition is well merited, it may help the author if I call attention to those I have noticed. On p. 233 he speaks of "going *down*" to London; as Canon Loane is an Australian there is an excuse for his ignorance of the custom of always referring to "going *up*" to the capital. On p. 189, 1801 should be 1821; on p. 253 note 2 Ballinee should be Balleine; Howell Harris is everywhere misspelled Howel, and Schwartz, Swartz. The index needs revising as the use, surely unnecessary, of "Rev." before members of the clergy has led to a number of mistakes. It is, for example, given to Howell Harris who was a layman, and withheld from William Law; while Paley should have been called archdeacon or given the title "Ven".

We turn now to our second volume, Miss Brown's *Polished Shaft,* in which another form of Evangelical Succession, or at least influence, is considered, this time in the field of literature. The style of this volume differs from the direct and simple writing of Canon Loane; occasionally, indeed, it becomes forced and unnatural, not to say obscure. The four essays which it contains are of unequal length; the longest, and by far the most valuable, is devoted to James Hervey.

Hervey was a gentle and attractive character, and it is right that he should become better known. His great achievement was to commend Evangelical views to polite society; but in order to do so he adopted the highly artificial style current in his day, and both *Meditations and Contemplations* and the even more popular *Theron and Aspasio* have been ridiculed for this reason. But though Dr. Johnson might parody Hervey, and others be critical of his writings and their fulsome expressions, they had an immense vogue; and, what is very surprising in view of their prolixity, they became favourite literature for humbler folk—Robert Burns read them in his youth. On p. 54 Miss Brown condemns Hervey's brother for having published posthumously his unrevised letters against John Wesley. This is to do him an

injustice, for a garbled version had already appeared, sponsored by certain dissenting opponents of Wesley, and it was only right that the authentic original should be made public.

The next essay is much shorter. It contains a quite adequate and interesting study of William Cowper, whom Miss Brown calls "The Bard of Christianity". Cowper is, of course, so well known that any elaborate treatment was not called for; but Miss Brown's concluding estimate deserves quotation:

> "What an amazing depth of spiritual intuition and struggle is concealed in this eighteenth century poet! Stopping short of any judgment on what he achieved, one can see that he had to answer, both as a man and poet, an absolute demand, and that this is what entitles him to be regarded as, in the highest degree, a religious poet".

The next essay is entitled "William Gilpin: Student of the Picturesque". Here we begin to stray from the strict highway of succession, for although Gilpin was a zealous clergyman, both as a schoolmaster and as a parish priest, he was scarcely an Evangelical as the term was understood in his day. Gilpin was descended from Bernard Gilpin, the famous "Apostle of the North", and wrote his life, and also lives of some of the Reformers. But his best known writings are those describing the English countryside.

The final essay is devoted to Shelley, Peacock, and Jane Austen. These are strange names to appear in a list of Evangelical influences. Shelley is especially surprising, and Miss Brown tries to justify her choice by affirming that his "'gospel is not distinct from the Christian . . . and the spirit in which he preaches it is surely that of the early evangelicals" (p. 115). This seems to beg a good many questions, but space will not allow discussion of them. Miss Brown also claims that he and his friend Peacock are both "in the direct line of inheritance from the eighteenth century Christian idealists" (p. 122). Over Jane Austen, though she seems on the face of it a more worthy successor of the Evangelicals, Miss Brown is more hesitant, saying of her:

> "I shall not argue the direct literary connexions or exactly place Jane Austen in relationship to the evangelical movement, but just suggest how her seriousness may have been partly formed upon the

lines of eighteenth century Christian culture and refinement" (p. 124).

Although I am far from being convinced that Miss Brown has established her thesis, quite apart from this, she has produced a most interesting series of essays which are well worth reading and pondering for their own sake. One reader, at least, can say that he found them delightful and fascinating, and he only wishes that Miss Brown had a little extended her scope and given us an essay on Hannah More; a subject well worthy of her undoubted talents, and a writer, moreover, who certainly had greater influence in an evangelical direction over literature than some of those included in the present volume.

REVIEWS

F. D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology. By Arthur Michael Ramsey, B.D. (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1951.) 118 pp. 10s. 6d.

Maurice is said to have written five million words, and they are all out of print. This is not surprising, for he often wrote obscurely and always without style; and his thought contains many apparent contradictions and inconsistencies. What is surprising, therefore, is that his influence has been, and is, so considerable. F. J. A. Hort, Stewart Headlam and Fr. Herbert Kelly have all testified to his creative inspiration; to-day there appears to be a rediscovery of him in process; by some Scandinavian Lutherans he is ranked very high among the best Anglican theologians; and there are others, who have not spoken publicly, who have learned much from him.

One interesting feature of this persisting influence is that many of those who have most fully acknowledged their debt have gone beyond their master and yet have claimed to remain in the true line of development from him. As an example one might quote Stewart Headlam (Ramsey, p. 107): "In certain directions I may have gone further than Maurice went in his day—thus in my devotion to the Sacrament of the Altar — though not further, perhaps, than he would have gone had he been alive to-day." *Cor ad cor loquitur.* Newman was a far more subtle and powerful thinker than Maurice and lives to-day by the inherent vigour and originality of his thought, expressed in hauntingly beautiful prose and impressed on our minds by the well publicized pathos of his life. Yet is there in the history of his influence anything comparable with this capacity of Maurice's to inspire thought and action several stages beyond the point where he left off ? What is the secret of Maurice's influence ?

Professor Ramsey's admirably lucid and discriminating book goes far, within the limits of its scope and size, towards providing an answer. For Maurice is at his most characteristic in controversy, and it is his distinctive contribution to some of the great Victorian theological stirs which makes him of permanent interest and perennial inspiration. In this book we are given excellent accounts of his teaching on the Church and its signs, of the controversy over Maurice's denial that "eternal life" could be identified with temporal duration, of the controversy with Mansel about the limits of reason and moral judgement, and in particular

what the author claims to be the first attempt " to evaluate Maurice's teaching on Atonement and Sacrifice as a whole, or to examine his methods of Biblical exegesis in relation to the subsequent trends of Biblical study". Emphasis is laid on the tensions in Maurice's thought, on his capacity to see that two truths have sometimes to be held together even though they appear to be contradictory; and when he takes sides in controversy we are reminded that Christian theology, to be balanced, needs to preserve the truth he was contending for, even though that does not necessarily mean abandoning the view he opposed. More than once we are reminded that where Maurice and the Tractarians parted company all the right was not always on Maurice's side. For example, over Baptism:

> " The contrast between the Tractarian and the Maurician doctrines of the Church is in part the contrast between the Latin and the Alexandrine outlook. But the roots of the contrast are within the Bible. There the Church is a society, with an historical origin and a boundary, standing over against the world ; there also the Church is inherent in the creation of mankind, and definable as the whole race of mankind redeemed. These diverse aspects of the Church have sometimes become doctrines defined in mutual antagonism ; but a sound theology demands the validity of both in union and tension."

Nevertheless, this revived interest in Maurice has its dangers, particularly for those concerned with Christian reunion. One of the most hopeful features of the reunion movement—in this country at least—is that many of those most concerned with it are those who have the most vivid and robust faith in the Church as the body of Christ, and whose theology is most Biblical and orthodox. It is a different world from the 1920's, and Mgr. Knox's old jests about " Reunion all round " fall rather flat to-day. Some of these theologians find in Maurice a road which takes them beyond traditional controversies to a more profound understanding of Christian truth, and have come to feel that these controversies have been partially unreal. There is possibly a parallel to be drawn between the importance of Maurice in this respect for Anglicans and that of the modern French Jesuit, Père de Lubac, for Roman Catholics. But the old jests are not quite out of date. There are the *politiques* of the reunion movement, and the kindly, muddle-headed centre and the embittered partisans of " no party " churchmanship, who brook no criticism. And these, too, find powder and shot in Maurice. To take one, but crucial, example: episcopacy. For Maurice episcopacy is, with Scripture, Creeds, sacraments and liturgy, a sign of the Catholic Church; and he tries to show his Quaker and Nonconformist friends how these signs safeguard the truths they themselves are really concerned to uphold:

> " Maurice sees in the episcopate not an archaism or a party cry, but the sign of the existence on earth of a Catholic Church greater than schools of thought or theological systems or sectional types of Christian experience ". (Ramsey, p. 31).
>
> " In each case Maurice emphasizes not views about the fact, but the fact itself in its witness to the existence of a universal Church ". (p. 30).

This sounds well. But suppose it were interpreted as meaning that so long as one has people called bishops one has this sign of the Church, and it does not much matter where they come from or what one believes about them? The Oxford Movement (which did make " a party cry " of the episcopate) inquired into the pedigree of bishops, and thought a certain theory about bishops to be important. Is Maurice here giving us a deep theological insight, or is he providing a smoke screen behind which opponents of the Oxford Movement may deploy their forces for a knock-out blow ?

There is a danger, also, that too much may be claimed for Maurice. Not all who write on him are as discriminating as the author of this book. Maurice was not at his best either as an historian or a philosopher. He was a Biblical theologian, and he is at his best in expounding the central theological themes of Scripture, and we should be grateful to Professor Ramsey for bringing out the importance of this part of his work. Perhaps most invigorating in this grey decade is Maurice's theological optimism. He is hopeful and positive—again one thinks, by way of contrast, of Newman brooding over the impending doom of an apostate world. For Maurice, all men are created in Christ, and in the Catholic Church realize their potential unity; all men should live unto each other because they already live by, in and through the Holy Trinity. The work of the ministry is not to snatch brands from the burning but to claim for Christ those who are already his. Perhaps Maurice has an even more important message for parish clergymen than for professional theologians and reunion conferences. Towards the end of his book Professor Ramsey writes:

> " For the greatness of Maurice lies in the fact that, while his teaching paved the way for many of the achievements of theology and sociology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it gave no sanction to those *naïvetés* and false inferences of which we have just been thinking. He taught the doctrine of the Logos—but he was never an immanentist in the common meaning of the term. He taught that evolution might be seen as the continuous act of the Creator—but he never slipped into axioms about inevitable progress. He taught a Christian politics—but he never could identify this politics with the current assumptions about democracy. He pleaded for the light that lighteth every man, against theologies

which virtually denied it—but he never lost sight of the uniqueness of the Word-made-flesh. And because the Bible which taught him these things taught him also that storm, famine, war and pestilence are the fate of civilizations which banish God, his message reaches beyond the liberal decades into the catastrophic times wherein we now find ourselves. The return to the living God of the Bible is a return to the constant theme of Maurice's writings. Yet these same writings sanction no lopsided transcendentalism, for they tell us of a divine image within our godless race. And while they tell of the vanity of every philosophy which leaves God out, they remind us that beneath heretical and godless ideologies there lie half-truths which are answered only when they have first been understood".

In conclusion, I have two sets of queries about Maurice's influence in our own day. (1) In recent years his influence has been felt most—apparently—by High Anglicans, and many have gone beyond him in one way or another. Is there anything comparable with this among recent or contemporary Evangelical theologians? How much Maurician influence is there here, how is it shown and how is Maurice's teaching modified in this tradition? (2) In Maurice's own life, theology and social action went hand in hand, and one would have been incomplete without the other. Does he still inspire this union of thought and deed? Is the impression a false one that—rightly or wrongly—admirers of Maurice discuss the social problem from the theological point of view with great thoroughness and clear insight but feel helpless to translate thought into action? And would not this be to fail to interpret Maurice?

R. CANT.

THE OLD TESTAMENT TEXT AND VERSIONS. The Hebrew Text in Transmission and the History of the Ancient Versions by BLEDDYN J. ROBERTS. (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1951) pp. xv. 326. 21s.

MORE than forty years have passed since A. S. Geden wrote his *Outlines of Introduction to the Hebrew Bible.* During those years the chequered history of the transmission of the Textus Receptus of the Old Testament, the so-called Massoretic Text, has been unravelled by Kahle; critical editions of the Septuagint and the Vulgate have been published and are nearing completion; and the Dead Sea scrolls, one of which presents a text differing considerably from the Massoretic Text of Isaiah, have been discovered.

This book gives a clear, careful, and lucid account of these

matters and will remain authoritative for many years to come. It was written while the controversy about the date of this scroll was raging, and though in the reviewer's opinion the author is right in saying that it is a thousand years older than any extant copy, some writers argue that it is as late as the Arab invasion of Palestine.

How soon was the astonishing uniformity of the Hebrew MSS. of the sacred text attained ? We know from the New Testament that the Scribes were active in the time of our Lord, and if the reference in Mt. v, 18 to the jots in the Law refers to the *scriptio plena* there was in some circles of the Jewish Church of the first century an authoritative textual tradition which permitted no deviation from the Received Text even in such a comparatively unimportant detail. In Gal. iii, 16, S. Paul, the converted Pharisee, bases a doctrine on the jot which marks the plural. On the other hand, it is certain that the Hebrew text or texts which lay before the translators of the Greek version a century or two earlier differed greatly in this matter. Some scholars still hold that the text had become fixed and standardized during the early Christian era; but in spite of the evidence of the New Testament it can be shown that there are so many variations in later MSS., some of them being confirmed by the Versions, that this view is untenable. Nevertheless the vast majority of these variants are orthographic.

Between the seventh and tenth centuries a system of vocalization was adopted in the Babylonian academies probably based on Christian-Syriac models. This system was afterwards elaborated by the Qaraites. Besides this, there was an old Palestinian system which has yet to be fully explored. The system which ultimately prevailed was the Tiberian which was completed about A.D. 900. Mr. Roberts' chapters on the work of the Massoretes enables readers to thread their way through this complicated development.

It is not possible in the compass of this review to deal with all the versions. The first and most important is the Septuagint which was the Bible of the early Christian Church. It is now recognized that it is impossible to recover the text of the "original" Septuagint, and many authorities question whether such a text ever existed. Nothing can destroy the authority of the Greek version as a witness to the pre-Massoretic text, which it often corrects and makes intelligible, but recent studies have shown that when the Greek version differs from the Hebrew the difference is often an explanatory paraphrase such as the Targums employ and not a translation at all.

The chapter on the Samaritan Pentateuch is of great interest. Unfortunately attempts to obtain a photograph of the oldest known MS. in the Samaritan synagogue at Nablus have repeatedly failed, but according to Kahle enough is known of the version to authorize the statement that it is a witness to the pre-Massoretic text and

offers a text presupposed by some quotations in the New Testament.

Apart from the ripe scholarship this book reveals the author deserves the highest praise for the interesting way in which he marshals the facts and discusses their significance. It would have been so easy to write a dull book, but he has written a book which the reviewer for one was unable to put down until he had reached its final page. It will fascinate the ordinary reader and satisfy the specialist.

Two additions might be made to a second edition which will surely be needed: some reference might be made to the Continental edition of the Old Latin text which is in course of publication, and to the large number of Arabic texts mentioned in Graf's *Geschichte der Christlichen arabischen Literatur.*

A. GUILLAUME.

THE OLD TESTAMENT AND MODERN STUDY. A GENERATION OF DISCOVERY AND RESEARCH. Essays by members of the Society for Old Testament Study, edited by H. H. ROWLEY. (Geoffrey 1951, pp. xi, 326). 21s.

Two previous volumes of essays have been issued by the Society of Old Testament Study (one in 1925, the other in 1938), containing original contributions to the study of the Old Testament; the object of the present volume is somewhat different, as it is intended to give a review, more or less summary, of the work done, both in this country and abroad, during the 30 years that the society has been in existence.

Readers, indeed, will observe the numerous changes that have taken place during this period. In 1914 many if not most problems of the Old Testament seemed to have been exhaustively studied and to be within sight of solution, if not actually solved; at any rate, fairly stable conclusions had been reached. Now the broad agreement amongst scholars is gone. Emendation of the Old Testament no longer has the vogue that it once enjoyed. The documentary hypothesis of the Pentateuch has come under heavy criticism and scholars are not wanting, *e.g.*, to deny the existence of E. or P. or to invent new sources such as L. or S.: and indeed the documents themselves (in so far as they are accepted) are very much in the position of the Pentateuch before 1914. The date of Deuteronomy is no longer a sheet-anchor, having gone back and come forward with surprising facility. The study of the Prophets is now not so much occupied with the date and composition or the genuineness of the writings bearing their names as with quite different questions, *e.g.*, the relation of oral to written transmission, the cultic position of the

prophet, the nature of the prophetic gift, and so on. Another important study, especially in connexion with the Psalter, is that of *Formgeschichte* and the ritual pattern, the former the work primarily of continental and the latter of British scholars. Many of these tendencies have, of course, been pushed to extreme limits by the advocates of this or that theory; but, as they settle down, they are seen to have yielded substantial gains in the true understanding of the Old Testament. These advances are due rather to differences of approach than to the accumulation of new facts. Yet here, too, there are considerable gains, *e.g.*, the now famous Hebrew scrolls from Jericho, the inscribed ostraca from Lachish of the time of Jeremiah, the vast collection of cuneiform tablets from Mari on the Middle Euphrates, the sensational tablets from Ugarit, and so on; and to them may be added a very large number of Aramaic documents of the fifth-fourth centuries B.C., of which editions may be expected at no distant date.

The picture is changing with the advance of knowledge. At the same time on some sides a tendency to more conservative views is noticeable, due partly to acquaintance with the fate of the extreme views advocated before 1914 and partly to a feeling, when so much new material has become available, some of it confirming the traditional text and not contradicting older theories, that there is more of like nature to come. On the other side a fresh school, the so-called Scandinavian school, seems to have set itself the task of taking the place of the German and to call attention to itself by ever seeking something new; while often brighter than the Germans, it is also nothing like so solid or so trustworthy.

After a masterly summary of modern trends by Prof. Rowley, Prof. Albright opens the main part of the volume with two essays on the archaeology of Palestine and the ancient East, written with his usual brilliance and wealth of learning; but the reader may take warning that everything is not so sure as the author's didactic style may lead him to suppose. Prof. North's essay on the Pentateuch gives as clear a picture as is possible of a tangled and perplexing problem and is illumined by many a shrewd criticism. Prof. Snaith's account of work on the Historical Books is not so stimulating and is in parts almost scrappy, but it provides what is required in a field which has not been a major battle-ground. The Prophetical Literature is entrusted to the competent hands of Prof. Eissfeldt, whom nothing has escaped; yet the writing is as stimulating as any reader can desire. The same may be said of Prof. Johnson's account of the Psalms, which gives a brilliantly lucid review of the main lines of study, especially of the important work of Mowinckel and Gunkel, who have overshadowed all other workers in this branch of study. The Wisdom Literature, for which

Prof. Baumgartner is responsible, is another field in which not so much work of a sensational nature has been done; but the account of it here is adequate, even if sometimes a little thin. Prof. Thomas and Prof. Honeyman deal the one with Textual Criticism and the other with Epigraphy and Philology, both subjects notoriously difficult to handle in a popular manner; their essays, however, will give the general reader some insight into the methods and aims of modern research in these subjects. Prof. Anderson and Prof. Porteous discuss Religion and Theology, and these two essays taken together give as good an account, in a small space, as is possible of the large amount of work that has been done recently on these fundamentally important subjects; both can be unreservedly recommended to students of the subject. Finally, Dr. Robinson adds an epilogue on the Old Testament and the Modern World, in which he says well many things that require to be said.

In conclusion, the volume under review is a most timely publication that ought to find its way into the library of every theological student and minister of religion in the country.

G. R. Driver.

Some Tendencies in British Theology. By J. K. Mozley. (S.P.C.K.). 10s. 6d.

Mozley died before finishing this book, and there can therefore be no criticism on account of omissions. Yet so rare a gift did he have of lucid exposition and sympathetic criticism that one cannot but regret that the book is a torso. Its scope is British theology since *Lux Mundi*, but it is not so much a history of thought as the comments of an unusually discerning observer on what seemed to him to be the things most worth noticing. He gives us a fairly full account of Anglican and Scottish Presbyterian writing down to the late 'thirties, rather less on the Free Churches (though Forsyth is one of his heroes) and a very little on von Hügel and Tyrrell. Given this limitation of scope it is a brilliant book; Anglicans will find it especially useful to see their modern problems set against the background of yesterday, and all will learn from the wisdom with which the problems of yesterday are discussed.

The first few pages are devoted to a description of Pusey's theological position and limitations. By the time of his death "there were real issues to be faced, problems of Biblical criticism, of dogmatic theology, of the philosophy of religion, and of Christian unity and reunion. . . It was certain that they could neither be left on one side nor decided simply in accordance with Pusey's presuppositions". The publication of *Lux Mundi* was significant

because it demonstrated the public acceptance by the younger generation of high churchmen of a moderate biblical criticism, and the book gained a piquancy through being edited at Pusey House. Gore especially achieved notoriety by his courageous attempt to face what seemed to be the Christological implications of this criticism. Two comments may be permitted, perhaps, on Mozley's treatment of this part of his story. I do not think he allows sufficiently for the strength of that persisting orthodoxy which was never quite happy about *Lux Mundi,* and which was represented most trenchantly by Darwell Stone; nor does he consider the possibility that there might have been a case for "leaving on one side" some of these issues, in the sense of recognizing that while the historical basis of Christian teaching is open to examination, history is not the only basis of it. It is possible to attribute too much importance to the latest word of historical scholarship.

The English story is told in three parts. The first deals with *Lux Mundi* and Old Testament criticism at the end of the century, and glances at the ritual troubles of the Church of England. The second shows how certain work of first-class importance, notably Moberly's, grew out of these ecclesiastical controversies; describes the movement of criticism towards the danger area of the gospels, and the controversies which can be summed up in the slogan "Jesus or Christ?". All this is most important, for without an understanding of these years of stress and confident negation the significance of the so-called revival of Biblical theology in recent years is lost. Particularly illuminating is Mozley's treatment of *Foundations.* For every one who has read this book a hundred have read Mgr. Knox's satire, with the result that less than justice has been done to the good intentions and considerable influence of its critically orthodox authors, five of whom were to become bishops. Another example of the author's historical balance is his careful appraisement, at this point, of the new Anglican Evangelical Group Movement, a movement whose importance with regard to low churchmen is as great as that of Liberal Catholicism with regard to high. The third section carries the story from one war to the next. Naturally, as it nears our own time the difficulties of a conscientious historian increase. He notes the influence of Barth:

> "The Barthians show plainly enough, if concrete evidence is needed, that the element of contrast and opposition cannot be rooted out of theology. The capacity for saying 'Yes' involves also the capacity for saying 'No'; and that capacity is not one that merely lies in reserve as an ultimate safeguard of truth, which, nevertheless, may never be brought into action. If theology were to be regarded as positive only in its affirmations and not also in its denials, it would be difficult to justify the contrast inherent in Christian theology between itself and all other theologies".

Yet what strikes him most is the eirenic temper of modern theology, and the search for synthesis at a deeper level than that of the controversy between Catholic and Protestant. He gives as examples the expression of eucharistic theology and of the doctrines of the Church and Ministry. He is careful not to exaggerate the extent of agreement, but his presentation of the state of thought on these subjects among the theologians of the Church of England and the Free Churches is very striking. With that eye which missed so little, however, he notes that "there is a section of Anglo-Catholics whose theology is decisively Roman Catholic rather than Anglican. . . . For it, the idea of an *Anglican* theology is intolerable"; and that there is a comparable phenomenon at the other wing.

A book about books is bound to have only a limited appeal. The scope of Mozley's book, however, is widened by the inclusion of a long and excellent chapter on Scottish theology. This is one of the best parts of the book, and for some English readers may open up a new world of theological thought. Scottish Presbyterianism is more consistent and coherent than Anglicanism, more solidly based philosophically (and therefore in spite of its Calvinism quite as attentive to the problems of natural religion as any other system), less disturbed by ecclesiastical squalls, and—dare one say it?—less likely than Anglicanism to confuse an amateurish eclecticism with broad comprehensiveness, or insularity with originality. It is a pity the account has to break off as the shadow of Barth falls over the scene. The signs are that Scottish divinity will lose none of its vigour under the influence of the continental dialectic, though it may for a time lose its philosophical balance. Mozley's concluding words are :

> "Of the Scottish tradition, as a whole, in so far as I have been able to give any adequate account of it, I cannot take leave without expressing my sense of the debt that Christians of others communions owe to its representatives, for all that they have done to uphold and illuminate the truth of the Gospel".

R. Cant.

The Episcopal Colleagues of Archbishop Thomas Becket, being the Ford Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford. By David Knowles, F.B.A., Professor of Medieval History in the University of Cambridge. (C.U.P.) 12s. 6d.

The Ford Lectures are usually, as Professor Knowles writes in the preface, "the result of many years of laborious scholarship in a specialized field", but it must be seldom that they have the fascination of a novel by Trollope. Yet in this study of the bishops of the

English Church who saw Becket through the great quarrel with Henry II, the evidence is so handled that each man comes alive, with his own perception of the difficulties of the situation and his own reaction to the claims of conflicting loyalties, particularly those of the king in a feudal society and a pope and archbishop in a universal and centralized Church. The problem takes on a contemporary quality because the evidence is largely derived from letters, and contemporary writing. In the light of the evidence, sifted by the lecturer with meticulous scholarship and marshalled with the fairness and clarity that his hearers and readers expect of him, the bishops act as men not knowing what the end will be, taking each step in fear, and making reluctant decisions when from the making of a decision there was no escape.

The materials for the history of this controversy are voluminous and in print, but for the most part lack modern editing: Professor Knowles' conclusions are submitted as tentative. The *Materials for the History of Archbishop Thomas Becket,* in seven volumes of the Rolls Series, were indeed published as far back as 1875-1885: they include nine Lives of the archbishop, and two volumes of letters. The letters of Gilbert Foliot, Becket's arch enemy, and of John of Salisbury, humanist scholar and Becket's friend, are also historically important; critical editions of both are in hand.

The English bishops in Becket's day were a remarkable group of men, some of them outstanding in scholarship, and all of them of sufficient stature, training or social background to be independent figures, not mere " king's men ", like many of the later medieval bishops. They were not a crowd who could be easily overawed into opposition to their archbishop: some were of the modern, post-Hildebrandine, reforming school, some were the friends of saints like Bernard of Clairvaux and the patrons of new religious houses. It might have been expected that this " unusually distinguished and honourable body of men ", " men of the Church to whom ecclesiastical affairs and interest took precedence of all else " would have given Becket close-knit support: that they would have seen as clearly as he finally did that the king was striving to set up (or maintain) " the barriers of a regional or insular church of the early Norman model ", and that they would have seen all this as early as the meetings in the palace on the green down of Clarendon, in January, 1164, and in the castle of Northampton in October of that year. There were, however, complications of circumstance, side-issues, and a fear of the dark and horrible consequences of royal anger that affected even Becket himself; Professor Knowles gives a closely-reasoned account of the fear behind Becket's first yielding at Clarendon to Henry's " constitutions " (written out as a chirograph *tripliciter* on a single piece of parchment), and then his refusal to

affix his seal. He shows that it was this early indecision, this "double *volte-face*", that confused and split the episcopate, rendering them at Northampton only eager for the archbishop's submission to Henry; Bartholomew of Exeter, the canonist, fell on his knees before the archbishop, as he sat holding his cross, and begged him to yield.

The fifteen bishops who sat with Becket during the years of crisis, 1164 to 1170, were all men of experience: their average length of rule was no less than twenty-eight years. Professor Knowles considers them in four groups: the royal officials (Nigel of Ely, supreme in the science of the administration of the royal revenue, and archbishop Thomas himself); bishops who had had a normal ecclesiastical career, been the notable young men in the households of eminent bishops (Roger of York, Jocelin of Salisbury and the Bishops of Durham, Coventry, Lincoln, Rochester and Worcester); bishops who had made their reputation mainly outside England (Hilary of Chichester, Bartholomew of Exeter and Robert of Hereford) and the monk-bishops. These included the black monk, William of Norwich, Robert of Bath and Wells, a Cluniac from Lewes: and those two eminent sons of the magnificent house of Cluny, Henry of Winchester and Gilbert Foliot, bishop successively of Hereford and London. Henry, brother of King Stephen, a king-maker, an able financier and administrator who "manifested in one theatre after another the genius of a Woolton or a Keynes", was in his younger days much upbraided by St. Bernard for his wealth, intrigues and nepotism: but at the time of the Becket quarrel he was a venerable elder statesman, curiously beloved by all. Gilbert Foliot, on the other hand, the austere ascetic and special glory of Cluny, was beloved by no man. He was prudent, efficient, tactful, able: but he could not believe in the sincerity of the conversion of a royal chancellor who had attained the archbishopric. He was consistently Becket's enemy; when the archbishop arrived at the castle of Northampton, carrying the sacred host as *viaticum* and with an even chance of death that day, he took from the bearer his archiepiscopal cross. One of the archbishop's clerks, scandalized, said to Foliot who was watching: "My lord of London, can you stand by while the archbishop carries his own cross?" "My dear fellow", said Foliot, "the man always was a fool and he'll be one till he dies". To Becket, Foliot was *archisynagogus,* Achitophel, and even Judas, who made a pact upon his master.

On one point which Professor Knowles raises incidentally, in his handling of the individual bishops' careers, we could wish for more light, *i.e.,* the process by which bishops were, in the twelfth century, elected. Valuable indications as to the prime movers in the elections of these bishops are, it is true, given on pp. 7-9: there is, more-

over, the well-known chapter about elections in the constitutions of Clarendon and Jocelin of Brakelond's account of the election, in the king's chapel, of Abbot Sampson. But our knowledge of the procedure of elections none the less remains slight. The Merovingian kings of the Franks nominated their own candidates for the episcopate: but they had a procedure involving at least two royal letters and some form of election by the local "church". This was several hundred years before the meeting at Clarendon: and both Merovingian kings and bishops had some acquaintance with the formal procedure of Roman Law. Some three hundred years after Clarendon, the procedure for election in England was even more formalized, including now the notification of king and archbishop by the chapter of the death of their recent bishop; arrangements by the king for the administration of the temporalities, and by chapter or archbishop for that of the spiritualities, *sede vacante;* letters of permission to elect, and of nomination of candidate, to the chapter, notification of the election by the chapter to king, by the king to the archbishop, scrutiny of the election by the archbishop and certification to the king; release of the temporalities by the king; application by the archbishop to the pope for a letter of provision, and release of the spiritualities, only after its receipt.

Now, in the twelfth century, procedure was less formal: but letters must have been exchanged. The king took over the lands of the see, and whatsoever else in the late bishop's revenue was regarded as temporalities; chapter or archbishop took over the spiritualities. These must have been "released" later. There are no episcopal registers as early as this; but archbishops of Canterbury presumably kept letter-books, for we have Anselm's letter to the monk Eadmer, telling him that he is sending him certain letters for his record, but that it will be unnecessary to keep certain others. It would be of great interest if anyone as familiar with twelfth-century historical sources as Professor Knowles could piece together from casual reference information about election procedure at the date. In one or two cases, he suggests that bishops owed their election to "papal appointment" or influence; it would be of interest to know how, or through what channels, the pope acted.

M. Deanesly.

The Channel Islands under Tudor Government (1485-1642): A Study in Administrative History. By A. J. Eagleston. (Published for the Guernsey Society by the Cambridge University Press.) 21s.

The author of this work was a civil servant: from 1913 until his retirement in 1932 he was an Assistant Secretary in the Home Office.

and for a part of that time he was head of that division of the Home Office which is the link between the Channel Islands and the Privy Council. This scholarly and documented Study in Administrative History was the fruit of his retirement: and it has the advantage of being written from the "Whitehall" point of view.

The purpose of the book is "to give an account of some aspects of the history of the Channel Islands during the period when the Tudor system of government prevailed in the Islands and England alike, that is from 1485 until the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642". It deals for the most part with constitutional questions and administrative problems.

But it also throws an interesting sidelight on the Elizabethan Settlement of religion, and one which no historian of the English Reformation can ignore.

The series of Acts of Parliament which formed the legal framework of the Reformation under Henry VIII were all so drawn as to include the Islands, and were enforced there as a matter of course and with little opposition. Even the dissolution of the monasteries appears to have caused no excitement. There were no Roman Catholic martyrs in the Islands under Henry VIII or Edward VI. Indeed when, under the Marian Counter-Reformation, Papal Catholicism was re-established, it became evident that Protestantism had begun to take root among the people (partly owing to the influx of religious refugees from France and the Walloon provinces, who could carry on propaganda among the islanders in their own language), and had not been merely imposed from above. In 1556 three Guernsey women were burned as heretics: and Foxe records, quite truly, that one of the women gave birth at the stake to a child, which was burned with its mother.

With the accession of Elizabeth, the discipline and worship of the Reformed religion were restored. But the Protestantism of the Channel Islands was not Anglican, but Huguenot. The complete Presbyterian system of the French Reformed Churches soon established itself: the Huguenot refugee, Nicholas Baudouin of Rouen, set up a Presbyterian organization in the Town Church of St. Peter Port, and in 1563 obtained the permission of the Governor for the election of elders and deacons and the formation of a consistory, which was sanctioned by an Order in Council of August 7th, 1565. Guillaume Morise, Sieur de la Ripaudière, of Anjou, had similarly entrenched Presbyterianism in St. Helier. It is true that the Order in Council sanctioned the use of the Geneva order in the two churches of St. Helier and St. Peter Port on condition that the rest of the parishes used the Anglican service. But this condition proved impossible to enforce. The first Synod of the two islands had already met in Guernsey in 1564: a complete system of Presbyterian church polity

covering both islands was constructed, and in 1569 the Synod drew up a set of articles entitled "Police et Discipline Ecclésiastique" which, though never formally sanctioned by any English authority, was officially adopted in June, 1576 by a full Synod of the islands at which both Governors were present.

The Governors themselves were definitely Puritan in sympathy, and the English Government was content to be guided by their judgement. It was the best way of keeping the Islands orderly, contented, and secure against invasion. The Dean of Guernsey was himself a strong Calvinist, and the Bishop of Winchester (Horne), to whose jurisdiction the Islands, hitherto nominally in the diocese of Coutances, were assigned by the Queen's orders in 1569, was an advanced reformer who made no attempt to interfere with the establishment of the Presbyterian system there. Thus, somewhat illogically, Elizabeth and her Council, while endeavouring to enforce Anglican uniformity at home, were prepared to tolerate the establishment of Presbyterianism in the Channel Islands, for political reasons: although in the event the Presbyterian system was apt to create embarrassments for the civil government.

To the logical mind of Archbishop Laud, such an anomaly was naturally abhorrent. Already under James I an Anglican Governor, Sir John Peyton, had succeeded in liquidating the Presbyterian establishment in Jersey (though there was to be a temporary revival under the Commonwealth). But in Guernsey the laity were solid behind their ministers, and opposed a respectful but obstinate resistance to all attempts to make a breach in their Presbyterian system. Laud had in mind to reduce the island — though not simply by coercion—to conformity with the Church of England, despite the political hesitations of the Governor, Lord Danby. But his intentions were frustrated by the outbreak of the troubles in Scotland, which was the prelude to the Civil War.

This curious narrative is an interesting sub-department of the history of the Elizabethan Settlement, and Mr. Eagleston's book—although this is not its primary purpose—is calculated to start many trains of thought in the mind of the ecclesiastical historian.

CHARLES SMYTH.

ATTENTION should be drawn to two additions to the notable series of Historical Monographs relating to St. George's Chapel, Windsor Castle, edited by the late Canon Ollard (published for the Dean and Canons by Messrs. Oxley and Son, 4 High Street, Windsor): ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL, WINDSOR CASTLE, 1348-1416: A STUDY IN EARLY COLLEGIATE ADMINISTRATION, by Miss A. K. B. Roberts,

Ph.D., with a foreword by Dr. G. M. Trevelyan: and THE INVENTORIES OF ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL, WINDSOR CASTLE, 1384-1667, edited by Maurice F. Bond, M.A., F.S.A., Clerk of the Records in the House of Lords, with a foreword by Professor Hamilton Thompson. Both are works of exact and careful scholarship: and both are illustrated with photographs. Unlike the Collegiate Church of St. Peter in Westminster (more commonly known as Westminster Abbey), the Collegiate Church of St. George can claim a continuous existence from the Middle Ages to the present day: and Dr. Roberts' work upon its medieval records throws valuable light not only upon the constitution of the Chapter, but also upon the background of medieval economic life as reflected in the management of the estates.

Mr. Bond's *Inventories* is a masterpiece of skilful editing, in which the value of the text is greatly enhanced by the introduction and the appendices, which are both informative and suggestive.

C. H. S.

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INDEX TO VOL. CLII.

ARCHETYPES, IDOLS AND THE LIVING GOD. Article by Graham Ikin, 191.

ATHANASIUS, THE LETTERS OF SAINT, CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT. Translated by Shapland, reviewed, 130.

BECKET, ARCHBISHOP THOMAS, THE EPISCOPAL COLLEAGUES OF. By Knowles, reviewed, 250.

BEHOLD THY KING COMETH. Edited by Brother Edward, reviewed, 116.

BIBLE, THE SHORTER OXFORD. Edited by Briggs, Caird and Micklem, reviewed, 128.

BRITISH THEOLOGY, SOME TENDENCIES IN. By Mozley, reviewed, 248.

CATHOLICITY OF THE PSALTER, THE. Article by Lacey May, 180.

CHANNEL ISLANDS UNDER TUDOR GOVERNMENT (1485-1642), THE. By Eagleston, reviewed, 253.

CHRIST AND TIME. By Cullmann, reviewed, 112.

CHRISTIAN AND THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY, THE. Article by Reardon, 159.

CHRISTIAN EDUCATION, THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A. Article by Chaplin, 77.

CHRISTIAN INITIATION. Article by Tindall, 53.

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, THE SUPREMACY OF A. Article by Adcock, 201.

CHURCH, THE UNITY OF THE. Article by Mascall, 25.

CONFLICTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY, F. D. MAURICE AND THE. By Ramsey, reviewed, 241.

EARLY, ORTHODOX-OLD CATHOLIC RELATIONS. Article by Morgan 1.

EDUCATION, CHRISTIAN, THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A. Article by Chaplin, 77.

EPISCOPACY AND THE ROYAL SUPREMACY IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By Davies, reviewed, 125.

EPISCOPAL COLLEAGUES OF ARCHBISHOP THOMAS BECKET, THE. By Knowles, reviewed, 250.

EVANGELICAL SUCCESSION, OXFORD AND THE. By Loane, reviewed, 235.

EVANGELICAL TRADITION, THE. Article by Elliott-Binns, 235.

FORD LECTURES, THE. By Knowles, reviewed, 250.

GNOSTICISM, TWO REACTIONS TO. Article by Blair, 141.

GOD, LIVING, ARCHETYPES, IDOLS AND THE. Article by Graham Ikin, 191.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF A CHRISTIAN EDUCATION, THE. Article by Chaplin, 77.

HISTORY, THE CHRISTIAN AND THE INTERPRETATION OF. Article by Reardon, 159.

HOLY SPIRIT, THE LETTERS OF SAINT ATHANASIUS CONCERNING THE. Translated by Shapland, reviewed, 130.

IDOLS AND THE LIVING GOD, ARCHETYPES. Article by Graham Ikin, 191.

INITIATION, CHRISTIAN. Article by Tindall, 53.

INVENTORIES OF ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL, WINDSOR CASTLE, THE. 1384-1667. Edited by Bond, reviewed, 256.

LETTERS OF SAINT ATHANASIUS CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT, THE. Translated by Shapland, reviewed, 130.

MAURICE, F. D., AND THE CONFLICTS OF MODERN THEOLOGY. By Ramsey, reviewed, 241.

OLD TESTAMENT, THE. Vol. II. Translated by Knox, reviewed, 120.

OLD TESTAMENT AND MODERN STUDY, THE. Edited by Rowley, reviewed, 246.

OLD TESTAMENT TEXT AND VERSIONS, THE. By Roberts, reviewed, 244.

ORTHODOX-OLD CATHOLIC RELATIONS, EARLY. Article by Morgan, 1.

OXFORD AND THE EVANGELICAL SUCCESSION. By Loane, reviewed, 235.

OXFORD BIBLE, THE SHORTER. Edited by Briggs, Caird and Micklem, reviewed, 128.

PHILOSOPHY, A CHRISTIAN, THE SUPREMACY OF. Article by Adcock, 201.

POLICY FOR THE WEST. By Ward, reviewed, 123.

POLISHED SHAFT, THE. By Brown, reviewed, 235.

PSALTER, THE CATHOLICITY OF THE. Article by Lacey May, 180.

ROYAL SUPREMACY, EPISCOPACY AND THE, IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By Davies, reviewed, 125.

SAINT ATHANASIUS, THE LETTERS OF, CONCERNING THE HOLY SPIRIT. Translated by Shapland, reviewed, 130.

ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL, WINDSOR CASTLE, 1348-1416. By Roberts, reviewed, 255.

ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL, WINDSOR CASTLE, THE INVENTORIES OF. 1384-1667. Edited by Bond, reviewed, 256.

SHAFT, THE POLISHED. By Brown, reviewed, 235.

SHORTER OXFORD BIBLE, THE. Edited by Briggs, Caird and Micklem, reviewed, 128.

SPIRIT, CONCERNING THE HOLY, THE LETTERS OF SAINT ATHANASIUS. Translated by Shapland, reviewed, 130.

SUPREMACY OF A CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY, THE. Article by Adcock, 201.

SUPREMACY, ROYAL, EPISCOPACY AND THE, IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY. By Davies, reviewed, 125.

TENDENCIES, SOME, IN BRITISH THEOLOGY. By Mozley, reviewed, 248.

TESTAMENT, THE OLD. Vol. II. Translated by Knox, reviewed, 120.

TESTAMENT, THE OLD, AND MODERN STUDY. Edited by Rowley, reviewed, 246.

TESTAMENT, THE OLD, TEXT AND VERSIONS. By Roberts, reviewed, 244.

THEOLOGY, MODERN, F. D. MAURICE AND THE CONFLICTS OF. By Ramsey, reviewed, 241.

TIME, CHRIST AND. By Cullmann, reviewed, 112.

TRADITION, THE EVANGELICAL. Article by Elliott-Binns, 235.

TUDOR GOVERNMENT, THE CHANNEL ISLANDS UNDER. (1485-1642). By Eagleston, reviewed, 253.

TWO REACTIONS TO GNOSTICISM. Article by Blair, 141.

UNITY OF THE CHURCH, THE. Article by Mascall, 25.

VEDANTA FOR THE WEST. Article by Chaning-Pearce, 11.

VERSIONS, THE OLD TESTAMENT TEXT AND. By Roberts, reviewed, 244.

WEST, THE, POLICY FOR. By Ward, reviewed, 123.
WINDSOR CASTLE, ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL, 1348-1416. By Roberts, reviewed, 255.
WINDSOR CASTLE, THE INVENTORIES OF ST. GEORGE'S CHAPEL. 1384-1667. Edited by Bond, reviewed, 256.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

ADCOCK, N. Article: *The Supremacy of a Christian Philosophy,* 201.
ARMSTRONG, C. B. Review: (Ed. by) G. W. Briggs, G. B. Caird and N. Micklem, *The Shorter Oxford Bible,* 128.
BLAIR, H. A. Article: *Two Reactions to Gnosticism,* 141. Review: (Ed. by) Brother Edward, *Behold Thy King Cometh,* 116.
CANT, R. Reviews: J. K. Mozley, *Some Tendencies in British Theology,* 248. A. M. Ramsey, *F. D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology,* 241.
CHANING-PEARCE, M. Article: *Vedanta for the West,* 11.
CHAPLIN, W. N. Article: *The Historical Background of a Christian Education,* 77.
COLLIER, L. Review: B. Ward, *Policy for the West,* 123.
DEANESLY, M. Review: D. Knowles, *The Episcopal Colleagues of Archbishop Thomas Becket,* 250.
DRIVER, G. R. Review: (Ed. by) H. H. Rowley, *The Old Testament and Modern Study,* 246.
ELLIOTT-BINNS, L. E. Article: *The Evangelical Tradition,* 235. Reviews: W. E. M. Brown, *The Polished Shaft,* 235. M. L. Loane, *Oxford and the Evangelical Succession,* 235.
GUILLAUME, A. Review: B. J. Roberts, *The Old Testament Text and Versions,* 244.
HOOKE, S. H. Review: (Trsltd. by) R. Knox, *The Old Testament,* Vol. II, 120.
IKIN, A. GRAHAM. Article: *Archetypes, Idols and the Living God,* 191.
MASCALL, E. L. Article: *The Unity of the Church,* 25.
MAY, G. LACEY. Article: *The Catholicity of the Psalter,* 180.
MORGAN, J. H. Article: *Early Orthodox-Old Catholic Relations,* 1.
REARDON, B. M. G. Article: *The Christian and the Interpretation of History,* 159.
SMYTH, C. H. Reviews: (Ed. by) M. F. Bond, *The Inventories of St. George's Chapel, Windsor Castle,* 1384-1667, 256. A. J. Eagleston, *The Channel Islands under Tudor Government* (1485-1642): *A Study in Administrative History,* 253. A. K. B. Roberts, *St. George's Chapel, Windsor Castle,* 1348-1416: *A Study in Early Collegiate Administration,* 255.
TINDALL, F. C. Article: *Christian Initiation,* 53.
TURNER, H. E. W. Reviews: O Cullmann, *Christ and Time,* 112. (Trsltd. by) C. R. B. Shapland, *The Letters of Saint Athanasius Concerning the Holy Spirit,* 130.
WOOD, T. Review: E. T. Davies, *Episcopacy and the Royal Supremacy in the Church of England in the Sixteenth Century,* 125.

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AUTHORS REVIEWED

BOND, M. F. (Ed. by). *The Inventories of St. George's Chapel, Windsor Castle*, 1384-1667, 256.

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BROWN, W. E. M. *The Polished Shaft*, 235.

CULLMANN, O. *Christ and Time*, 112.

DAVIES, E. T. *Episcopacy and the Royal Supremacy in the Church of England in the Sixteenth Century*, 125.

EAGLESTON, A. J. *The Channel Islands under Tudor Government* (1485-1642): *A Study in Administrative History*, 253.

EDWARD, BROTHER (Ed. by). *Behold Thy King Cometh. A Symposium*, 116.

KNOWLES, D. *The Episcopal Colleagues of Archbishop Thomas Becket, being the Ford Lectures delivered in the University of Oxford*, 250.

KNOX, R. (Trsltd. by). *The Old Testament*, Vol. II, 120.

LOANE, M. L. *Oxford and the Evangelical Succession*, 235.

MOZLEY, J. K. *Some Tendencies in British Theology*, 248.

RAMSEY, A. M. *F. D. Maurice and the Conflicts of Modern Theology*, 241.

ROBERTS, A. K. B. *St. George's Chapel, Windsor Castle*, 1348-1416: *A Study in Early Collegiate Administration*, 255.

ROBERTS, B. J. *The Old Testament Text and Versions*, 244.

ROWLEY, H. H. (Ed. by). *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, 246.

SHAPLAND, C. R. B. (Trsltd. by). *The Letters of Saint Athanasius Concerning the Holy Spirit*, 130.

WARD, B. *Policy for the West*, 123.

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152
1950-

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152
1950-
51

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